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Background and aims: Evidence suggests that the mode in which traumatic events are 
processed may influence the development of PTSD, although experimental evidence is lacking.  
It is crucial to discover what could potentially protect against the development of symptoms 
such as intrusive memories, since this would allow for the development of evidence-based 
prevention programmes for at-risk groups.  Using a trauma film paradigm (Holmes & Bourne, 
2008), the current study investigated the effect of processing mode training (abstract versus 
concrete) during exposure to an analogue trauma on the subsequent development of intrusive 
memories, the hallmark feature of PTSD.  It also investigated its effect on emotional reactivity 
to a subsequent traumatic stimulus and whether potential vulnerability factors (e.g. rumination, 
dissociation, sleep problems, self-reported proneness to intrusions) were related to the frequency 
of intrusions developed. 
Method: Fifty-one participants were trained to process traumatic films in an abstract or 
concrete mode.  In the abstract condition, participants were trained to focus on the overall 
meaning and implications of the events and on questions such as ‘Why?’ and ‘What if?’  In the 
concrete condition, participants were trained to focus on contextual details and the sequence of 
events and on questions such as ‘What?’ and ‘How?’  Participants rated their emotional 
reactions to pre- and post-training test films.  They then recorded in a diary the number of 
intrusive memories they experienced in relation to the film clips over the subsequent week and 
completed the Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997) one week later.   
Results: As predicted, participants in the concrete group reported fewer intrusive memories in 
response to the film clips over the subsequent week and lower IES-R scores compared with the 
abstract group.  They also showed reduced emotional reactivity (distress and horror) in response 
to a post-training film clip although this did not extend to subjective ratings of arousal and 
negative affect.  Self-reported proneness to intrusive memories and pre-existing sleep 
difficulties significantly predicted intrusive memories, whereas trait rumination and dissociation 
did not.   
Conclusions: Overall, findings suggest that training people to adopt a concrete mode of 
processing during exposure to analogue trauma may protect against the development of 
intrusive memories and have important implications for the development of preventative 
programmes for at-risk occupational groups. 
 









Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a distressing and impairing anxiety disorder that 
develops in response to a traumatic event.  In DSM-IV, a traumatic event is defined as one in 
which the person ‘experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events that 
involved actual or threatened death or serious physical injury, or a threat to the physical 
integrity of self or others, and the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness or 
horror’.  PTSD is characterised by three core clusters of symptoms (APA, 1994).  The first is re-
experiencing of the event in the form of recurrent and distressing intrusive recollections (e.g. 
images, thoughts or perceptions, dreams), acting or feeling as if the event is re-occurring and 
intense psychological distress and physiological reactivity at internal and external cues that act 
as reminders.  The second is persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the event and 
numbing of general responsiveness (e.g. avoiding thinking or talking about the trauma and 
reminders of it).  The third cluster is increased arousal, including difficulty with concentration, 
sleep and irritability.  To meet criteria for PTSD, symptoms must have persisted for one month 
and cause impaired social and/or occupational functioning.  In addition to these core symptoms, 
the traumatic event and its consequences are often associated with a range of emotions, such as 
guilt, shame and anger.  PTSD is also associated with increased rates of major depressive 
disorder (including an increased risk of suicide), other anxiety disorders and substance misuse, 
causing further distress and disruption to functioning. 
 
1.1.2 Intrusive memories 
 
Persistent and distressing intrusive memories are the hallmark feature of PTSD, with studies 
showing them to be the most frequently endorsed symptom in response to a traumatic event 
(Durham et al., 1985; Genest et al., 1990).  They are hypothesised to play a central role in the 
maintenance of the disorder (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), giving rise to additional symptoms such as 
hyperarousal and avoidance (Michael et al., 2005).  Intrusive memories tend to be vivid and 
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image-based, containing disjointed sensory and perceptual fragments of the trauma, which lack 
time perspective and context and are therefore experienced as if the event were happening all 
over again. They frequently correspond to worst moments of a trauma, accompanied by high 
levels of emotional distress, and are triggered by both internal and environmental cues (Ehlers et 
al., 2004; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). 
 
Intrusive memories themselves are a common everyday experience.  Studies suggest that they 
occur approximately one to five times a day in non-clinical populations (Berntsen, 1996; Mace, 
2005) and can be associated with positive as well as negative emotion.  Holmes (2003) argued 
that intrusive memories in PTSD lie on a continuum with these normal everyday intrusions, 
although in PTSD they are more frequent, distressing and debilitating.  Most people develop 
some initial PTSD symptoms such as intrusive memories after a traumatic event (O’Donnell et 
al., 2007) and, according to Horowitz (1975), they constitute a normal response, reflecting a 
general stress-response tendency.  It has been suggested that intrusive memories may even be 
adaptive, for example, by promoting communication and social support and reappraisal of the 
trauma (Shalev et al., 1993; O’Donnell et al., 2007).  However, experiencing high levels of 
intrusive memories after a trauma has been found to predict PTSD at 12 months (O’Donnell et 
al., 2007).   
 
Intrusive memories are not unique to PTSD and have been implicated in the maintenance of 
other psychological disorders including depression (Brewin, et al., 1996; Kuyken & Brewin, 
1994; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999), social phobia (Hirsch et al., 2004), agoraphobia (Day et al., 
2004), obsessive compulsive disorder (de Silva, 1986; Speckens et al., 2007), body dysmorphic 
disorder (Osman et al., 2004), psychosis (Morrison et al., 2002), bipolar disorder (Mansell & 
Lam, 2004) and substance misuse (May et al., 2004).  Steel et al. (2005) suggested that similar 
cognitive processes may underlie the development of intrusive memories across disorders.  
Intrusive memories are particularly common among individuals with depression.  Brewin et al. 
(1996) found that 86% of depressed individuals reported repetitive intrusive memories, which 
was comparable to the level experienced by those with PTSD and significantly higher than 
controls.  Reynolds and Brewin (1999) compared the frequency and characteristics of intrusive 
memories reported by matched samples of participants with PTSD and depression.  They found 
that although intrusive memories were slightly more common in those with PTSD, there was 
considerable overlap in the characteristics of the intrusive memories between the two groups.  
This is perhaps unsurprising given high levels of comorbidity and symptom overlap between 
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PTSD and depression and that intrusive memories, nightmares and physiological arousal are 
common responses to stressful life events such as bereavement (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). 
 
1.1.3 Prevalence of PTSD 
 
Prevalence estimates of PTSD vary across studies and depend on characteristics such as 
sampling (e.g. specialist versus community, age group, geographical location) and assessment 
methods (e.g. criteria and measures used).  Early studies using community population samples 
found rates of between 1 and 3% (Davidson et al., 1991; Helzer et al., 1987; Shore et al., 1989) 
whereas higher prevalence rates have been reported in more recent studies (Breslau et al., 1991; 
Kessler et al., 1995; Resnick et al., 1993; Stein et al., 1997).  In a large representative 
community sample in the USA, Kessler et al. (1995) found a lifetime prevalence of 7.8% and 
Breslau et al. (1991) found a lifetime prevalence of 9.2% among a large young urban sample.  
In a large US sample of adult women using structured telephone interviews, Resnick et al. 
(1993) found a lifetime prevalence of 12.3%.  Higher prevalence rates found in later studies 
have been attributed to their use of DSM-III-R or DSM-IV rather than DSM-III criteria and 
being more inclusive in their definitions of traumatic events (Kessler et al., 1995). 
 
Estimated rates of exposure to traumatic events are substantially higher, ranging from 39% 
(Breslau, 1991) to 89.6% (Breslau et al., 1998).  Kessler et al. (1995) found that more than half 
of their sample had experienced at least one traumatic event in their lifetime, with many 
reporting two or three, which suggests that PTSD is not an inevitable consequence of trauma.  
The risk of developing PTSD appears to vary according to the type of event.  For example, 
deliberate acts of interpersonal violence, particularly physical and sexual assault, are associated 
with an increased risk of PTSD compared with other accidents or disasters (Breslau et al., 1991; 
Kessler et al., 1995, Resnick et al., 1993). 
 
Studies consistently show that PTSD is more common among women than men (Breslau et al., 
1991; Kessler et al., 1995; Perkonigg et al., 2000; Stein et al., 1997).  Kessler et al. (1995) 
found that women were twice as likely to have a diagnosis compared with men (10.4% versus 
5% respectively), which is consistent with Breslau et al. (1991) who found a lifetime prevalence 
rate of 11.3% for women and 6% for men.  Men and women also differ in their experience of 
traumatic events, with men reporting higher levels of exposure (Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler et 
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al. 1995; Stein et al., 1997).  Kessler et al. (1995) found that 60.7% of men reported at least one 
trauma compared with 51.2% of women.  Men are more likely to experience physical attacks, 
combat, being threatened with a weapon, held captive or kidnapped, whereas women are more 
likely to experience rape, sexual molestation, childhood parental neglect and childhood physical 
abuse (Kessler et al., 1995; Stein et al., 1997).  As well as experiencing more ‘high impact’ 
events, women show a greater risk of developing PTSD than men following the same event 
(Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler et al., 1995). 
 
Studies have found evidence of sub-threshold variants of PTSD which do not meet full 
diagnostic criteria and are less impaired than those with full PTSD, yet cause clinically 
meaningful functional impairment.  Stein et al. (1997) found a one-month prevalence rate of 
3.4% for women and 0.3% for men in a large community sample.  Sub-threshold PTSD is found 
to be particularly common in Vietnam War veterans who have exhibited levels of impairment 
that rivalled those of people with full PTSD (Kulka et al., 1990; Weiss et al., 1992). 
 
1.1.4 Occupational groups at risk of developing PTSD 
 
Increased rates of PTSD symptoms, such as intrusive memories, have been found in certain 
occupational groups who are regularly exposed to trauma; such as people working in military 
and emergency services.  Emergency service workers, particularly ambulance workers, attend to 
potentially traumatic events, such as road traffic accidents, suicides or cot deaths, every day.  
Thompson & Suzuki (1991) studied forty experienced ambulance workers selected randomly 
from the London Ambulance Service.  The sample scored highly on the intrusion scale of the 
Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979) and 60% showed signs of ‘probable 
psychological distress’.  In a systematic review, Sterud et al. (2006) found that out of seven 
studies looking at PTSD among ambulance workers, five showed prevalence rates of over 20%.   
 
1.1.5 Comorbidity and course 
 
PTSD is frequently associated with other psychological disorders.  Lifetime comorbidity rates 
range from 62% to 92% and strong associations have been found with affective, anxiety and 
substance use disorders (Breslau et al., 1991; Davidson et al., 1985; Helzer et al., 1987; Kessler 
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et al., 1995; Perkonigg et al., 2000).  Kulka et al. (1990) found that 98.8% theatre veterans with 
PTSD had some other DSM-III-R disorder compared with 40.6% of those without. 
 
The onset of PTSD usually occurs in the first month of the trauma, although a minority (fewer 
than 15%) experience a delay in onset of months or years (McNally, 2005).  Whereas a high 
proportion of people exhibit symptoms of PTSD soon after a trauma, a substantial proportion 
recover naturally in the following years without treatment, with a steep decline in PTSD rates 
occurring during the first year (e.g. Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler et al., 1995).  However, it is 
estimated that in at least a third of cases, PTSD persists for three years or longer. 
 
1.1.6 Summary of PTSD 
 
PTSD is relatively common in the general population and occurs more frequently among 
females and occupational groups who are routinely exposed to trauma.  Prevalence rates of sub-
threshold symptoms, which cause clinically meaningful distress and impairment, are also higher 
in these groups.  PTSD is frequently comorbid with other disorders such as depression, 
substance misuse and other anxiety disorders.  Rates of exposure to traumatic events in the 
general population are high and whilst many people develop initial symptoms, the majority 
recover naturally whilst a third go on to develop persistent PTSD.  This has stimulated interest 
in understanding how PTSD develops after exposure to a traumatic event and has led to the 
development of psychological theories and models aimed at explaining its development and 
maintenance. 
 
1.2 Psychological theories of PTSD 
 
Several theories of PTSD have been developed (for a review, see Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  
The most influential theories will be reviewed here and include: emotional processing theory; 
(Foa & Rothbaum, 2001; Foa et al., 1989); dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996); and 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model.   
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1.2.1 Emotional processing theory 
 
Emotional processing theory (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Foa et al., 1989) stemmed from the fear 
network model of PTSD (Lang, 1979), which proposes that the memory of a traumatic event 
comprises stimulus, fear and response nodes, and the connections between them.  Activation of 
this network results in hypervigilance, intrusive re-experiencing and consequent avoidance.  Foa 
& Rothbaum (1998) elaborated on this model and argued that the traumatic event interacts with 
an individual’s prior beliefs about safety and personal competence.  Foa & Rothbaum (1998) 
argued that individuals with more rigid pre-trauma views would be more vulnerable to PTSD, as 
the event may shatter previous positive beliefs (e.g. ‘the world is safe place’, ‘I am competent’) 
or confirm previously held negative beliefs (e.g. ‘the world is a dangerous place’, ‘I am 
incompetent’).  This interaction may be reinforced by other negative appraisals of the event or 
of the individual’s response to it.  These problematic appraisals lead to a low threshold of 
activation of the fear memory network, which is activated by a wide range of cues and triggers 
and dominates other experiences of safety and competence.  This prevents the individual from 
receiving disconfirming evidence and the memory fails to be incorporated into existing 
knowledge structures.   
 
1.2.2 Dual representation theory 
 
Dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996; 2001) proposes that traumas are processed via 
two separate memory systems: a verbally accessible memory (VAM) system and a situationally 
accessible memory (SAM) system, resulting in two distinct representations of the event.  VAM 
representations contain verbal narrative memories of the trauma including rich contextual 
information such as time.  They result from higher-level conscious processing of the event, 
forming a memory of it which is integrated into autobiographical memory and can later be 
deliberately retrieved.  SAM representations contain sensory and image-based memories 
resulting from lower-level perceptual processing of the trauma, which have received insufficient 
attention to be incorporated into the VAM system.  Because these memories lack higher-level 
verbal and contextual information (e.g. time code), they are poorly integrated into 
autobiographical memory and poorly discriminated from other memories and experiences.  
They are therefore difficult to retrieve deliberately and communicate to others and instead are 
accessed automatically through exposure to cues and reminders, which trigger re-experiencing 
of images and emotional responses.   
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According to Brewin et al. (1996), a balance of both verbal and perceptual processing is needed 
for functional processing of trauma and detailed VAM representations are needed to block 
automatic unwanted SAM representations from intruding into consciousness.  PTSD symptoms 
therefore arise from a shift in processing balance away from VAM processing towards SAM 
processing, leading to insufficiently formed verbal representations needed to block automatic 
unwanted lower-level sensory representations from intruding into consciousness.  For example, 
if an individual experiences a car crash, high levels of anxiety and the rapid unfolding of the 
trauma may prevent them from being able to process meaning of the situation and narrow 
attention to sensory stimuli such as approaching car headlights, which may be later re-
experienced as an intrusive image. 
 
1.2.3 Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model 
 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) synthesised and elaborated on previous theories to provide a cognitive-
behavioural account of the development and persistence of PTSD (see Figure 1).  According to 
their model, PTSD arises when individuals process information relating to trauma in a way that 
signifies current threat, even though the event is in the past.  This results from two key 
processes: 1) excessively negative appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae and 2) a 
disturbance in autobiographical memory of the event, which is poorly elaborated and 
contextualised.  The first process includes overgeneralisations of danger or overestimating the 
likelihood of further trauma (e.g. ‘bad things always happen to me’, ‘the world is unsafe’), or 
negative appraisals of one’s own feelings and behaviour during the event (e.g. sexual arousal 
during a rape trauma).  Negative appraisals of the sequelae may include appraisals of symptoms 
(e.g. ‘having intrusions means I’m going mad’), of the consequences on their life (e.g. 
physically, socially and financially) and of other people’s reactions. 
 
The second process proposed to maintain a sense of current threat involves a disturbance in the 
autobiographical memory of the event, which is poorly elaborated and contextualised and 
therefore not integrated into autobiographical knowledge.  As a result the individual is ‘unable 
to see the trauma as a time-limited event that does not have global negative implications for 
their future’ (Ehlers & Clark, 2000, p.320).  Similar to Brewin et al. (1996), they highlighted the 
role of peri-traumatic cognitive processing and argued that functional processing of a trauma 
requires a balance of two processing styles, distinguishing between conceptual processing 
(focusing on meaning, organising information and placing it in context) and data-driven 
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processing (encoding of sensory impressions, such as smells and light at the time of the trauma).  
According to Ehlers and Clark (2000), a shift in information processing during the trauma away 
from conceptual processing towards data-driven processing prevents the formation of a coherent 
narrative, resulting in a disjointed unorganised memory which is easily triggered by cues. 
 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed a reciprocal relationship between the memory disturbance and 
appraisals, whereby the distorted memory reinforces dysfunctional appraisals (e.g. about the 
sequence of events and one’s own and others’ responses), which in turn precludes the accessing 
of inconsistent information.  The resulting symptoms of re-experiencing and hyperarousal 
motivate dysfunctional cognitive and behavioural coping strategies (e.g. avoidance, thought 
suppression and rumination), which aim to reduce distress in the short term but paradoxically 
maintain perceived threat.  These strategies may exacerbate symptoms directly (e.g. triggering 
intrusive memories) or indirectly (e.g. preventing change in appraisals or the elaboration and 
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1.2.4 Summary of psychological models 
 
Although psychological models of PTSD differ in their emphasis on hypothesised mechanisms 
relevant to the development of the disorder, there is a high degree of overlap.  For example, all 
three models implicate the role of encoding mechanisms, memory processes, appraisals and 
coping strategies and prior beliefs (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  All three theories agree that 
exposure to the trauma through reliving facilitates the elaboration and contextualisation of the 
trauma memory.  Dual representation theory and Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model overlap in 
their account of the role of peri-traumatic cognitive processing in the development of intrusive 
memories.  Both theoretical accounts posit that a balance of sensory-perceptual and verbal-
conceptual processing is required for functional processing of a trauma whereby verbal-
conceptual processing allows the meaning of the trauma to be processed, for the memory to be 
organised and placed in context, so preventing sensory fragments, which lack time code, from 
intruding involuntarily into consciousness.  Both argue this imbalance can be caused by an 
extreme emotional response to the event (e.g. fear and anxiety) or the speed at which the trauma 
unfolds allowing little time for conceptual processing.  Ehlers and Clark (2000) elaborated on 
existing theories explaining how PTSD symptoms are maintained and why symptoms persist in 
a subset of individuals.   
 
1.3 Psychological interventions for PTSD 
 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model stipulates that effective treatment for persistent PTSD involves 
the elaboration and integration of the trauma memory into autobiographical memory to reduce 
intrusive re-experiencing (through imaginal exposure and reliving) and modifying problematic 
appraisals and coping strategies.  Their model gives clear implications for cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) for PTSD.  This typically involves providing psychoeducation and a rationale for 
treatment, exposure (imaginal or in vivo) and cognitive restructuring, in order to elaborate the 
trauma memory and modify dysfunctional appraisals and coping strategies.  Another established 
treatment for PTSD is Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR; Shapiro, 
1989), which also aims to integrate the trauma memory into autobiographical memory and 
shares some features with CBT.   
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The effectiveness of CBT for PTSD is well established (e.g. American Psychiatric Association, 
2004; Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health, 2007; Foa et al., 1998; National 
Institute of Clinical Excellence, 2005).  A meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials carried 
out by the Department of Health concluded that both trauma-focused CBT and EMDR showed 
clinically important benefits on PTSD symptoms over waiting-list and other supportive and 
non-directive treatments.  The evidence is strongest for CBT (NICE, 2005).  NICE (2005) 
recommend that all sufferers should be offered a course of CBT or EMDR.   
 
Despite the success of CBT and EMDR in treating persistent PTSD, early interventions aimed at 
preventing the development of PTSD symptoms following trauma (e.g. intrusive memories and 
related distress) are lacking.  Early intervention and prevention of PTSD symptoms is 
particularly relevant for at-risk occupational groups such as emergency service workers, 
journalists working in conflict zones, and military personnel, who are regularly exposed to 
trauma.  A type of early intervention known as ‘debriefing’ was developed to help people cope 
with the immediate psychological aftermath of a trauma, aimed at accelerating recovery through 
support, education about traumatic stress, expressing emotions and making plans for the future.  
This may include a single individual session or multi-component group programmes consisting 
of pre-trauma training, a group debriefing meeting, follow-up and case management (‘Critical 
Incident Stress Management’; Mitchell & Everly, 1997).  Evidence suggests that individual, 
single session debriefing is ineffective in preventing the development of PTSD and may even be 
harmful in certain cases (Van Emmerik et al., 2002; NICE, 2005; Rose et al., 2004).  However, 
reviews have mainly focused on single session interventions and there is a shortage of 
methodologically sound studies investigating group debriefing and multi-component 
programmes (NICE, 2005). 
 
1.3.1 Summary of psychological interventions 
 
The effectiveness of interventions for persistent PTSD is well established.  However, early 
interventions aimed at preventing its development are lacking.  Such interventions are 
particularly relevant for occupational groups who are at increased risk of developing PTSD.  
Preventative interventions may be informed by research into factors associated with the 
development of PTSD symptoms such as intrusive memories.   
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1.4 Factors linked to the development of PTSD 
 
A vast number of studies have revealed factors linked to the development, severity and 
persistence of PTSD.  Understanding such factors is important in identifying individuals at risk 
(e.g. through screening measures) and informing the development of prevention or early 
intervention programmes for vulnerable individuals.  Correlational findings (from both cross-
sectional and prospective longitudinal studies) will be reviewed first and can be categorised into 
pre-trauma, peri-traumatic and post-trauma factors.  This will be followed by a review of 
experimental studies which investigate the causal role of such factors in the development of 
PTSD.   
 
1.4.1 Pre-trauma factors 
 
Pre-trauma vulnerability factors linked to PTSD include demographic variables and 
psychological factors such as personality traits or coping styles.  Demographic factors include 
female gender (Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler et al., 1995; Perkonigg et al., 2000), younger age, 
low social class, place of residence and number of previous traumatic events (e.g. Perkonigg et 
al., 2000), early separation from parents (Breslau et al., 1991), lower intellectual ability, history 
of psychiatric disorder (Davidson et al., 1991; McFarlane, 1989; Resnick et al., 1993) and 
family history of anxiety (Breslau et al., 1991).  Breslau et al. (1991) also emphasised lifestyle 
factors associated with increased risk of exposure to traumatic events as an indirect risk factor 
for developing the disorder. 
 
Individual psychological characteristics associated with PTSD include neuroticism (Breslau et 
al., 1991; McFarlane, 1989), pre-existing anxiety or depression, pre-trauma depressive 
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and an avoidant coping style (Bryant & 
Harvey, 1995).  Davies and Clark (1998b) investigated whether participants’ subjective ratings 
of their proneness to intrusive cognitions in everyday life predicted the number of intrusive 
memories they developed in response to a traumatic film.  As predicted, a higher self-reported 
tendency to experience intrusions was associated with a higher number of intrusive memories in 
response to the film.   
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Although it is well established that sleep disturbance is a consequence of PTSD, due to intrusive 
symptomatology (e.g. nightmares and intrusive images) and hyperarousal symptoms, pre-
trauma sleep difficulties have also been implicated in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD (Mellman et al., 1995).  Mellman et al. (2005) found that among survivors of Hurricane 
Andrew, greater pre-trauma sleep difficulties rated retrospectively following a trauma predicted 
the development of PTSD. 
 
1.4.2 Peri-traumatic factors 
 
Peri-traumatic factors implicated in the development of PTSD include characteristics of the 
event itself and cognitive and affective processes operating at the time.  Characteristics such as 
the duration and predictability of the trauma may be important (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), as well 
as the type of event (e.g. Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler et al., 1995).  Affective processes linked 
to PTSD include high levels of peri-traumatic anxiety and distress (Davies & Clark, 1998a; 
Laposa & Alden, 2006; Regambal & Alden, 2009; Rothbaum et al., 1992). 
 
Cognitive factors operating at the time of the event are emphasised in psychological models of 
PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and have received considerable research 
attention.  Peri-traumatic cognitive factors associated with increased risk of PTSD include 
greater appraisals of threat (March, 1993; Solomon et al., 1989), mental defeat (Dunmore et al., 
1997), data-driven processing (Ehlers et al., 2003, 2010; Evans et al., 2007; Halligan et al., 
2003; Murray et al., 2002), lack of self-referent processing (Halligan et al., 2003; Evans et al., 
2007) and dissociation (Weiss et al., 1995). 
 
1.4.3 Post-trauma factors 
 
Studies of post-trauma factors have looked at the role of initial symptoms, appraisals of the 
trauma and its sequelae and cognitive and behavioural coping strategies.  Although mild 
symptoms are common following a traumatic event, they do not predict later PTSD whereas 
high levels of initial re-experiencing, avoidance and arousal symptoms a week after the trauma 
have been found to predict PTSD at 12 months (O’Donnell et al., 2007).   
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Studies have also consistently found that excessively negative appraisals of the trauma, initial 
symptoms and trauma-induced changes in self are associated with severity and persistence of 
PTSD (Bryant & Guthrie, 2007; Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Dunmore et al., 1997; Ehlers et al., 
1998; Ehlers & Steil, 1995) even when controlling for intrusion frequency (Steil & Ehlers, 
2000).   
 
A number of post-traumatic cognitive and behavioural coping strategies have been investigated.  
Rumination is a strong predictor of  PTSD maintenance (Ehlers et al. 1998; Ehring et al., 2008; 
El-Leithy et al. 2006; Laposa & Rector, 2012; Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991).  Other 
strategies associated with PTSD include high levels of initial avoidance (Lawrence et al., 1996), 
efforts to suppress memories of the trauma (Ehlers et al., 1998), suppression of emotions over a 
long period of time (e.g. Joseph et al., 1997), mental disengagement (cognitive avoidance), 
wishful thinking (correcting the past in fantasy; Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) and counterfactual 
thinking (imagining how things could have turned out differently; Callander et al., 2007; 
Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Ehlers et al. 1998b; El Leithy et al., 2006; Steil & Ehlers, 2000).  An 
association has also been found between PTSD and compensation claims and PTSD and 
physical injury (NICE, 2005).  Clohessy and Ehlers (1999) identified coping styles that were 
more helpful after a traumatic event, which include disclosure (Pennebaker & O’Heeron, 1984), 
understanding and making sense of trauma (Silver et al., 1983) and use of social support (Jones 
& Barlow, 1990).   
 
As well as pre-trauma sleep factors being a potential vulnerability factor (Mellman et al. 1995), 
sleep complaints one month after a trauma have been found to significantly predict PTSD at 12 
months (Koren et al., 2002).  Furthermore, Krakow et al. (2001) found that a sleep-focused 
intervention was associated with an improvement in PTSD symptoms.  This suggests that sleep 
disturbance after trauma may also be a risk factor.   
 
1.4.4 Meta-analyses of factors linked to PTSD 
 
Two key meta-analyses have attempted to synthesise the wide range of findings of factors 
linked to PTSD symptoms and severity.  Brewin et al. (2000) looked at 14 risk factors from 77 
articles.  These included: female gender; younger age; greater social, educational and 
intellectual disadvantage; race (minority status), psychiatric history; childhood abuse and 
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adversity; previous trauma; family psychiatric history; trauma severity; lack of social support 
and life stress.  They found that peri- and post-traumatic factors (e.g. trauma severity, lack of 
social support, additional life stress) were stronger predictors than pre-trauma factors.  
Significant moderating effects were found for study design, samples and measures used, 
therefore Brewin et al. (2000) cautioned against a general vulnerability model which assumes 
effect sizes will be constant across all samples (e.g. both civilian and military).  They advocated 
a more dynamic model whereby, for example, peri-traumatic factors (e.g. cognitive processes) 
may interact with pre-trauma factors in determining risk of PTSD. 
 
Ozer et al. (2003) also synthesised findings from 68 studies looking at seven predictors, 
including: prior trauma and psychological adjustment; family history of psychopathology; 
perceived life threat during the trauma; post-trauma social support; peri-traumatic emotional 
responses; and peri-traumatic dissociation.  All were significant predictors of PTSD.  Consistent 
with Brewin et al. (2000), Ozer et al. (2003) found that peri-traumatic factors (perceived threat 
during the trauma and dissociation), were better predictors of PTSD symptoms than historical or 
static characteristics (e.g. prior trauma, prior adjustment and family history of 
psychopathology). 
 
1.4.5 Summary of correlational studies 
 
A range of pre-, peri- and post-trauma factors have been linked to the development and 
persistence of PTSD symptomatology.  Evidence suggests that peri-traumatic processes may be 
more important in the development of intrusive memories than pre-trauma factors and that both 
may interact to increase vulnerability.  However, caution must be taken when interpreting the 
results of correlational studies as they often rely on retrospective reporting of variables that may 
lead to recall bias.  Furthermore, the direction of causality is unclear.  Experimental studies are 
needed in order to delineate factors that are causally involved in the development of PTSD 
symptoms such as intrusions, and to reduce bias associated with retrospective measures.  As 
well as improving our understanding of factors causally linked to PTSD, experimental studies 
could inform interventions aimed at preventing these symptoms in vulnerable individuals.  
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1.5 Experimental studies of factors linked to PTSD: The trauma film 
paradigm 
 
Despite the limitations of correlational studies, it is clearly unethical to expose people to real-
life trauma in order to study these factors experimentally.  A widely used experimental method 
of investigating factors linked to trauma exposure in an ethical way is the trauma film paradigm, 
which was pioneered by Lazarus et al. (1965) and later developed by Horowitz (1975).  In this 
paradigm, participants are typically exposed to a film containing traumatic material (e.g. serious 
road traffic accidents, scenes of violence and death) under different conditions, and their 
responses (e.g. frequency of intrusive memories, avoidance and arousal) are measured.  These 
studies have shown that PTSD and related symptoms such as intrusive memories can be induced 
in the laboratory, and their frequency increased or decreased by manipulating peri- or post-
traumatic variables (see Holmes & Bourne, 2008 for a review). 
 
1.5.1 Peri-traumatic processing 
 
Verbal-conceptual versus sensory-perceptual processing 
 
Studies adopting the trauma film paradigm have sought to investigate predictions of cognitive 
models, which hypothesise that intrusive memories result from a shift in information processing 
away from verbal-conceptual processing towards sensory-perceptual processing (e.g. Brewin et 
al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Holmes et al. (2004) conducted a series of experiments aimed 
at manipulating verbal versus visuospatial processing by instructing participants to perform 
different concurrent tasks while watching a traumatic film.  Based on dual representation theory, 
they predicted that performing a concurrent visuospatial task would reduce the number of 
intrusions experienced by competing with SAM processing of the trauma, whereas a verbal task 
would interfere with VAM processing and possibly lead to more intrusions.   
 
As predicted, performing a visuospatial tapping task whilst watching the film resulted in 
significantly fewer intrusions over the following week compared with a no task control 
condition (study 1), whereas completing a concurrent verbal task (counting backwards in 3s) 
increased frequency of intrusions (study 2).  Holmes and colleagues argued that performing a 
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visuospatial task resulted in poorer encoding of sensory-perceptual details by disrupting SAM 
processing, making them less likely to be accessed by reminders and less likely to intrude 
during the following week.  Conversely, they argued that the verbal task disrupted encoding of 
verbal-narrative memories by impoverishing VAM processing, reducing their ability to suppress 
subsequent images and leading to more frequent intrusions.  Similar results were found by 
Stuart et al. (2006) who used a within-subjects design showing that a different visuospatial task 
during an analogue trauma reduced intrusion frequency compared with a no task control, 
without affecting distress or dissociation.   Holmes et al. (2009) extended these findings 
demonstrating that playing a visuospatial computer game (Tetris) after viewing the traumatic 
film reduced the frequency of intrusive memories over one week, whilst leaving memory recall 
intact. 
 
Halligan et al. (2002) also sought to investigate whether promoting verbal-conceptual relative to 
sensory-perceptual processing of an analogue trauma would act as a protective factor against 
developing intrusions.  Healthy participants were instructed to process a traumatic film in a 
conceptual way (e.g. ‘focus on the story, follow what is happening to people and why and think 
about what might happen next’) or a perceptual way (‘watch the film whilst being absorbed in 
the images and sounds, viewing the scenes as unconnected snapshots’).  Contrary to predictions, 
no significant differences were found between the two groups in number of intrusions 
experienced over the subsequent week.  However, when they divided participants into trait 
conceptual or perceptual information processing style based on the Conceptual Processing 
Questionnaire (Ehlers, 1998), trait conceptual processing was positively correlated with number 
of intrusions experienced, distress and avoidance.  This means that innate ability to process the 
meaning in an organised way (e.g. placing it in context) may lead to fewer intrusive memories 
after a traumatic event. 
 
In two studies, Laposa and Alden (2006) interviewed emergency service workers to elicit 
coping strategies that were perceived to be the most effective in regulating emotions when 
dealing with traumatic situations (study 1) and manipulated healthy participants’ use of these 
strategies using the trauma film paradigm (study 2).  The most effective strategies reported 
were: attending to the mechanical steps of medical treatment, focusing on events and processes 
occurring in the here and now, and recalling and applying prior training to solve medical 
problems.  Participants in the second study were asked to watch a video of real events in a 
hospital emergency room.  The ‘coping’ group was asked to use the medical focus strategies 
(e.g. ‘focus on the medical procedures being used by the medical staff and analyse what the staff 
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are trying to accomplish’), whereas the no strategy control group was asked to simply watch the 
events.  As predicted, the coping group reported significantly fewer intrusions during the 
following week compared with controls. The authors inferred that these strategies facilitated 
verbal-conceptual processing, therefore promoting more functional processing of the trauma and 
protecting against the development of intrusive memories.  This study has greater external 
validity than Holmes et al. (2004) as it involved generating an internal strategy rather than 
performing a concurrent task.  However, given that the instructions were context-specific, the 




Dissociation is defined as ‘a disruption of the usually integrated functions of consciousness, 
identity, or perception of the environment’ (APA, 1994) and during trauma is characterised by 
feeling that the event is not really happening in reality, and feeling disconnected from one’s 
body, feelings or environment.  It is thought to interfere with adequate processing of the trauma, 
contributing to poor elaboration and contextualisation of the trauma memory (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000).  Although correlational studies suggest that peri-traumatic dissociation is associated with 
the development of PTSD symptoms, experimental studies that have attempted to induce peri-
traumatic dissociation have failed to demonstrate an effect on the development of intrusive 
memories (e.g. Holmes et al., 2004; Murray, 1997).  However, these studies support 
correlational findings by showing that both trait (Murray, 1997) and state (Holmes et al., 2004) 
dissociation were linked to intrusive memory development.  Nevertheless, it has not yet been 
shown that dissociation leads to the development of intrusive memories.  That is, the causal role 
of dissociation in the development of intrusive memories remains unclear.   
 
1.5.2 Post-trauma factors 
 
Avoidance and thought suppression 
 
Davies and Clark (1998a) examined the impact of thought suppression on intrusive memories 
experienced following exposure to a traumatic film.  In the two minutes following the film, 
participants were either asked to deliberately suppress their thoughts relating to the film or to 
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think freely about it.  The frequency of intrusive memories in the subsequent two minutes was 
then recorded.  Those who were asked to suppress their thoughts experienced a greater number 
of intrusive memories in the subsequent two minutes compared with those who were asked to 
think freely.  This provides support for the role of thought suppression in the development of 
intrusive memories, although these were not measured over a longer period (e.g. a week). 
 
Rumination and worry 
 
Butler et al. (1995) investigated the effects of worrying about an analogue trauma after 
exposure.  Worry is a verbal process, which has been conceptualised as a form of avoidance, 
which functions to reduce aversive imagery and thus prevent emotional processing of these 
images (Borkovec et al., 1998).  After viewing a traumatic film, participants were instructed to 
either worry about the film’s contents during the subsequent four minutes, or to imagine 
visually the distressing aspects of it.  As predicted, the worry group reported more intrusions 
over the subsequent three days than the imagery group.  Similar results were found by Wells 
and Papageorgiou (1995) who found that worrying about an analogue stressor for a period of 
four minutes after exposure led to significantly more intrusions over the next three days 
compared with a ‘settle-down’ control condition. 
 
1.5.3 Preventing intrusive memories using cognitive bias modification 
 
In the wider field of research on the role of cognitive processes in the development and 
prevention of emotional disorders, another experimental method known as cognitive bias 
modification (CBM) has been developed.  Cognitive models of emotional disorders propose that 
cognitive biases (also known as information-processing biases, thinking styles or errors or 
cognitive distortions) are involved in the onset and maintenance of emotional disorders (Beck, 
1976; 1979).  Mineka and Tomarken (1989) define cognitive biases as ‘selective or non-
veridical processing of emotion-relevant information’.  Although these biases are evident across 
a range of disorders, the type or content appears to be disorder-specific and linked to emotion 
(for reviews see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Mineka & Sutton, 1992).  For example, anxiety is 
associated with attentional biases towards threatening stimuli and depression is characterised by 
a memory bias for negative self-relevant material, although both are associated with 
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judgemental or reasoning biases such as overestimating the likelihood of certain negative events 
(Williams et al., 1988).   
 
CBM aims to systematically modify cognitive biases by training individuals (either implicitly or 
explicitly) to process events in a particular way which is consistent or inconsistent with a 
particular cognitive bias, with the aim that this will alter how those individuals process similar 
events in the future.  As well as testing predictions from cognitive models about the causal role 
of such biases in the aetiology of emotional disorders, this provides a method of potentially 
reducing vulnerability to emotional distress by training individuals to naturally generate more 
functional biases or appraisals. 
 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) originally used this paradigm to implicitly train healthy 
participants over a series of trials to process ambiguous scenarios in a benign or threatening 
way.  Participants were exposed to ambiguous scenarios with the meaning (positive or negative) 
only becoming apparent in the final word in the event description.  For example, ‘Getting ready 
to go you think the new people you meet will find you (boring/friendly)’, with the final word 
presented as a word fragment that participants had to complete.  The authors then presented 
participants with novel scenarios and found that participants who had undergone negative 
training continued to process events in a negative way and demonstrated increased anxiety 
reactivity in response to a later stressor compared with those who had undergone positive 
training.  In another study, Wilson et al. (2006) found that those who acquired negative biases 
demonstrated increased anxiety reactivity in response to a later stressor despite no effect of 
training on mood state, providing further support for the causal role of negative biases in the 
development of anxiety.  Yiend et al. (2005) found that experimentally acquired negative 
cognitive biases could endure for several days and Holmes et al. (2006) demonstrated that 
participants could also be trained to adopt positive appraisals.   
 
Studies looking at the causal role of information processing biases in the development of 
intrusive memories and PTSD have combined trauma film and CBM paradigms.  This involves 
training people to process analogue traumatic events or their sequelae in a manner which is 
consistent or inconsistent with that typically associated with PTSD and investigating subsequent 
responses.  Woud et al. (2011) assigned participants to either positive or negative appraisal 
training after viewing a traumatic film.  Training targeted beliefs about self-efficacy and 
appraisals of responses to the film (e.g. emotions and intrusive memories).  An implicit, 
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computerised procedure was used whereby participants were presented with ambiguous 
sentences, the meaning of which participants had to resolve by completing an unambiguous 
word fragment.  Participants in the negative training condition were trained to use maladaptive 
appraisals associated with PTSD (Foa et al., 1999), for example, ‘In a crisis I predict my 
responses will be u_el_ss’.  Those in the positive training condition were trained to use the 
opposite, adaptive counterparts: ‘In a crisis I predict my responses will be h_lpf_l’.  Over one 
week, participants in the positive condition reported less frequent and less distressing intrusive 
memories, as well as lower scores on the Impact of Events Scale-Revised (Weiss & Marmar, 
1997), than those the negative condition.   
 
A similar design was used by Lang et al. (2009) who manipulated appraisals of depressive 
intrusions after watching a depressive film (scenes of bereavement and bullying), using a 
computerised implicit CBM paradigm. Participants read a series of statements on a computer 
screen.  Again, the sentences remained ambiguous and the meaning (positive or negative) was 
only resolved by the word fragment (‘Having intrusions means s_mething’s wrong with me’, or 
‘Having intrusions means that n_thing is wrong with me’).  Again, participants who underwent 
positive CBM showed a more positive interpretation bias in a recognition test, reported fewer 
intrusive memories of the film and had lower scores on the Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz, 
1979) one week later.   
 
CBM studies have typically used implicit induction of interpretative biases, for example, by 
resolving the meaning of an ambiguous stimulus with a word fragment.  In a series of studies, 
Schartau et al. (2009) used a novel approach investigating the effect of explicitly training 
individuals to generate functional appraisals whilst watching a series of traumatic films.  They 
first identified broad dysfunctional appraisal themes representative of those found across 
emotional disorders (e.g. anxiety and depression) and used these to generate functional appraisal 
themes, which were linked to seeing ‘the bigger picture’ (e.g. ‘bad things happen’, ‘silver 
lining’, ‘broader perspective’ and ‘time heals’).  In three studies, healthy participants were 
trained to apply specific functional appraisals based on these themes to a series of traumatic 
training films, and their emotional reactions to pre- and post-training test clips were compared 
with controls, who were simply asked to watch the film without trying to control their emotions 
in any way.   
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In the first study, participants who underwent appraisal training exhibited reduced levels of self-
reported negative emotion (distress and horror) and psychophysiological responses between pre- 
and post-training which were greater than the controls’.  In the second study, they found the 
same effect when participants appraised after rather than during the film.  In a third study, they 
replicated this effect and found that the appraisal group showed reduced emotional reactivity 
compared with controls and an additional ‘detachment’ control group.  Importantly, in a fourth 
study, they investigated the effects of appraisal practice on recalling distressing 
autobiographical memories and included participants with higher levels of depression and 
anxiety.  They found a significantly reduced number of intrusions and related avoidance of the 
target memories in the week post-study, compared with a non-significant effect in controls. 
 
1.5.4 Summary of experimental studies 
 
The trauma film paradigm provides an ethical way of testing hypotheses about the causal role of 
certain processes in the development of intrusive memories.  Studies employing this paradigm 
have provided support for the role of peri-traumatic and post-traumatic factors implicated in 
psychological models of PTSD (including verbal-conceptual versus sensory-perceptual 
processing, thought suppression and worry).  The trauma film paradigm can be combined with a 
cognitive bias modification procedure whereby individuals are trained to process analogue 
traumatic events and their sequelae in a way that is either consistent or inconsistent with a 
particular cognitive bias.  Studies using this method have shown that training healthy 
individuals to process traumatic scenes in a manner consistent with PTSD (e.g. using 
maladaptive appraisals of emotional reactions and symptoms) increases the number of intrusive 
memories, whereas training individuals in more functional appraisals (e.g. of the trauma and it’s 
sequelae) reduces distress, horror and physiological arousal, and protects against the 
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1.6 Processing mode and the development of intrusive memories 
 
1.6.1 Processing mode theory 
 
In recent decades, a growing body of research has suggested that, in addition to content, the 
mode or style in which people think about negative events is an important factor in determining 
outcomes such as mood and intrusive memories (e.g. Watkins, 2008).  This theory emerged 
partly from studies showing that rumination and worry are implicated in the onset and 
maintenance of a range of axis one disorders, including PTSD (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; 
Harvey, 2004).  Both rumination and worry are types of repetitive negative thinking, and 
evidence suggests that repetitive negative thinking can be constructive or unconstructive, 
depending on the mode of processing adopted (Watkins, 2008). 
 
Various authors have made a distinction between abstract and concrete modes of processing 
(Carver & Scheier, 1990; Stöber, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Watkins, 2008).  Abstract 
processing is characterised by high-level construals of events, situations and behaviours.  These 
tend to contain generalised and decontextualised mental representations conveying overall 
meanings of events and actions.  They tend to consist of ‘Why?’ and ‘What if?’ questions that 
have no obvious solution and focus on desirability and importance of outcomes (e.g. ‘Why did 
this happen to me?’ ‘What if things had been different?’).  Concrete processing is characterised 
by lower-level construals, which contain contextual and specific details of events, situations and 
behaviours.  They tend to consist of ‘How?’ questions and focus on direct experience (including 
emotions) and means to desired ends (e.g. steps needed to achieve an overall goal; Watkins, 
2008).   
 
The idea of concrete, low-level versus abstract, high-level construals stems from cognitive and 
social cognitive literature, which proposes that mental representations are organised 
hierarchically.  Vallacher & Wegner, (1987) distinguished between low- and high-level 
‘identities’ in the mental representation of actions.  Low-level identities contain the specifics or 
details of the action, convey how the action is done and the means to an end, whereas high-level 
identities contain abstract representations which include general understanding of the action 
conveying why the action is done and what its effects or implications are.  Similarly, Trope and 
colleagues distinguished between abstract high-level and concrete low-level construals (Trope 
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& Liberman, 2003) when perceiving objects and events or behaviour.  For example, in 
perceptions of behaviour, high-level construals represent global and stable traits (e.g. ‘laziness’) 
whereas low-level construals refer to situation-specific states (e.g. ‘tiredness’; Nussbaum et al., 
2003). 
 
Watkins (2008) outlines evidence from cross-sectional, prospective longitudinal and 
experimental studies showing that, when thinking about negative content, an abstract-evaluative 
mode of processing leads to maladaptive outcomes on outcomes such as low mood.  A concrete-
experiential mode of processing on the other hand can be adaptive, for example, by facilitating 
emotional processing and recovery from upsetting events.  Cognitive processes such as worry 
and rumination are characterised by an abstract mode of processing about negative events, 
which individuals tend to get stuck in.  It is hypothesised that this process leads to dysfunctional 
outcomes across a range of disorders, even though the content may be disorder-specific (Ehring 
& Watkins, 2008; Harvey, 2004). 
 
1.6.2 Theories of the effect of processing mode 
 
Various theoretical accounts have been offered to explain why processing mode is important 
when thinking about negative events.  One explanation is its effect on problem-solving.  
Vallacher and Wegner (1987) proposed that representations of goal-directed action contain 
high-level abstract representations of a goal or purpose and low-level action identities 
containing the specific details of an action and indicating the steps needed to achieve it.  If 
representations of a goal are too abstract then this may impair performance and lead to negative 
mood (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Watkins, 2008).  This idea is compatible with Stöber's 
(1998) reduced concreteness theory of worry.  Stöber (1998) proposed that because worry is 
predominantly experienced in abstract-verbal form, it is less detailed and specific and therefore 
less amenable to problem-solving compared with concrete thinking about problems, which is 
detailed and specific and therefore facilitates the finding of potential solutions.   
 
The second way in which processing mode may determine outcome is through its effects on 
emotional processing.  In their interacting cognitive subsystems theory, Teasdale & Barnard, 
(1993) proposed that there are two different modes of self-focused attention with distinct 
functional properties: a propositional mode and an implicational mode, which correspond to 
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different levels of meaning.  The propositional mode is concerned with processing language-
based conceptual meanings and characterised by conceptual, evaluative thinking, focusing on 
discrepancies between current and desired outcomes.  The implicational mode on the other hand 
is concerned with processing of implicit meanings derived from direct sensory experience and 
includes emotional as well as propositional information.  According to this theory, effective 
emotional processing is facilitated at the implicational level, whereas it is hindered at the 
propositional level (Teasdale, 1999).  This is also compatible with Borkovec’s (1998) cognitive 
avoidance theory of worry.  According to this theory, worry is a verbal process, which functions 
to avoid aversive imagery associated with feared outcomes.  This has the effect of preventing 
emotional processing of these images, maintaining anxiety and distress. 
 
It has also been argued that processing mode determines outcomes of thinking about negative 
events through its effect on self-regulation.  For example, Leary et al. (2006) suggested that 
concrete thinking about problems or stressful events reduces self-focused attention and directs 
attention to the immediate environment, thereby reducing anxiety.  They also argued that by 
focusing attention on the present environment and reducing abstract construals about the 
meaning and implications of situations, concrete construals may free up cognitive resources. 
 
Another mechanism by which processing mode may improve self-regulation is by influencing 
the degree of generalisations formed from events (Watkins, 2008).  Abstract processing fosters 
generalisations across events and situations and people.  Whilst such generalisations can be 
adaptive (e.g. by deriving inferences and promoting learning across situations), negative 
overgeneralisations can be unhelpful and lead to distress (Hamilton et al., 1993).  These 
overgeneralisations reflect the types of cognitive bias seen in depression (Beck, 1976), where 
personal, global and stable generalisations are made about the self, world and the future (e.g. ‘I 
am worthless’, ‘The world is unfair’, ‘The future is hopeless’).  Overgeneralised appraisals are 
also hypothesised to play a role in the maintenance of PTSD, for example, ‘The world is a 
dangerous place’, ‘I attract disaster’ or ‘My future is ruined’.  Concrete processing may have 
more constructive effects by reducing unhelpful overgeneralisations and engendering more 
situation-specific and contextual appraisals.   
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1.6.3 Evidence for the role of abstract versus concrete processing in depression 
 
Most of the empirical evidence for processing mode theory comes from studies of depression.  
In a series of studies, Watkins and colleagues have compared (a) an abstract, verbal analytical 
evaluative mode of processing consistent with depressive rumination in which participants are 
instructed to think about the causes, meanings and consequences of their symptoms and feelings 
and (b) a concrete-experiential mode inconsistent with the phenomenology of depressive 
rumination in which participants are instructed to focus attention on the experience of their 
symptoms and feelings.  These studies have shown that the conceptual-evaluative variant 
reduced overgeneral autobiographical memory recall (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2004), reduced negative global self-evaluations (Rimes & Watkins, 2005) and 
improved social problem solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005).   
 
Studies have also shown that processing mode influences emotional recovery after failure and 
emotional reactivity to upsetting events. Watkins (2004) exposed healthy participants to an 
induced failure task, which involved solving a series of reasoning problems, many of which 
were unsolvable.  Participants were told this task was correlated with IQ.  Following the task, 
they were assigned to writing about the failure experience in a conceptual-evaluative mode 
(consistent with an abstract mode of processing, e.g. ‘Why did you feel this way?’) or a 
concrete-experiential mode (e.g. ‘How did you feel moment by moment?’).  Those who wrote 
about the failure experience in a conceptual-evaluative mode demonstrated increased depressed 
mood, intrusive memories and avoidance about the failure experience 12 hours later compared 
with those who wrote about it in a concrete-experiential way. 
 
Williams and Moulds (2010) investigated the effect of manipulating processing style on the 
experience of naturally occurring self-referent intrusive memories in dysphoric participants.  
Participants who underwent an analytical ruminative processing induction subsequently rated 
their intrusive memories as more negative, distressing, more evocative of a negative emotional 
response and reported more negative mood than participants in a distraction condition.  
However, the authors did not investigate the impact on the frequency of intrusive memories and 
only focused on intrusive memories within the session, without examining the effect on 
intrusive memories over a longer period.  Furthermore, there was no concrete or experiential 
processing condition for comparison. 
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Using a CBM paradigm, Watkins et al. (2008) trained healthy participants to adopt specific 
modes of processing (i.e. abstract versus concrete).  They asked participants to think about 
positive or negative scenarios in a mode either consistent or inconsistent with the abstract-
evaluative mindset observed in depressive rumination, both via explicit instructions and via 
implicit induction of interpretative biases, before being exposed to a failure experience.  
Participants trained in the concrete mode, antithetical to depressive rumination, demonstrated 
less emotional reactivity following failure than participants trained in the mode consistent with 
depressive rumination.  Watkins et al. (2009) extended this finding to dysphoric individuals and 
showed that concreteness training resulted in significantly greater decreases in depressive 
symptoms and significantly greater increases in concrete thinking than the waiting-list and a 
‘bogus training’ control.   
 
Studies have demonstrated that trait rumination can predict outcome although this depends on 
processing mode condition (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 
2004).  For example, both Watkins (2004) and Watkins and Moulds (2004) found that, after 
controlling for depression, high levels of trait rumination predicted greater increases in negative 
mood following failure in the conceptual-evaluative condition but not in the concrete-
experiential condition. 
 
1.6.4 The role of processing mode in the development of intrusive memories following 
trauma 
 
Michael et al. (2007) investigated the mechanisms by which rumination maintains PTSD in 
assault survivors.  They found that unproductive thoughts containing ‘Why?’ and ‘What if?’ 
questions indicative of abstract processing were both concurrently and prospectively associated 
with PTSD, and accounted for significantly more variance than solely the presence of 
rumination.  Ehring et al. (2009) suggested that, like depressive rumination, dysfunctional forms 
of trauma-related rumination are also characterised by reduced levels of concreteness and that 
abstractness of thinking is important for the contribution of trauma-related rumination to the 
maintenance of PTSD symptoms such as intrusive memories.  Drawing upon on the cognitive 
model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), they suggested that abstract rumination may prevent the 
elaboration of the trauma memory (e.g. to incorporate contextual details) and modification of 
negative appraisals, whereas concrete processing facilitates these.  They also suggested that 
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abstract rumination may interfere with problem-solving, further contributing to the maintenance 
of PTSD symptoms. 
 
Evidence suggests that processing mode is causally involved in the development of emotional 
reactivity and intrusive memories in depression, which shares common cognitive processes with 
PTSD (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999).  Like depression, PTSD is characterised by abstract, 
overgeneralised appraisals (e.g. ‘the world is a dangerous place’, ‘I attract disaster’).  Another 
similarity in cognitive processing between depression and PTSD is overgeneral recall, which is 
the inability to retrieve specific autobiographical memories and instead tending to recall 
memories relating to collection of events or a time period.  This is a well-established processing 
bias in depression (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995) and has also been demonstrated in individuals with 
PTSD (McNally et al., 1994, 1995). 
 
Ehring et al. (2009) used the trauma film paradigm to test the hypothesis that the abstractness of 
thinking is responsible for the dysfunctional effects of trauma-related rumination by looking at 
its impact on mood and intrusive memories.  They assigned healthy participants to abstract 
rumination, concrete thinking or distraction conditions after watching a traumatic film 
containing scenes of the aftermath of serious road traffic accidents (RTAs).  In the abstract 
rumination condition, participants were presented with questions on a computer screen and 
asked to think about them, such as ‘Why do so many accidents have to happen?’,  ‘Why do 
people have to drive so recklessly?’ and ‘Would I ever be able to get over it?’.  In the concrete 
condition, they were asked to think about questions such as ‘What are the reasons for accidents 
happening?’, ‘What factors contribute to the roads being dangerous?’ and ‘Which consequences 
would such an accident have on my life?’ Results showed that abstract rumination led to 
significantly longer maintenance of negative mood and arousal than both concrete thinking and 
distraction, although the hypothesis that abstract rumination would lead to an increase in 
intrusive memories was not supported.  Unexpectedly, the distraction group showed the highest 
number of intrusions whereas the abstract and concrete conditions did not significantly differ.  
However, only participants in the concrete thinking condition, but not those in the abstract one, 
reported significantly fewer intrusive memories than controls, which was interpreted as indirect 
evidence for the idea that concrete thinking is more functional than abstract thinking.  The lack 
of difference between the two groups may have been due to the concrete instructions being 
insufficiently concrete, as questions about the reasons for accidents happening may have 
overlapped with ‘Why’ questions.  It may also be due to manipulating processing modes 
(abstract versus concrete) after rather than during the analogue trauma. 




Zetsche et al. (2009) compared the effects of abstract rumination and memory integration on 
mood and intrusive memories.  They randomly assigned healthy participants to a guided 
thinking task designed to induce either rumination, memory integration or distraction after 
exposure to an analogue stressor (video of the aftermath of serious RTAs).  Again, the 
ruminative sentences were chosen to resemble the form (‘Why’ and ‘What if’) and content of 
ruminative thoughts reported by RTA survivors with PTSD.  In the memory integration 
condition, participants were asked to think about their experience of the film in a self-referent 
and chronological way (e.g. linking the experience of the video to the chronological sequence of 
events that day and distinguishing the video from their own non-traumatic experiences with 
road traffic), with questions adapted from a writing task used by Michael and Ehlers (2007).  
This aimed to promote the elaboration and integration of the memory into autobiographical 
memory and resembled a concrete mode of processing.  The control condition involved 
distracting participants from thinking about the video whilst demanding a similar amount of 
concentration and verbal activity as the other two tasks (e.g. answering quiz questions).  
Consistent with Ehring et al.’s (2009) findings, rumination led to less recovery from sad mood 
triggered by the video than the other two conditions, although there was no differential effect of 
condition on intrusive memories.  However, they found that self-reported levels of rumination 
during the guided thinking task predicted subsequent intrusive memories in the session.  They 
interpreted this as correlational evidence supporting the link between rumination and intrusive 
memories. 
 
1.6.5 Summary of processing mode theory 
 
Processing mode theory holds that the mode or style of thinking about negative events can 
determine the effect it has on subsequent mood and memory features.  Experimental studies of 
depression have demonstrated that a concrete mode of processing leads to reduced negative 
mood, promotes faster recovery from upsetting events, reduced emotional reactivity to future 
failure and reduced frequency of intrusive memories compared with an abstract mode.  There is 
correlational evidence that abstract processing of an analogue trauma after the event is 
associated with prolonged negative mood and development of intrusive memories.  However, 
no effect of post-trauma processing mode has been found on the future development of intrusive 
memories.  To date, studies have not explored the effect of abstract or concrete processing 
during a traumatic event (i.e. peri-traumatic processing) on PTSD symptoms.  It is unclear 
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whether processing a trauma in an abstract and overgeneralised way leads to more intrusions 
and other PTSD symptoms compared with adopting a concrete and contextualised processing 
mode during trauma. 
 
1.7 Summary of literature review and rationale 
 
PTSD is a debilitating condition associated with numerous adverse psychological and social 
outcomes.  Its lifetime rate of prevalence is approximately 8% (Kessler et al., 1995) although 
rates of sub-threshold symptoms with associated functional impairment may be even higher 
(Stein et al., 1997).  Further, certain groups such as emergency and military personnel who are 
routinely exposed to traumatic events may be at increased risk.  The hallmark of PTSD is 
distressing intrusive memories, which are vivid, image-based sensory fragments of the trauma 
that intrude into consciousness accompanied by strong emotions, creating a sense that the 
trauma is happening all over again.   
 
Cognitive models of PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) hypothesise that 
intrusive memories result from dysfunctional peri-traumatic information processing 
characterised by a lack of verbal-conceptual processing in favour of sensory-perceptual 
processing, which prevents the elaboration and contextualisation of the trauma memory.  
According to Ehlers and Clark (2000), intrusive memories and physiological arousal create a 
sense of ongoing threat, which is reinforced by dysfunctional appraisals of the trauma and its 
sequelae and maladaptive coping strategies.  Established psychological treatments of PTSD are 
thought to work through elaboration of the trauma memory and modification of problematic 
appraisals (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), which reduce the frequency of intrusive memories and linked 
distress.  Whilst the effectiveness of such treatments for PTSD is well-established (NICE, 
2005), early interventions aimed at reducing vulnerability to or preventing PTSD in at-risk 
groups are lacking.   
 
Numerous studies have indicated a vast number of factors (historical, peri-traumatic and post-
traumatic) associated with increased risk of PTSD.  Experimental studies using the trauma film 
paradigm support predictions of cognitive models, providing evidence for the causal role of 
peri-traumatic and post-traumatic processes in the development of PTSD.  Studies using CBM 
methodologies have also shown that individuals can be trained (implicitly or explicitly) to 
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appraise trauma-related information in a more functional way which reduces emotional 
reactivity and intrusive memories. 
 
Evidence is now emerging that, in addition to content, the mode of processing adopted whilst 
thinking about negative events is involved in the development and maintenance of emotional 
disorders.  Studies of depression show that an abstract-evaluative mode of processing (e.g. 
focusing on ‘Why’, ‘What if’, on meanings and implications) is associated with increased 
negative mood and intrusive memories following a failure task compared with a concrete mode 
of processing (e.g. focusing on how events are happening and the specific details).  This effect 
appears to be moderated by trait variables such as tendency to ruminate.  
 
Processing mode theory has been applied to PTSD, which is also characterised by 
overgeneralised appraisals and a ruminative style of thinking.  Ehring (2009) proposed that the 
dysfunctional effects of trauma-related rumination could be accounted for by reduced 
concreteness of processing, preventing the elaboration and contextualisation of the trauma 
memory.  However, although correlational evidence suggests that an abstract mode of 
processing after an analogue trauma is associated with a greater number of intrusive memories, 
experimental evidence that processing mode is causally involved in the development of PTSD 
symptoms is currently lacking. 
 
The effect of abstract versus concrete processing during a traumatic event has yet to be 
investigated.  Studies have shown that peri-traumatic processes are important in determining the 
psychological sequelae of traumatic events such as intrusive memories.  Holmes et al. (2004) 
argued that peri-traumatic cognitive processes are important as they affect the representations 
formed of the event.  Using a CBM paradigm, Schartau et al. (2009) found that training 
individuals to apply functional appraisals to traumatic film clips reduced emotional reactivity to 
a subsequent clip.  However, these appraisals were content-based and they did not look at the 
impact on the development of intrusive memories in relation to the clips. It is unclear whether 
processing analogue trauma in an abstract way leads to more intrusions and other PTSD 
symptoms compared with concrete processing. Abstract peri-traumatic processing would be 
expected to prevent processing of contextual details, inhibiting the elaboration of the trauma 
memory and generating overgeneral negative appraisals thereby lead to greater frequency of 
intrusions compared to a concrete mode of processing.  Investigating the effect of processing 
mode during analogue trauma has implications for cognitive models of PTSD and potentially 
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future interventions aimed at preventing the development of distressing intrusive memories in 
at-risk groups. 
 
1.8 Aims of the current study 
 
1. To investigate the effect of peri-traumatic processing mode (abstract versus concrete) 
using cognitive bias modification within a trauma film paradigm on: 
• emotional reactivity to an analogue trauma (trauma film);  
• the development of intrusive memories; 
• the development of associated PTSD symptoms during the following week. 
   
2. To explore whether individual characteristics and traits previously shown to be 
associated with PTSD symptoms influence the development of PTSD symptoms in this 
study. 
 
1.9 Research hypotheses 
 
1.9.1 Main hypotheses 
 
1. Healthy participants who are trained to process traumatic films in a concrete way will 
experience fewer intrusive memories and associated PTSD symptoms during the 
following week compared with participants who are trained to process the same event in 
an abstract way. 
2. Participants who undergo concreteness training will experience reduced emotional 
reactivity (distress, horror, arousal and negative affect) to the traumatic films compared 
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1.9.2 Exploratory hypotheses 
 
1. Pre-existing individual characteristics that have been previously linked to PTSD (trait 
rumination, trait dissociation, proneness to intrusive memories and pre-trauma sleep 
difficulties) will predict the development of intrusive memories. 
2. Participants who undergo abstract training will experience a greater decrease in mood 
over training compared with the concrete group.    
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A between-subjects design was used, whereby healthy participants were randomly allocated to 
one of two groups: training in abstract or concrete processing.  They then watched a ‘baseline’ 
traumatic film clip, underwent their training, and then watched a ‘test’ traumatic film clip in the 
way they had been trained. That is, in an abstract or concrete mode. Questionnaires were 
administered prior to the baseline film clip, immediately after the test film clips and one week 
later.  The independent variable was training condition, with two levels (abstract versus 
concrete).  There were three dependent variables, which were: 1) Number of spontaneously 
occurring intrusive memories experienced over the week following the traumatic film viewing; 
2) Severity of post-traumatic symptomatology one week after viewing, as measured by the 
Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997); and 3) Emotional reactivity 
(negative emotion, distress, horror and arousal) to the test film following training. A pilot study 




Fifty-one participants took part in total.  There were 29 (56.9%) females and 22 (43.1%) males.  
Participants ranged in age from 18-52 years with a mean age of 25.8 (SD = 7.6).  Participants 
were staff and students from King’s College London who responded to a circular email 
advertising the study.  Exclusion criteria were a current self-reported mental health problem or 
scoring above cut-off on standard measures of depression and post-traumatic stress.  Depression 
was assessed using the Personal Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001) using a cut 
off of 10 or above (indicating major depression).  Post-traumatic stress symptoms were assessed 
using the IES-R using a cut off of greater than 33 (recommended by Creamer et al., 2003).  In 
order to establish an index traumatic event for completing the IES-R, participants completed the 
trauma screener (unpublished). 
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2.3 Ethical issues 
 
As the study involved watching films that contained traumatic material intended to induce 
PTSD symptoms (e.g. intrusive memories), there was a risk that participants would become 
distressed.  This risk was minimised in several ways.  First, participants were informed that they 
would be required to watch films of a traumatic nature and of the associated risks in the 
participant information sheet before taking part, and were given time to think about it before 
consenting.  Second, they were informed both verbally and in writing before commencing the 
study of their right to withdraw at any time.  Third, participants with a current self-reported 
mental health problem that scored above cut-off on measures of depression or PTSD were 
excluded, as this may have increased the risk of emotional distress in response to the trauma 
films.  Fourth, they were informed that should they become distressed, they would be able to 
talk to the researcher (a clinical psychologist in training), the researcher’s supervisor (a 
consultant clinical psychologist) or signposted to other sources of support where appropriate. 
 
2.3.1 Ethical approval 
 
Ethical approval was granted by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics 
Committee at Kings College London (see Appendix 1). 
 
2.4 Power analysis and sample size 
 
In order to conduct a power analysis, means and standard deviations of the target population are 
required.  As these are only available on completion of the study, the means and standard 
deviations of prior research are used to calculate the likely effect size.  The resulting value can 
be divided into small, medium and large.  Setting power at 80% (the proposed convention for 
general use), one can then consult Cohen (1992) to determine the sample size, which 
corresponds to the effect size. 
 
The power analysis was conducted based on the effect sizes of a similar study conducted by 
Schartau et al. (2009), investigating the effect of cognitive bias modification on emotional 
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reactivity to distressing films, with a between-groups design comparing an ‘appraise’ and a 
‘watch’ group.  Results of the power analysis showed that a sample size of 25 in each group 
would have 80% power to detect a significant difference in mean change scores between groups 
1 and 2 using a two group t-test with a .05 two-sided significance level.  It was concluded 
therefore that 50 participants would be needed in total. 
 
2.5 Materials and measures 
 
Where possible, published measures were used with established reliability and validity.  
However, for variables for which no existing measure had been validated, it was necessary to 
use or develop unpublished measures.  All unpublished measures can be found in the 
Appendices. 
 
2.5.1 Demographic information 
 
General Information Questionnaire (GIQ; unpublished) 
 
A 10-item General information questionnaire was used to obtain demographic information 
(Appendix 2). It elicited information on age, sex, ethnicity, native language, marital status, 
employment, education, and income.  An additional question was included asking how 
frequently the participant drove a car.  This was to ensure equivalence in the frequency of 




State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait version (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983) 
 
The STAI-T is a self-report measure of anxiety proneness or ‘differences between people in the 
tendency to perceive stressful situations as dangerous or threatening and to response to such 
situations with elevations of their state anxiety’ (Spielberger et al., 1983).  It has been used 
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extensively in research and clinical practice with a variety of clinical and non-clinical 
populations and was included in the present study to ensure equivalence of groups in trait 
anxiety.  The scale contains twenty statements about how people generally feel (e.g. ‘I feel 
calm’, ‘I get in a state of tension or turmoil’) for which participants are required to give 
frequency ratings from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always).  Scores range from a minimum of 
20 and a maximum of 80, with higher scores indicating a higher level of trait anxiety.  Norms 
for the scale are available for working adults, college students, high school students and military 





Personal Health Questionnaire – nine item (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001) 
 
The PHQ-9 is a widely used, brief diagnostic and severity measure of depression, containing 
nine items which reflect DSM-IV criteria.  It was included to ensure equivalence of depressive 
symptoms and as screening measure, where participants were excluded from the study if they 
score above 10.  Participants indicate how often they have experienced each symptom in last 7 
days (e.g. ‘Feeling down depressed or hopeless’, ‘Having little energy’), with responses ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 4 (nearly every day).  Scores range from 0 to 27 with higher scores 
indicating a greater severity of depressive symptoms.  The PHQ-9 has been validated in clinical 
populations (in primary care and obstetrics-gynaecology settings).  It has demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .86 - .89) and excellent test-retest reliabiity (r tt = 
.84).  It has also demonstrated criterion validity, correlating with a mental health professional 
interview and demonstrating 88% sensitivity and 88% specificity of a score of 10 or greater for 
detecting major depression.  Construct validity has been established, correlating strongly with 
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2.5.4 Prior trauma exposure 
 
Trauma screener (unpublished) 
 
The Trauma Screener (Appendix 3) is a self-report inventory of prior exposure to traumatic 
events which has been used in previous studies (e.g. Ehlers et al., 1998).  It was derived from 
the trauma checklist included in the Clinical Administered Post-traumatic Scale (Blake et al., 
1990), with additional items added assessing whether re-experiencing symptoms (intrusive 
memories or thoughts) were developed in relation to the trauma.  This measure was included to 
ensure equivalence of groups in prior trauma exposure and to establish and index event on 
which to base the baseline IES-R.  It contains a 17-item checklist of traumatic events including: 
serious traffic accidents; serious other accidents (e.g. fire or explosion); natural disasters; non-
sexual assault; seriously injuring or killing somebody else; sexual assault, military combat or 
war zone; terrorist attacks; childhood sexual abuse; imprisonment; torture; life-threatening 
illness; witnessing others die/being seriously hurt; sudden traumatic death of significant other; 
life-threatening illness of significant other; and ‘other traumatic events’ which participants are 
asked to specify. 
 
2.5.5 Post-traumatic stress symptoms 
 
Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1996) 
 
The IES-R was used to assess level of post-traumatic stress symptoms both prior to taking part 
in the study and at one week follow-up.  The follow-up was completed as an online 
questionnaire.  The IES-R is a 15-item self-report measure of post-traumatic stress symptoms, 
which is a widely used in both clinical and research settings.  The original Impact of Events 
Scale (IES) was developed by Horowitz (1979) to assess subjective distress following a stressful 
life event.  It comprised two subscales of intrusion (thoughts, feelings, nightmares, images, 
dissociative like re-experiencing, e.g. ‘I thought about it when I didn’t mean to’, ‘pictures about 
it popped into my mind’) and avoidance (numbing of responsiveness, avoidance of feelings, 
situations and ideas, e.g. ‘I tried not to think about it’).  Subjects are required to indicate 
frequency of these symptoms over the past week in relation to an index event.   
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Weiss and Marmar (1997) revised the IES to include a third subscale capturing to the third core 
DSM-IV symptom cluster of hyperarousal (anger, irritability, hypervigilance, difficult 
concentrating, heightened startle; APA, 1994; e.g. ‘I felt watchful and on guard’), so that the 
revised scale contains 22 items.  They also altered the response scale so that subjects indicate to 
what extent they have been distressed by the symptoms listed from 0 (not at all) to 4 
(extremely).  The scale yields a total score of 88, with higher scores indicating greater severity 
of PTSD symptoms.  The revised scale has been validated with both non-clinical and clinical 
samples (Weiss & Marmar, 1997; Creamer et al., 2003).  It has demonstrated high internal 
consistency for the total scale (α = .96), and adequate to high internal consistencies for the three 
subscales (α = .87-.94 for the intrusion scale, α = .84-.87 for the avoidance scale and α = .79-.91 
for the hyperarousal scale).  Test-retest reliability coefficients ranged from r = .5-.9 for the total 
scale; r = .57-.94 for the intrusion scale; r = .51-.89 for the avoidance scale and r = .59-.92 for 
the hyperarousal scale.  Concurrent validity has been documented with the scale being highly 
correlated (r = .84) with the Post-traumatic Checklist, an established measure of PTSD 
symptoms.  Creamer et al. (2003) found that a clinical cut off of 33 on the IES-R provided the 
best diagnostic accuracy for PTSD. 
 
2.5.6 Trait rumination 
 
Perseverative thinking questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2010) 
 
The PTQ is a content-independent self-report measure of repetitive negative thinking (RNT) 
such as rumination and worry, which was developed with the rationale that existing measures of 
RNT were highly content-dependent (e.g. relating specifically to depression or anxiety).  It was 
used to assess trait rumination and the potential relationship of this with intrusive memories.  
The PTQ contains 15 items, with three subscales assessing different aspects of RNT.  The first 
subscale relates to the core characteristics of repetitiveness (e.g. ‘the same thoughts keep going 
through my mind again and again’), intrusiveness (e.g. ‘thoughts come into my mind without 
me wanting them’) and difficulties with disengagement (e.g. ‘I can’t stop dwelling on them’).  
The second subscale relates to the unproductiveness of RNT (e.g. ‘I keep asking myself 
questions without finding an answer’) and the third to RNT capturing mental capacity (e.g. ‘my 
thoughts prevent me focusing on other things’).  Subjects are required to rate the frequency of 
each item, ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (always).  The maximum score is 60, with higher scores 
indicating a greater tendency towards repetitive negative thinking (e.g. rumination and worry).  
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The scale has been validated on non-clinical and clinical samples, in both English and German.  
Excellent internal consistency have been reported for the total scale (α = 0.94-0.95) and internal 
consistencies for the three subscales range from acceptable to high (core characteristics α = 
0.92-.94, unproductiveness α = 0.77-.87, capturing mental capacity α = 0.82-.90).  Satisfactory 
test-retest reliability has been reported for the whole scale (rtt = 0.69) and for the three subscales 
(r tt = .66, r tt = .68 and r tt = .69 respectively).  The measure has demonstrated convergent 
validity, correlating significantly with standard content-dependent measures of rumination and 
worry (the rumination scale of the Response Style Questionnaire, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991; the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, Meyer et al., 1990; and the Rumination Scale; 
McIntosh, 1995).  It also shows predictive validity, with significant and substantial correlations 
found with severity of anxiety and depressive symptoms and with individuals with anxiety and 
depression scoring significantly higher than those without (Ehring et al., 2010). 
 
2.5.7 Proneness to intrusive memories  
 
Proneness to intrusive memories scales (unpublished) 
 
A self-report measure of proneness to intrusive memories was developed for this study 
(Appendix 4), similar to that used by Davies and Clark (1998b).  It was administered to assess 
participants’ proneness to negative and positive intrusions and the potential relationship 
between these and the subsequent development of intrusive memories after exposure to the 
analogue trauma. It consisted of three 5-point Likert scales assessing trait tendency towards 
different intrusive memory experiences; including intrusive memories of a stressful or 
unpleasant event, seeing an unpleasant event on television and a positive or happy event.  
Subjects rated the frequency with which they experienced these over a week on a scale ranging 
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2.5.8 Sleep problems 
 
Insomnia severity index (ISI; Morin et al., 1993) 
 
The ISI is a brief 7-item screening measure for insomnia severity over the past two weeks.  It 
was used to assess the relationship between pre-existing sleep difficulties and the subsequent 
development of intrusive memories in response to the film.  It looks at subjective symptoms and 
impact of insomnia, as well as level of related concern or distress.    It contains seven items 
which correspond in part to the diagnostic criteria for insomnia, including: (a) sleep onset, sleep 
maintenance and early awakening; (b) satisfaction with current sleep pattern; (c) interference 
with daily functioning; (d) noticeability of impairment; and (e) level of distress caused by the 
sleep problem.  Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 
(extremely).  The total score ranges from 0 to 28 with higher scores indicating higher severity of 
insomnia.  The measure has been validated on younger and older populations attending a sleep 
clinic or receiving treatment for insomnia, and has demonstrated adequate internal consistency 
(α = 0.74-0.78).  It has also demonstrated concurrent validity, correlating significantly with 
other measures of insomnia (sleep diaries, polysomnography, informant and clinician reports) 
and sensitivity in detecting change in perceived sleep difficulties following treatment (Bastien et 
al., 2001). 
 
2.5.9 Trait dissociation 
 
Trait dissociation questionnaire – short version (TDQs; Murray, 1997) 
 
The TDQs is an 11-item valid and reliable measure of trait disposition to dissociation.  It was 
administered to assess participants’ level of trait dissociation and the relationship of this to the 
number of intrusive memories developed.  The TDQs measures seven aspects of dissociation, 
including detachment from others and the world; sense of split self; lability of mood and 
impulsivity; inattention and memory lapses; emotional numbing; confusion and altered sense of 
time; and amnesia for important life events, which were supported by factor analysis.  Subjects 
are required to report the frequency with which they experience these aspects of dissociation 
from 0 (never) to 5 (always).  It was developed from a larger 38-item version with high internal 
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consistency (α = 0.93) and good test-retest reliability (r = 0.86), which predicted intrusive 
memories in a student population (Murray, 1997).  The shorter version was validated with an 
outpatient sample and correlated highly with the original TDQ (r = 0.94).  It showed good 
internal consistency (α = 0.86) and adequate retest reliability (r = 0.56). 
 
2.5.10 Intrusive memories 
 
Intrusions diary (unpublished) 
 
Number of intrusive memories developed in the week following the analogue trauma was 
assessed using an intrusions diary (Appendix 5), which participants completed for one week 
after the film task.  This is a standard way of assessing frequency of intrusions and has been 
extensively used in analogue trauma paradigms (see Holmes & Bourne, 2008).   It comprised a 
sheet of paper with a table divided up by the days of the week.  Each day contained a column 
for recording the total number of intrusions, whether the intrusions were thoughts or images and 
which film clips they referred to.   
 
2.5.11 Emotional reactivity 
 
Emotional reactivity scales (unpublished) 
 
Emotional reactivity to the test films was assessed using four 11-point Likert scales  ranging 
from 0 to 10 (Appendix 6).  These measured valence of emotion (ranging from extremely 
negative to extremely positive), distress (ranging from no distress to extreme distress), horror 
(ranging from no horror to extreme horror) and arousal (ranging from no arousal to extreme 
arousal).   
 
Distress and horror were chosen as they were the target emotions used by Schartau et al. (2009), 
who demonstrated an effect of appraisal training on these emotions in reaction to distressing 
films.  Schartau and colleagues focused on these emotions since they were most intensively 
evoked during piloting of their distressing film clips.  They also noted that generalised emotion 
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terms (e.g. distress, negative emotion) have been demonstrated as reliable indices of emotion 
change in response to experimental manipulations (Richards & Gross, 2000) and bear similarity 
to the Subjective Units of Distress measure which is often used in clinical research and practice 
(e.g. Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006).  They further noted that distress and horror are emotions 
historically elicited by traumatic experiences. 
 
Subjective level of arousal was also included as an emotional reactivity measure in this study to 
explore the impact of training on this variable between conditions, given that higher post-trauma 
arousal has been linked to the subsequent development of PTSD (O’Donnell et al. 2007).  
Valence of affect was used to explore whether greater levels of overall negative affect elicited 
by the film was associated with more intrusions. 
 
2.5.12 Personal relevance and mood ratings 
 
Personal relevance scale (unpublished) 
 
An 11-point Likert scale was used to assess the personal relevance of the pre- and post-training 
films (Appendix 7).  This was included in order to investigate potential differences between the 
groups in the extent to which they found the post-training test film clip more personally relevant 
compared with the baseline clip, since the abstract group’s instructions encouraged them to 
relate the films to their own lives.  Participants were asked ‘How much personal relevance did 
this film have for you?’ with the scale ranging from 0 (none) to 100 (extreme).  
 
Mood rating (unpublished) 
 
An 11-point Likert scale was used to assess participants’ self-reported mood before and after 
training (Appendix 8).  The scale ranged from 0 (extremely negative) to 100 (extremely 
positive). 
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2.5.13 Manipulation and diary compliance checks 
 
Manipulation check for processing mode (unpublished) 
 
Participants’ self-report compliance to the allocated processing mode (Appendix 9) was indexed 
using an 11-point Likert scale which asked ‘To what extent did you watch the film according to 
the instructions given to you?’, with responses ranging from 0 (none of the time) to 100 (all of 
the time).  In addition, their level of attention to the film was assessed by asking ‘To what extent 
did you pay attention to the film?’ with an 11-point Likert scale of responses ranging from 0 
(none of the time) to 100 (all of the time).  Participants were excluded if their level of adherence 
was less than 50% of the time. 
 
Diary compliance (unpublished) 
 
Diary compliance (the extent to which participants completed the diary reliably and accurately) 
was assessed using an 11-point Likert scale with responses ranging from 0 (never) to 100 (all of 
the time; Appendix 10).  This measure was also completed online, following the IES-R. 
 
2.5.14 Trauma films 
 
The two test films (shown pre- and post-training) contained real-life footage of the aftermath of 
RTAs and included scenes of destruction, severely injured people in distress and dead bodies.  
These two clips, along with three of the training films with similar content, have been used in 
previous studies (e.g. Steil, 1997).  The remaining three training clips included scenes of 
violence involving animals and humans, which were borrowed with permission from Schartau 
et al. (2009).  Each film (including the two test films) contained a short voice-over at the 
beginning explaining what the clip was about.  Film clips ranged from 21 to 137 seconds with a 
mean length of 89 seconds (SD = 35.88).  Since the films involved witnessing events that 
involved ‘actual or threatened death or serious physical injury’, which elicited significant levels 
of distress and horror (see Section 2.6 below), the film content conformed to the DSM-IV 
criteria for a traumatic event (APA, 1994). 
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2.6 Pilot phase 
 
There were two pilot phases.  The first was to select the two test films and the second was to 
assess the acceptability of the experimental task.  All pilot participants met inclusion criteria for 
the study and gave written informed consent.  The two test films were chosen from a series of 
seven clips used by Steil (1997).  A pilot study was conducted with student volunteers (N = 10) 
at King’s College London to determine which two test films evoked the most distress out of the 
set of seven films and hence may best used as a baseline film before training and a test film after 
training in the study (see Table 1).  The mean age of the pilot sample was 31.7 years (SD = 
10.1, range = 25-58).  Three (30%) were male and seven (70%) were female.  The mean distress 
rating of the baseline film (film 6) was 55.3 (SD = 27.8).  The mean distress rating of the post-
training test film (film 3) was 59.7 (SD = 23.5). These two films were comparable in the level of 










1 47 (29.7) 49.6 (34.7) 43.3 (28.1) 24.9 (13.8) 
2 42 (30.4) 44 (30.5) 50 (30.2) 37.4 (15.2) 
3 59.7 (23.5) 62.5 (23.5) 60.4 (30.3) 20.6 (9.4) 
4 43.5 (31.9) 42.6 (36.1) 46.3 (30.0) 25 (13.3) 
5 47.3 (24.2) 57.3 (29.1) 57 (33.4) 20 (13.9) 
6 55.3 (27.8) 58 (30.8) 53.9 (39.4) 20.8 (10.4) 
7 38.8 (28.6) 34.8 (29.6) 35.3 (29.7) 28.9 (13.4) 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations (SD) of emotional reactivity ratings of RTA film clips. 
 
A second pilot study was conducted to establish feasibility and acceptability of the experimental 
procedure.  This used the present version of the current study.  Participants were volunteers 
from the MindSearch database who met the study inclusion criteria.  One participant was 
excluded from the analysis for failing the manipulation check relating to adherence to 
instructions.  The whole sample had a mean age of 33.3 years (SD = 11.0, range 23-60).  The 
mean age for the abstract group was 32.3 years (SD = 11.16) and 34.3 years (SD = 11.61) for 
the concrete group, with no significant difference in age between the two groups, t(13) = -.333, 
p = .745.  Of the sample, 6 participants were male (37.5%) and 10 were female (62.5%), and 
groups were equivalent in sex, χ2(1) = .001,  p = 1.000.  Table 2 compares baseline measures 
and manipulation checks for both groups, showing that there were no significant differences 
between groups (p = > .1). 
Main Research Project 
53 
 






PHQ 2.14 (2.12) 1.13 (1.36) t(13) = 1.125, p = .281 
STAI-T 35.00 (7.44) 30.38 (7.11) t(13) = 1.230, p = .240 
Trauma checklist 2.29 (1.98) 1.88 (2.10) t(13) = .388, p = .704 
IES-R (baseline) 8.43 (7.91) 3.88 (5.17) t(10.1) = 1.299, p = .223 
PTQ  32.00 (11.45) 19.71 (15.91) t(12) = 1.658, p = .123 
TDQ-s 7.29 (6.13) 5.14 (4.26) t(13) = .542, p = .597 
ISI 4.00 (3.10) 4.86 (2.85) t(11) = -.519, p = .614 
Proneness to intrusions 1 0.83 (0.75) 1.00 (0.58) t(11) = -.452, p = .660 
Proneness to intrusions 2 0.50 (0.55) 0.43 (0.54) t(11) = .238, p = .817 
Proneness to intrusions 3 2.33 (0.82) 2.00 (0.58) t(11) = .860, p = .408 
Test film 1 distress 50.00 (26.46) 41.25 (33.57) t(13) = .554, p = .589 
Test film 1 horror 52.86 (32.0) 37.50 (34.54) t(13) = .889, p = .390 
Test film 1 arousal 35.71 (13.97) 20.00 (25.07) t(13) = 1.275, p = .225 
Test film 1 valence 35.71 (22.25) 33.13 (10.99) t(13) = .402, p = .695 
Mood post-training 44.29 (17.18) 56.88 (25.21) t(13) = -1.112, p = .286 
Attention to final film 95.00 (5.35) 90.00 (11.55) t(13) = -1.102, p = .291  
Mode compliance 75.71 (22.25) 85.00 (15.12) t(13) = -.957, p = .356 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations and t-tests of baseline measures and manipulation checks 
by group for the pilot sample. 
 
Table 3 compares emotional reactivity ratings in response to the two test films between groups.  
It shows that the groups were equivalent in levels of emotional reactivity to the baseline test 
film clip.  However, after training, the abstract group showed significantly greater distress, 
horror, arousal and negative affect in response to the second test film clip. 
 
 Abstract Concrete t-tests 
Test film 1 distress 50 (26.46) 41.25 (33.57) t(13) = .554, p = .589 
Test film 1 horror 52.86 (32.0) 37.5 (34.54) t(13) = .889, p = .390 
Test film 1 arousal 35.71 (13.97) 20.0 (25.07) t(13) = 1.275, p = .225 
Test film 1 valence 35.71 (22.25) 33.13 (10.99) t(13) = .402, p = .695 
Test film 2 distress 77.14 (26.28) 45.00 (27.26) t(13) = 2.317, p = .037 
Test film 2 horror 68.57 (25.45) 32.50 (27.12) t(13) = 2.644, p = .020 
Test film 2 arousal 75.71 (19.88) 25.00 (28.79) t(13) = 3.908, p = .002 
Test film 2 valence 12.86 (16.04) 42.50 (25.36) t(13) = -2.657, p = .020 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations and t-tests of emotional reactivity scores by group for pilot 
sample. 
 
Table 4 compares number of intrusive memories and IES-R scores between groups.  The mean 
number of intrusions and IES-R scores was higher in the abstract compared with the concrete 
group although the difference was not statistically significant. 




 Abstract Concrete t-tests 
Intrusions 4.14 (3.63) 2.13 (2.42) t(13) = 1.285, p = .221 
IES-R 9.29 (8.10) 3.63 (4.24) t(8.8) = 1.661, p = .132 





An overview of the study procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.  An email circular advertising the 
study was circulated to all staff and students at King’s College London (Appendix 11).  
Participants were given the rationale that the study was looking at what factors influence 
people’s reactions to trauma. Those who responded to the email expressing interest in taking 
part and were sent a detailed information sheet to read and consider (Appendix 12).  Prior to 
deciding whether they wanted to take part, they were given the opportunity to ask any questions.  
Those who still wanted to take part on reading and considering the information sheet were 
invited to attend a session of approximately one hour, which took place in a quiet testing room 
at the Institute of Psychiatry.  All participants were reminded verbally at the outset of the 
session that they were free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  Written 
consent was obtained for all participants (Appendix 13), followed by screening measures (PHQ, 
trauma screener and IES-R).  Those who did not meet the inclusion criteria based on these 
questionnaires were informed of this and signposted to potential sources of support.  A risk 
assessment and management plan was put in place for those who expressed suicidal ideation.  
Those who met the inclusion criteria were asked to complete a series of baseline measures 
(STAI-T, GIQ, PTQ, proneness to intrusions, TDQ-s, ISI and mood rating).   Participants were 
then randomly allocated to either the abstract or concrete training condition to complete the film 
task.  Following the film task, participants were given an intrusion diary to take with them and 
to record for one week. One week after the task, they were asked to post back the diaries (in a 
stamped addressed envelope provided) and complete the online IES-R. 
 




Figure 2. Overview of study procedure. 
Interested volunteers given information 
sheet (N = 144) 
Informed consent obtained 












1 = > 10 on PHQ 
1 = > 33 on IES-R  
Diary completed for one week 
Diary sent back 
Online questionnaire completed 
£15 payment and written debrief 
Trauma film task 
Yes (N = 53) 
No (N = 81) 
No (N = 2) 




Passed (N = 50) 
Diary compliance 
Passed (N = 50) 
Excluded  
Did not pass 
(N = 1) 
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2.7.1 Film task 
 
The film task procedure is summarised in Figure 3.  Participants sat in a comfortable chair and 
watched the films at a desk on a 15 inch laptop screen.  They were told that the task involved 
watching a series of film clips of real-life traumatic footage, which they would be asked to 
watch in a particular way according to some instructions they would be given.  For the baseline 
test film, participants were asked to simply watch the film as they would normally and 
completed the measures of emotional reactivity and personal relevance afterwards.  Following 
the first test film, participants were given instructions for how to watch the subsequent clips 
according to the condition they had been assigned to. 
 
In the abstract condition, participants were given the following instructions: 
 
‘For each film, I would like you to focus on: 
1.) Why these sorts of things happen; 
2.) What it means about the world; 
3.) What it means for the people involved; 
4.) What if this was to happen to you, or someone in your family?' 
 
In the concrete condition, participants were given the following instructions: 
 
‘For each film, I would like you to focus on: 
1.) The specific and objective details of the event, for example, what you can see, what you can 
hear; 
2.) The sequence of events as they are unfolding; 
3.) What needs to happen step by step from here.’ 
 
All participants were informed that it was not a memory test and that they would get a chance to 
practise and familiarise themselves with the instructions.  They were given the opportunity to 
ask questions for clarification and further explanation was given if necessary. 
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In order to help them understand how to process in an abstract or concrete way, participants 
were told what the first training film depicted and given examples of how someone adopting the 
particular processing mode might view this film.  For the abstract condition, participants were 
told: ‘Here is the first film.  It is about an elderly man whose wife is killed by a drunk driver, 
and the man ends up having a breakdown and taking his own life on the motorway.  In relation 
to why these things happen, you might think that they happen because of other people’s 
carelessness or for no good reason.  In relation to what it means about the world, you might 
think that it means the world can be unfair and unpredictable.  In terms of the implications you 
might wonder about the effect on the man’s family and on the police that witnessed it.  Finally, 
you may consider what if this was to happen to you or someone in your family.’ 
 
For the concrete condition, participants were told: ‘Here is the first film.  It is about an elderly 
man whose wife is killed by a drunk driver, and the man ends up having a breakdown and 
taking his own life on the motorway.  So focusing on the specific details you might notice that 
there is a man with a gun who is standing next to a car, and register other details such as what 
colour the car is, what else you can see in the scene, what time of day it is, what the police are 
shouting and so on.  In focusing on the sequence of events you might think to yourself “the man 
is walking over to the boot of his car, he’s opening the boot, he’s loading his gun, he’s looking 
around”, and so on.  In terms of what is needed to happen step by step from here, you may 
simply think that the road needs to be closed off and there needs to be an investigation.’  Again, 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions before presentation of the first film clip. 
 
Following the first three training films, participants were asked to give examples of what they 
were thinking about or focusing on whilst watching the film so that the investigator could be 
sure that they understood the instructions and were adopting the mode of processing correctly.  
Where participants demonstrated difficulty applying the required mode of processing or their 
feedback reflected thoughts that were inconsistent with that mode of processing, further 
instruction was given.  For the last three training clips, participants were simply asked whether 
they thought they had successfully applied the required mode of processing.   
 
Before each training film, written prompts containing the processing mode instructions 
appeared on the computer screen.  After each training film the word ‘relax’ appeared on the 
screen for five seconds, which aimed to minimise any accumulative effect of the training phase 
on mood.   
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A second mood rating was obtained after the training phase, prior to the final test film.  
Participants were told that this was the last film and were reminded to pay attention to it whilst 
adopting the required mode of processing. Following the final test film, participants completed 
the emotional reactivity, personal relevance and manipulation check measures. 
 
At the end of the testing session, participants were given the intrusions diary with instructions 
for completing it.  They were asked to carry it with them for the next week and to record any 
spontaneously occurring memories that they experienced relating to any of the film clips.  They 
were given a specific timescale (from leaving the test room to the same time the following 
week) and the specific days were written on their diary for ease of completion.  To promote 
compliance with the diary, participants were asked whether they could foresee any difficulties 
with completing it, and if so, the experimenter helped the participant problem-solve how 
compliance with the diary could be maximised.   
 
One week after the session, participants were sent an email prompting them to return the diary 
(in a stamped addressed envelope which had been given to them) with a link to the online 
questionnaire containing the IES-R and diary compliance measure.  Once the online 
questionnaire had been completed and the diary was received, participants were sent a payment 
of £15 as compensation for their time.  All participants received a written debrief on completion 














































week later  
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2.8 Data analysis 
 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate possible pre-experimental group 
differences in baseline measures, manipulation and diary compliance checks, as well as number 
of intrusive memories and IES-R scores one week later.  Chi-squared tests were used to test for 
possible baseline differences categorical variables.  Mixed (2 x 2) ANOVAS were conducted to 
compare pre- and post-training emotional reactivity (distress, horror, valence and arousal) 
between the two groups, as well as pre- and post-training levels of mood and personal relevance 
of the test film clips, with training condition (abstract versus concrete) as the between groups 
factor and time (pre-film versus post-film) as the repeated measures factor.  Bivariate Pearson’s 
correlations were conducted to explore relationships between individual predictor variables and 
outcome (number of intrusive memories and IES-R score).  A hierarchical regression analysis 
was carried out to investigate the relationship of these variables to number of intrusive 
memories developed.  Finally, potential interactions between these baseline vulnerability 
measures and training condition in predicting number of intrusions was investigated by carrying 
out individual hierarchical regression analyses and including the interaction terms. 
  





Variables were assessed for normality by obtaining values of skewness and kurtosis and 
calculating their associated z-scores, with a cut off of 2.58 following Field (2009).  Those with 
z-scores of 2 and above were inspected visually using histograms and Q-Q plots.  Variables that 
violated assumptions of normality were log 10, square root or reciprocally transformed where 
appropriate, and variables that could not be successfully transformed were analysed using non-
parametric tests.  Observed rather than transformed values are reported for purposes of 
readability.  Homogeneity of variance was assessed with Levene’s test before using parametric 
tests.  All analyses used a two-tailed significance level of α = .05.  Data were analysed using 
SPSS for Windows version 18. 
 
One participant failed the adherence check related to the experimental manipulation, reporting a 
complete failure to follow the instructions whilst watching the final test clip.  This participant 
also failed the adherence check related to the intrusions diary, reporting that they had not 
completed it accurately or reliably.  This person’s data were excluded for failing to meet 
reliability standards. 
 
3.1 Group comparisons at baseline 
 
The mean age of participants was 27.2 years, in the abstract condition (SD = 9.1) and 24.7 years 
in the concrete condition (SD = 5.4), and a t-test showed no significant difference in age 
between the two conditions, t(48) = .004, p = .367.  In both groups, the majority of participants 
were female, with 15 females (57.7%) in the abstract condition and 13 females (54.2%) in the 
concrete condition.  A chi-squared analysis showed no significant differences in sex between the 
two conditions, χ2(1) = .063, p = .802.  There were no between-group differences in frequency 
of driving, χ2(1) = .024, p = .877 with 7 (26.9%) driving at least once a week in the abstract 
group and 6 (25%) driving at least once a week in the concrete condition. 
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Table 5 compares means and standard deviations of baseline measures between the groups.  
There were no significant differences between the two groups in trait anxiety (STAI-T) or 
depression (PHQ).  Both groups reported equivalent levels of prior trauma exposure on the 
trauma checklist and there were no significant differences between the groups in baseline 
symptom levels of PTSD on the IES-R.  Scores on the PHQ, STAI-T and IES-R are all below 
clinical cut-offs.   
 
Baseline measures Abstract (N = 26) 
Mean (SD) 




PHQ 1.88 (2.18) 2.17 (1.20) t(39.6) = -.572, p = .570 
STAI-T 30.15 (7.15) 32.58 (7.19) t(48) = -1.197, p = .237 
Trauma checklist 1.38 (1.42) 1.33 (1.61) t(48) = .276, p = .784 
IES-R (baseline) 5.15 (6.29) 6.54 (7.83) t(48) = -.321, p = .750 
Table 5. Means, standard deviations and t-tests of baseline measures by group. 
 
Comparisons of predictor variables between groups are presented in Table 6.  There were no 
significant differences between the two groups in the levels of trait rumination (PTQ); trait 
dissociation (TDQs); self-reported proneness to intrusive memories after stressful events (PTI1), 
unpleasant scenes on television (PTI2) or positive events (PTI3); or sleep difficulties (ISI).   
 
Predictor variables Abstract (N = 26) 
Mean (SD) 




PTQ  14.54 (9.47) 16.83 (11.26) t(48) = -.782, p = .438 
TDQ-s 6.92 (5.76) 6.75 (4.23) t(47) = -.058, p = .954 
ISI 5.31 (5.42) 4.38 (2.84) t(43.3) = .395, p = .695 
PTI 1 1.31 (1.16) 1.25 (1.03) t(48) = .185, p = .854 
PTI 2 0.73 (0.60) 0.71 (0.69) t(48) = .123, p = .903 
PTI 3 2.73 (1.00) 2.29 (1.04) t(48) = .1.519, p = .135 
Table 6. Means, standard deviations and t-tests of predictor variables by group. 
 
Table 7 compares ratings of baseline mood (prior to watching the first test clip), emotional 
reactions to the first test clip (distress, horror, arousal and valence) and ratings of personal 
relevance for the first test clip between groups.  There were no significant differences in ratings 
of mood, distress, horror, valence or personal relevance of the first test film clip.  Unexpectedly, 
there was a significant difference between the groups in self-reported levels of arousal in 
relation to the first film clip, with the abstract group giving higher subjective ratings of arousal 
than the concrete group.  Since this was based on a subjective measure of arousal however, for 
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which no objective physiological data are available, it should be interpreted with caution.  
Furthermore, it was not significantly correlated with the hyperarousal scale of the IES-R at one 




Abstract (N = 26) 
Mean (SD) 




Baseline mood rating 75.25 (16.82) 72.75 (11.72) t(38) = .545, p = .589 
Test film 1 distress 49.81 (23.34) 45.21 (25.43) t(48) = .667, p = .508 
Test film 1 horror 47.12 (24.67) 41.46 (27.72) t(48) = .764, p = .449 
Test film 1 arousal 39.81 (27.66) 25.00 (20.64) t(46.1) = 2.156, p = .036 
Test film 1 valence 30.77 (13.17) 33.33 (12.99) t(48) = -.692, p = .492 
Test film 1 personal 
relevance 
15.00 (23.37) 14.17 (21.65) t(48) = -.101, p = .920 
Table 7. Means, standard deviations and t-tests of mood and responses to baseline test film clip 
by group. 
 
Between group comparisons of manipulation check scores are shown in Table 8.  All 
participants generally reported paying attention to the film (> 70% of the time) and complying 
with their allocated mode of processing (> 50% of the time).   
 
Manipulation check Abstract (N = 26) 
Mean (SD) 




Attention to final film 91.92 (10.87) 92.29 (11.03) t(48) = .021, p = .983 
Mode compliance 86.35 (12.46) 85.42 (7.93) t(48) = -1.053, p = .298 
Table 8. Means, standard deviations and t-tests of manipulation checks by training condition. 
 
In addition, there were no significant differences between the two groups in terms of their self-
reported compliance with the intrusion diary, U = 255, z = -.630, p = .528, with all participants 




Participants completed a range of baseline trait and state measures at the beginning of the 
testing session and after viewing the first test film clip.  Between group comparisons showed 
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that groups did not differ on demographic variables, baseline questionnaires, state measures or 
ratings of distress, horror and valence in response to the first test film.  However, the abstract 
group rated themselves as significantly more aroused in relation to the first test film clip, 
although the validity of this measure is unclear. 
 
3.2 Change in mood and personal relevance of film clips 
 
Mixed ANOVAs were conducted to assess potential change in mood and personal relevance of 
the test film clips over the course of the testing session.  Effect sizes were derived using partial 
eta-squared (η2p), where η2p = .01 represents a small effect size, η2p = .06 a medium effect size 
and η2p = .14 a large effect size (Cohen, 1988).  Figure 4 compares change in mood ratings from 
pre- to post-training between groups.  There was a main effect of time on mood, with both 
groups reporting a decrease in mood from pre- to post-training, F(1, 37) = 104.36, p = .001, η2p 
= .738.  There was no main effect of condition on mood F(1, 37) = 1.054, p = .311, η2p = .028.  
However, there was a significant interaction between condition and mood over time, F(1, 37) = 
5.26, p = .028, η2p = .124 with decrease in mood in the abstract group being more pronounced in 
the abstract condition.   Paired sampled t-tests confirmed that in both groups there was a 
significant decrease in mood from pre- to post-training (abstract: t(18) = 8.221, p = .001; 
concrete: t(10) = 6.056, p = .001).  Independent samples t-tests revealed that whereas there was 
no significant difference in mood between groups before training, t(38) = .545, p = .589, the 
abstract group gave significantly lower ratings of mood after training, t(47) = -2.688, p = .010.  
 
 




Figure 4. Change in ratings of mood from pre- to post-training between groups. 
 
Figure 5 shows change in ratings of personal relevance of the test film clips over time for both 
groups.  Again, there was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 48) = 18.771, p = .001, η2p = 
.281, indicating that both conditions rated the second test clip as having more personal 
relevance than the first.  However, there was no main effect of condition on personal relevance 
F(1, 48) = .259, p = .613, η2p = .005, and no interaction between condition and change in 
personal relevance over time F(1, 48) = .917, p = .343, η2p = .019.  This suggests that ratings of 































Changes in mood state and degree to which participants experienced the test film clips as 
personally relevant from pre- to post-training were compared between groups.  This indicated 
that both groups reported a decrease in mood across the testing session, although this was more 
marked in the abstract group.  Both groups showed a comparable increase in the degree to 
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3.3 Analysis of hypotheses 
 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Participants who are trained to process traumatic films in a concrete 
way will experience fewer intrusive memories in relation to the film clips 
compared with participants who are trained to process the clips in an abstract way 
 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate differences in primary outcome 
measures assessed at one-week follow-up:  the number of intrusive memories experienced in the 
week following the test-session and total and sub-scale IES-R scores.  Effect sizes were 
calculated using Pearson’s r, where r = .10 represents a small effect, r = .30 a medium effect 
and r = .50 a large effect (Field, 2009).  Potential between group differences in the number of 
image- and thought-based intrusive memories were also investigated.  Pearson’s correlations 
were conducted to investigate the relationship between baseline measures, their changes over 
the course of the session, and outcome measures. Where baseline measures were significantly 
correlated with primary outcomes, they were treated as covariates in the relevant analyses. 
 
Of the whole sample, 47 participants (94%) reported at least one intrusive memory relating to 
the film clips.  Table 9 shows the mean number of intrusive memories and IES-R scores by 
group. 
 




Intrusive memories 11.85 (11.06) 6.29 (4.81) 
IES-R total 12.62 (12.71) 6.29 (4.31) 
IES-R intrusion scale 6.62 (4.07) 3.79 (2.62) 
IES-R avoidance scale 4.85 (5.40) 2.29 (2.39) 
IES-R hyperarousal scale 1.15 (2.26) 0.21 (0.59) 
Table 9. Means and standard deviations of intrusive memories and IES-R scores by group. 
 
Figure 6 displays the differences between the two groups for total number of intrusive memories 
recorded in the diary and for total IES-R scores.  The concrete group reported significantly 
fewer intrusive memories that the abstract group, t(48) = 2.06, p = .044, r = .29.  The concrete 
group also reported significantly lower IES-R scores than the abstract group, t(48) = 2.69, p = 
.009, r = .43.  A Pearson’s correlation indicated that there was no significant relationship 
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between decrease in mood from pre- to post-training and number of intrusive memories 
developed, r = -.240, p = .135, or between mood change and IES-R score, r = -.271, p = .095.  
There was a significant correlation between change in personal relevance ratings of the films 
pre- to post-training and number of intrusive memories, r = -.316, p = .03.  However, after 
controlling for change in personal relevance, the effect of condition on intrusive memories 
remained, F(1, 42) = 4.803, p = .034.  There was no significant correlation between change in 
personal relevance and IES-R scores, r = -.244, p = .300.  Arousal ratings in response to the 
baseline test film clip were significantly correlated with IES-R score, r = .364, p = .009.  
However, after including these arousal ratings as a covariate, the effect of training on IES-R 
score remained, F(1, 47) = 4.229, p = .045. 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of intrusive memories and IES-R scores by group (means and standard errors 
are shown). 
 
Table 10 shows the number of image- and thought-based intrusive memories by group.  The 
concrete group reported significantly fewer image-based intrusive memories compared with the 














Number of intrusions IES-R score 
Abstract 
Concrete 
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Image-based 8.88 (10.47) 3.86 (2.97) t(45) = 2.238, p = .030 
Thought-based 3.28 (4.20) 2.14 (3.20) t(45) = 1.343, p = .186 
Table 10. Means and standard deviations of image- and thought-based memories by group. 
 
Figure 7 shows differences between conditions in individual IES-R subscales.  The concrete 
group reported significantly lower scores on the intrusion subscale, t(43) = 2.93, p = .005, r = 
.38.  There was a non-significant trend for the concrete group to report lower avoidance 
subscale scores, t(48) = 1.74, p = .087, r = .24, and hyperarousal scores, U = 250.00, z = -1.662, 
p = .097, r = -.24.   
 
 
Figure 7. Individual IES-R subscale scores by group (means and standard errors are shown). 
 
Summary: Hypothesis 1 
 
As hypothesised, the concrete group reported significantly fewer intrusive memories in relation 
to the film clips during the following week, as well as lower IES-R scores one week later 
(including on the intrusion subscale).  There was a trend towards the concrete group scoring 
lower on the avoidance and hyperarousal subscales.  Although the abstract group reported a 
greater decrease in mood than the concrete group, this was not significantly related to the 
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relevance , which was correlated with number of intrusive memories, and baseline subjective 
arousal, which was correlated with IES-R scores.  These findings suggest that the first 
hypothesis, that participants trained to process traumatic stimuli in a concrete way will 
experience fewer intrusive memories than those trained to process the same stimuli in an 
abstract way, is supported. 
 
3.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Participants who are trained to process the films in a concrete way 
will experience reduced emotional reactivity to a subsequent traumatic film 
compared with participants who are trained to process the films in an abstract 
way 
 
Mixed ANOVAS were conducted to investigate changes in emotional reactivity measures 
between the groups.  Effect sizes were derived using partial eta-squared (η2p), where η2p = .01 
represents a small effect size, η2p = .06 a medium effect size and η2p = .14 a large effect size 
(Cohen, 1988).  Paired samples t-tests were conducted to investigate pre- to post- differences in 
ratings within groups.  Where shift in mood was correlated with outcome, this was included as a 
covariate.   
 







Test film 1 distress 49.81 (23.34) 45.21 (25.43) 
Test film 1 horror 47.12 (24.67) 41.46 (27.72) 
Test film 1 arousal 39.81 (27.66) 23.75 (21.23) 
Test film 1 valence 30.77 (13.17) 33.33 (12.99) 
Test film 2 distress 65.77 (23.57) 45.21 (22.91) 
Test film 2 horror 58.46 (26.79) 37.92 (29.78) 
Test film 2 arousal 54.23 (30.35) 31.46 (26.11) 
Test film 2 valence 23.08 (11.32) 31.67 (15.16) 
Table 11. Means and standard deviations of emotional reactivity ratings for test films by group. 
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Mixed ANOVAs were conducted to investigate change in emotional reaction ratings in response 
to the pre- and post-training test film clips.  For distress ratings, there was a main effect of time 
(pre- to post-training) on ratings of distress, F(1, 48) = 5.95, p = .018, η2p =.110, and a main 
effect of condition, F(1, 48) = 4.554, p = .038, η2p = .087.  As Figure 8 illustrates, there was a 
significant interaction between change in distress ratings from pre- to post-training and 
condition, with the abstract group showing greater increases in distress in response to the second 
test clip compared with the concrete group, F(1, 48) = .5.95, p = .018, η2p = .110.   
 
 
Figure 8. Change in distress ratings in response to pre- and post-training test film clips between 
groups. 
 
Paired samples t-tests revealed that whereas there was no change in distress ratings to the test 
film clips from pre- to post-training in the concrete group, t(23) = .001, p = .520, there was a 
significant increase in distress ratings for the abstract group, t(25) = -5.512, p = .001.  
Independent samples t-tests revealed that whereas there was no significant difference between 
groups in pre-training test clip ratings, t(48) = .667, p = .508, the abstract group rated the post-
training test clip as significantly more distressing than the concrete group, t(48) = -3.123, p = 
.003.  There was a significant correlation between decreased mood and increase in distress, r = -
.320, p = .047.  However, an ANCOVA was conducted including change in mood as a 
covariate.  This showed that, after controlling for decrease in mood, effect of condition on 
change in distress remained, F(1, 35) = 5.976, p = .013, η2p = .159.  There was no correlation 
between change in distress rating and change in personal relevance, r = .185, p = .436, nor with 
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Figure 9 shows change in pre- and post-training test clip ratings of horror for both groups.  
There was a significant interaction between change in horror ratings from pre- to post-training 
test films and condition, with the abstract group showing greater increases in horror ratings in 
response to the second test clip compared with the concrete group, F(1, 48) = 5.029, p = .030, 
η2p
 = .095.  There was also a main effect of time (pre- to post-training), F(1, 48) = 1.382, p = 
.246, η2p = .028, although no main effect of condition, F(1, 48) = 3.544, p = .066, η2p = .069. 
 
 
Figure 9. Change in ratings of horror in response to pre- and post-training test film clips 
between groups. 
 
Paired samples t-tests revealed that whereas there was no change in horror ratings to the test 
film clips from pre- to post-training in the concrete group, t(23) =.653, p = .520, there was a 
significant increase in distress ratings for the abstract group, t(25) = -2.867, p = .008.  
Independent samples t-tests revealed that whereas there was no significant difference between 
groups in pre-training test clip ratings, t(48) = .674, p = .449, the abstract group rated the post-
training test clip as significantly more distressing than the concrete group, t(48) = 2.568, p = 
.013.  There was no significant correlation between increase in horror ratings and decrease in 
mood, r = -.214, p = .191, change in ratings of personal relevance, r = -.039, p = .799, or 
baseline arousal, r = .079, p = .584  
 
Change in pre- and post-training test clip ratings of arousal between groups are shown in Figure 
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interaction between time and condition, F(1, 48) = .964, p = .331, η2p = .020.  This suggests that 
both groups reported a comparable increase in subjective ratings of physiological arousal in 
response to the second film clip.  There was a main effect of condition however, F(1, 48) = 
8.334, p = .006, η2p = .148, and as Figure 10 shows, the abstract groups ratings of arousal tended 
to be higher.  There was a significant relationship between ratings of arousal and mood, r = -
.397, p = .012, but not between ratings of arousal and personal relevance, r = .022, p = .888.  
Paired sampled t-tests revealed that both conditions reported an increase in arousal in relation to 
the second test clip, (abstract: t(25) = -3.084, p = .005; concrete: t(23) = -1.542, p = .137). 
 
 
Figure 10. Change in ratings of arousal test film clips between groups in response to pre- and 
post-training test film clips between groups. 
 
Pre- to post-training test film clip ratings of valence between condition are shown in Figure 11.  
There was a main effect of time F(1, 48) = 5.00, p = .030, η2p = .094, although no main effect of 
condition F(1, 48) = 3.252, p = .078, η2p = .063, and no interaction between time and condition, 
F(1, 48) = 2.072, p = .156, η2p = .041.  However, paired samples t-tests showed that the abstract 
group reported a significant decrease in valence, t(25) = 3.177, p = .004, whereas the concrete 
group did not, t(23) = .479, p = .636.  Ratings of valence were significantly correlated with 



























Figure 11. Change in ratings of valence of affect during test film clips in response to pre- and 
post-training test film clips between groups. 
 
Summary: Hypothesis 2 
 
Participants in the abstract condition demonstrated an increase in distress and horror from pre- 
to post-training in response to the test films, which was significantly greater than change in the 
concrete group, who demonstrated no increase in distress and horror.  The effect of training 
condition remained even when controlling for shift in mood, which was significantly related to 
change in distress ratings.  Both groups demonstrated an increase in self-reported arousal, 
although there was no difference in increase between the two groups.  Groups did not 
significantly differ in the extent to which their valence of affect changed in response to the clip 
from pre- to post-training.  These findings suggest that the second hypothesis, that participants 
trained to process the clips in a concrete way would lead to reduced emotional reactivity to the 
last test film compared with the abstract group, can be accepted, although this was limited to 
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3.3.3 Exploring the relationship of predictor variables to intrusive memories and IES-R 
scores 
 
Relationships between individual predictor variables and number of intrusive memories 
reported were explored using Pearson’s correlations.  Individual predictors were then entered 
simultaneously into a hierarchical regression analysis.  The order in which variables were 
entered was decided according to their theoretical importance based on the literature.  
Assumptions of multiple regression analyses were assessed and met.  To explore potential 
interactions between condition and individual predictor variables in predicting number of 
intrusive memories, hierarchical regression analyses were carried out with condition (coded as a 
dummy variable: 0 = abstract, 1 = concrete) and the centred predictor variable score entered 
first, followed by the interaction term (cross-product of condition x variable score).   
 
Individual Pearson’s correlations between predictor variables and number of intrusive memories 
for the whole sample and by group are summarised in Table 12.  Proneness to intrusions 1 (i.e. 
the tendency to experience intrusive memories in response to unpleasant or stressful events in 
everyday life) was significantly correlated with number of intrusive memories for the whole 
sample.  Both proneness to intrusions 2 (the tendency to experience intrusive memories in 
response to unpleasant scenes on television) and proneness to intrusions 3 (the tendency to 
experience intrusive memories in response to positive events) were only significantly correlated 
with intrusions in the abstract group.  Sleep difficulties in the two weeks prior to the test session 
were positively and significantly correlated with intrusive memories, although only in the 
concrete group. 
 
 Whole sample Abstract Concrete 
PTQ r = .043, p = .765 r = -.017, p = .933 r = .169, p = .431 
TDQ-s r = -.164, p = .260 r = -.172, p = .412 r = -.166, p = .439 
Proneness to intrusions 1 r = .350, p = .013 r = .354, p = .076 r = .363, p = .081 
Proneness to intrusions 2 r = .225, p = .116 r = .421, p = .032 r = .047, p = .826 
Proneness to intrusions 3 r = .245, p = .087 r = .492, p = .011 r = -.115, p = .591 
ISI r = .241, p = .092 r = .118, p = .566 r = .445, p = .029 
Table 12. Correlations between predictor variables and intrusive memories. 
 
Table 13 presents individual Pearson’s correlations between predictor variables and IES-R 
scores for the whole sample and by group.  ISI score was significantly positively correlated with 
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IES-R but only in the concrete group.  Proneness to intrusions 1 was significantly correlated 
with IES-R score for in the abstract group.   
 
 Whole sample Abstract Concrete 
PTQ r = .056, p = .700 r = .060, p = .770 r = .248, p = .242 
TDQ-s r = .059, p = .689 r = .052, p = .804 r = .113, p = .599 
Proneness to intrusions 1 r = .270, p = .058 r = .400, p = .043 r = -.017, p = .937 
Proneness to intrusions 2 r = .102, p = .481 r = .064, p = .757 r = .235, p = .270 
Proneness to intrusions 3 r = .146, p = .313 r = .206, p = .312 r = -.243, p = .253 
ISI r = .040, p = .784 r = -.112, p = .587 r = .572, p = .003 
Table 13. Correlations between predictor variables and IES-R scores. 
 
Table 14 summarises the hierarchical regression analysis exploring relationships between the 
predictor variables and intrusive memories. As only the first proneness to intrusions scale was 
significantly correlated with intrusive memories for the whole sample (see Table 12), only this 
proneness to intrusions measure was entered into the model.  In the first step, which included 
PTQ score, the overall model was not significant, F(1, 47) = .088, p = .768, and PTQ score did 
not significantly predict number of intrusive memories, β = .04, t(48) = .297, p = .768.  In the 
second step, when the remaining variables were included (TDQs, proneness to intrusions, ISI), 
the model explained significant additional variance (21%) and the overall model became 
significant, F(4, 44) = 3.990, p = .008.  Neither PTQ nor TDQs scores significantly predicted 
number of intrusions.  However self-reported proneness to intrusive memories significantly 
predicted number of intrusive memories, β = .43, t(48) = 2.996, p = .004, as well as ISI scores, β 
= .33, t(48) = 2.439, p = .019. 
 
 B SE B β p 





































R2 = .002 for step 1, ΔR 2= .264 for step 2 (p = .003) 
Table 14. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting number of 
intrusive memories (B = unstandardised beta, β = standardised beta). 
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Table 15 summarises the hierarchical regression analysis exploring relationships between the 
predictor variables and IES-R scores.  In the first step, which included PTQ score, the overall 
model was not significant, F(1, 47) = .911, p = .345, and PTQ score did not significantly predict 
number of intrusive memories, β = 0.14, t(48) = .955, p = .345.  In the second step, when the 
remaining variables were included (TDQs, proneness to intrusions, ISI), they did not explain 
significant additional variance.  The overall model remained non-significant, F(4, 44) = .964, p 
= .437, and none of the predictors significantly predicted IES-R score.   
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R2 = .019 for step 1, ΔR2 = .062 for step 2 (p = .410) 
Table 15. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting IES-R scores (B 
= unstandardised beta, β = standardised beta). 
 
When condition and PTQ score were simultaneously entered into a regression analysis, the 
overall model was not significant, F(2, 47) = 2.254, p = .116.  Condition significantly predicted 
number of intrusions β = -.29, t(49) = -2.100, p = .041, whereas PTQ did not, β =.08, t(49) = 
.544, p = .589.  In the second step when the interaction term of PTQ and condition was 
included, the overall model did not explain additional variance and the model remained non-
significant, F(3, 46) = 1.597, p = .203.  The interaction did not significantly predict number of 
intrusions, β = .13, t(49) = .588, p = .559.  When condition and TDQ-s score were entered 
simultaneously into a regression analysis, the overall model was not significant, F(2, 46) = 
2.834, p = .069, and TDQs did not significantly predict number of intrusions, β = -.16, t(48) = -
1.161, p = .252, whereas condition did, β = -.29, t = -2.068, p = .044.  In the second step when 
the interaction between training condition and TDQ-s was included, this did not significantly 
predict number of intrusive memories, β = -.01, t(48) = -.052, p = .959. 
 
When condition and proneness to intrusions scale score were simultaneously entered into a 
regression analysis, the overall model was significant, F(2, 47) = 5.846, p = .005, and both 
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condition and proneness significantly predict number of intrusions, β = -.28, t(49) = -2.119 p = 
.039 and β = .34, t(49) = 2.625, p = .012 respectively.  With the inclusion of the interaction term 
(cross-product of condition x proneness to intrusions score) in the second step, the model 
remained significant, F(3, 46) = 3.827, p = .016, although the interaction did not explain 
significant additional variance and did not predict number of intrusive memories, β = .03, t(49) 
= .173, p = .864. 
 
Finally, when condition and ISI score were simultaneously entered into a regression analysis as 
a first step, the overall model was significant, F(2, 47) = 3.589, p = .035, although ISI did not 
significantly predict number of intrusions, β = .23, t(49) = 1.658, p = .104, although there was a 
non-significant trend of condition, β = -.27, t(49) = -2.008, p = .050.  In the second step, when 
the interaction term (cross-product of condition x ISI score) was included, the model did not 
explain significant additional variance, although the model remained significant, F(3, 46) = 
3.251, p = .030.  However, the interaction between ISI scores and condition did not significantly 




As hypothesised, people with a greater tendency towards developing intrusive memories in 
response to stressful events in their everyday lives and people with greater sleep difficulties in 
the previous two weeks were more likely to develop intrusive memories in response to the film 
clips.  However, trait rumination and dissociation were not significant predictors.  Furthermore, 
there were no interactions between any of the predictor variables and condition in predicting 
intrusions.  This means that the relationship between predictor variables and intrusions did not 
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3.4 Summary of results 
 
There were no differences found between the groups across a range of baseline state and trait 
measures, although the abstract group reported significantly greater subjective arousal in 
response to the first test clip.  The validity of this measure is discussed in further detail in the 
Discussion.  As hypothesised, the concrete group reported fewer intrusive memories in relation 
to the film clips in the week following the test session and lower scores on the IES-R total scale 
and intrusion subscale.  There were non-significant trends towards the concrete group having 
lower scores on the avoidance and hyperarousal subscales.  The concrete group reported fewer 
image-based memories in particular.  Both groups demonstrated a decrease in mood from pre- 
to post-training, although this was not correlated with number of intrusions developed or IES-R 
scores.  After controlling for the increase in personal relevance of the second film clip for both 
groups, which was correlated with intrusive memories, the effect of the training condition 
remained.  The effect also remained after controlling for arousal in response to the first clip, 
which was correlated with IES-R score.   
 
Consistent with hypotheses, the abstract group demonstrated a significantly greater increase in 
distress and horror after training in relation to the second test film clip compared with the first, 
compared with the concrete group whose distress and horror ratings did not increase.  The effect 
of condition on post-training distress ratings remained after controlling for decrease in mood, 
which was correlated with increase in distress.  Both groups showed a comparable increase in 
arousal, with both reporting more arousal in response to the second test film clip.  However, the 
groups differed in their arousal ratings for the first test film clip, with the abstract group 
reporting more arousal.  Both groups reported decreases in valence (i.e. the degree to which they 
felt negative during the film clips), which were not significantly different. 
 
Finally, it was found that self-reported proneness to intrusive memories in everyday life and 
sleep difficulties significantly predicted number of intrusive memories in response to the film 
clips.  Trait rumination and dissociation failed to predict number of intrusive memories, and 
interactions between predictor variables and condition also did not predict intrusive memories. 
 
  





This study had three aims.  The primary aim was to investigate whether being trained to process 
an analogue trauma in a concrete way would lead to fewer intrusive memories of it compared 
with processing the same stimuli in an abstract way.  The second aim was to investigate whether 
undergoing concreteness training would reduce emotional reactivity (distress, horror, arousal 
and negative affect) to a subsequent traumatic film.  Finally, the third aim was to explore the 
relationship of certain predictor variables previously linked to PTSD (trait rumination and 
dissociation, proneness to intrusions, sleep difficulties), to the number of intrusive memories 
developed in response to the traumatic film clips. 
 
4.1 Summary of findings and comparison to previous literature 
 
The analogue trauma was successful in inducing intrusive memories with 94% of participants 
reporting at least one spontaneous intrusive memory of the film clips.  The primary hypothesis, 
that the concrete group would experience significantly fewer intrusive memories in relation to 
the film clips compared with the abstract group, was supported.  The concrete group reported 
fewer spontaneous intrusive memories of the film clips in their intrusion diaries in the following 
week and significantly lower scores on the Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R) one week 
later, including lower scores on the intrusion subscale.  The concrete group reported fewer 
image-based memories in particular, which are characteristic of intrusive memories experienced 
in PTSD (Ehlers et al., 2004; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995).  There were trends towards the 
concrete group reporting lower scores on the avoidance and hyperarousal subscales although 
these did not reach statistical significance. 
 
As hypothesised, concrete processing training led to reduced distress and horror ratings in 
relation to the final test film clip compared with abstract processing, although this did not 
extend to arousal and overall negative affect.  Finally, as predicted, self-reported proneness to 
intrusions significantly predicted number of intrusive memories developed, in that those with a 
higher tendency to experience intrusions relating to negative events in their everyday lives were 
more likely to develop intrusions in response to the film clips.  Sleep difficulties were also a 
significant predictor of number of intrusive memories, with greater self-reported sleep problems 
in the previous two weeks associated with a higher number of intrusions.  Contrary to 
Main Research Project 
80 
 
predictions, neither trait rumination nor trait dissociation predicted number of intrusions.  There 
were no interactions between individual trait variables and training condition in predicting 
number of intrusive memories.   
 
4.1.1 Intrusive memories 
 
The finding that concrete processing led to fewer intrusions than abstract processing supports 
findings from analogue studies of depression, showing that processing a stressful event (an 
induced failure task) in a concrete way afterwards leads to fewer intrusive memories than 
processing it in an abstract way (Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2004), although the present 
study examined peri-traumatic rather than post-traumatic processing.  The current study 
supports research showing correlational evidence linking a ruminative, abstract style of 
processing to PTSD symptoms (e.g. Ehring et al. 2009; El-Leithy et al. 2006; Michael et al. 
2007; Zetsche et al. 2009).  However, at present, this appears to be the first study to show that 
processing mode is causally involved in the development of PTSD symptoms such as intrusive 
memories, and that concrete processing may protect against the development of intrusions. 
 
There are a number of possible explanations as to why concrete processing led to fewer 
intrusive memories in the week following the task.  First, it is possible that the concrete mode 
facilitated contextualised processing, by encouraging focus on details and the temporal sequence 
of events.  Consistent with cognitive models of PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000), this potentially led to a memory of the analogue trauma that was more elaborated and 
organised and less likely to intrude into consciousness later on compared with the abstract 
group.  The concrete mode of processing may have also generated situation-specific appraisals, 
enabling participants to perceive the analogue trauma as a time-limited event and thus reducing 
any sense of ongoing threat.  The abstract mode of processing on the other hand may have 
prevented contextualised processing, generating a more disorganised memory, which was less 
elaborated, less integrated into other memories and therefore more easily triggered.  In addition, 
because of its focus on broader meanings and implications, this mode of processing may have 
led to overgeneralised negative appraisals (e.g. overestimations of danger).  A disorganised 
memory and generalised negative appraisals may have led to a greater sense of ongoing threat in 
the abstract group compared with the concrete group, leading to increased distress and intrusive 
memories.  These processes, (i.e. decontextualised peri-traumatic processing leading to a 
disorganised trauma memory and negative overgeneralised appraisals) are hypothesised to be 
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important factors in the development of intrusive memories, creating a sense of ongoing threat 
and additional symptoms such as avoidance and hyperarousal (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000).  The concrete mode may also have had other beneficial effects, for example by 
facilitating emotional processing of the trauma (e.g. Borkovec et al., 1998; Teasdale & Barnard, 
1993) or reducing anxiety by focusing attention on the immediate environment (e.g. Leary et 
al., 2006). 
 
A second possible explanation is that, it was a lowering of mood rather than a difference in 
processing mode that was responsible for the abstract group developing more intrusions since 
low mood is linked to greater frequency of intrusions (Davies & Clark, 1998b).  Both groups 
reported a significant decrease in mood over the course of training, which was more pronounced 
in the abstract group. This is consistent with previous studies showing a similar differential 
effect of processing mode on mood (e.g. Ehring et al., 2009; Watkins, 2004; Zetsche et al., 
2009).  However, the intrusive memories that participants reported tended to include films that 
were viewed throughout the whole testing session, rather than solely those viewed towards the 
end of the session when the abstract group was lower in mood.  Furthermore, participants 
experienced intrusive memories over the course of a few days and up to a week, whereas any 
mood induction effect was likely to have been short-lived (i.e. less than a day; e.g. Watkins, 
2004).  In addition, change in mood over the testing session was not significantly associated 
with the number of intrusive memories developed or IES-R scores.  For these reasons, it is 
unlikely that is was solely a greater decrease in mood which led to an increased number of 
intrusive memories in the abstract group.   
 
Third, it could be argued that, given that the abstract group gave higher subjective ratings of 
arousal in response to the first test clip, this was responsible for their higher reported levels of 
distress, horror and intrusive memories in response to the film clips.  However, arousal ratings 
in relation to the first clip were not significantly correlated with number of intrusive memories, 
neither were they correlated with the hyperarousal scale of the IES-R.  Arousal ratings were 
significantly correlated with IES-R scores, although after controlling for these the effect of 
condition remained.  Between-group differences in self-reported arousal need to be interpreted 
with caution.  First, whilst participants were asked to rate their subjective levels of physiological 
arousal, no objective measures were available to support these ratings.  Second, this difference 
was inconsistent with a range of other state measures, which are typically correlated with 
arousal (e.g. mood, distress, horror, negative affect) and on which groups were equivalent, as 
well as on ratings of personal relevance of the film clip and trait anxiety.  Third, it was observed 
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that many participants did not understand what was meant by the term ‘arousal.’  Although 
these limitations do not explain why the abstract group had higher subjective arousal ratings, it 
raises questions about the validity of this measure.  Discrepancies between self-reports of 
arousal and physiological measures of arousal have previously been reported (Shepherd, 2008). 
 
Fourth, given that the abstract condition’s training included instructions which encouraged them 
to think about the films in a more personally relevant way (e.g. ‘What if this happened to you or 
someone in your family?’) it could be argued that the abstract group experienced the film as 
more self-relevant, which led them to experience more intrusive memories. Increased self-
relevance of the film clips may be expected to increase distress and intrusive memories through 
increasing sense of threat and personalised negative appraisals.  However, no difference was 
found between the groups in change in personal relevance ratings from pre- to post-training.  
Furthermore, although an increase in personal relevance of the test film clips from pre- to post-
training was correlated with number of intrusive memories, the effect of training condition on 
intrusive memories remained even when controlling for this increase. 
 
Comparison to the literature 
 
Previous studies (e.g. Ehring et al., 2009; Zetsche et al., 2009) have failed to find a differential 
effect of processing mode on intrusive memories developed in response to an analogue trauma.  
As these studies manipulated post-traumatic rather than peri-traumatic processing mode, it is 
possible that it is the mode in which traumatic events are processed at the time which is 
important in determining the development of PTSD symptoms.  However, analogue studies of 
depression have shown that post-event processing mode influences the development of intrusive 
memories.  Furthermore, both Wells and Papageourgiou (1995) and Butler and Dewick (1995) 
showed that worrying about an analogue trauma, which is characterised by an abstract style of 
thinking, increased the rate of intrusions relative to controls.   
 
It may be that the way in which participants were trained accounted for the differential impact 
of processing mode in the current study.  It adopted a cognitive bias modification (CBM) 
training procedure, whereby participants received repeated verbal and written instructions and 
prompts and were able to practise applying the assigned processing mode to a series of training 
films clips.  The significant effect of processing mode on intrusive memories in this study, 
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compared with others using the trauma film paradigm, may therefore have been due to 
participants being trained in a more systematic way.  Woud et al. (2011) highlighted that many 
trauma film paradigm studies seek to induce a specific type of appraisal or processing style in 
one attempt, whereas it might be more effective to use a training paradigm (e.g. using CBM 
methodology) to induce the particular appraisal style.   
 
The instructions themselves also differed in the current study from Zetsche et al. (2009) and 
Ehring et al. (2009), which may account for the discrepant findings.  Although Ehring et al.’s 
(2009) concrete instructions were validated as concrete by independent raters, the authors 
acknowledged that their concrete instructions may not have been sufficiently different from 
abstract instructions.  For example, their concrete instructions contained questions such as ‘what 
are the reasons for accidents happening?’ and ‘what would the consequences be on my life?’ It 
could be argued that such questions guided participants into an abstract way of thinking because 
they appear closely linked to questions relating to ‘Why?’, ‘What if?’, and the implications of 
events.  Although in Zetsche et al.’s (2009) study the memory integration condition contained 
questions that resembled concrete processing, their instructions aimed to promote memory 
integration rather than concrete processing per se. (e.g. asking participants to think about what 
they had done and how they had felt before coming to the session, asking which scenes they 
found the most unpleasant and why, and how the scenes were similar or different to their own 
experiences). 
 
4.1.2 Emotional reactivity 
 
The finding that concreteness training lowered emotional reactivity (distress and horror) to the 
second test film clip supports Watkins et al.’s (2008) observations relating to the effect of 
processing mode training on emotional reactivity in an analogue study of depression.  They 
found that training participants to process scenarios in a concrete way led to reduced 
despondency in response to a later analogue failure task compared with participants who were 
trained to process the scenarios in an abstract way.  The findings also support those of Schartau 
et al. (2009), on which the current study paradigm was based, which showed that training 
participants to appraise traumatic film clips in a more functional way leads to reduced emotional 
reactivity (distress and horror) in response to exposure to a subsequent traumatic film clip.  
However, the current study extends their findings by providing preliminary evidence that, in 
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addition to the content of appraisals, the mode in which traumatic information is processed can 
lead to reduced emotional reactivity to a subsequent analogue trauma.   
 
Contrary to predictions, the training condition did not have a differential impact on self-reported 
levels of arousal or valence of affect.  As discussed in Section 3 above, the measure of arousal 
used should be interpreted with caution.  Schartau et al. (2009) advocated using ratings of 
distress and horror as indices of emotional reactivity, arguing that generalised emotion terms 
such as distress are a reliable index of change in emotional reactivity in response to 
experimental manipulations (Richards & Gross, 2000), as well as being commonly used in 
clinical settings (Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006).  They also highlight that the emotion categories of 
distress and horror are historically associated with traumatic events (APA, 1994).  The use of 
the term ‘arousal’ appeared to be unclear to participants.  Some participants interpreted it to 
mean general physiological arousal whereas others interpreted it to mean sexual arousal.  
Researchers in the field recommend the use of terms such as ‘distress’ and ‘horror’ as being 
more easily understood.  Furthermore, existing research suggests there is a poor relationship 
between subjective and objective measures of arousal (Shepherd, 2008).  The lack of observed 
difference in change in degree of negative affect (valence) may have been due to this measure 
being a less sensitive measure of change in emotional reactivity in response to traumatic stimuli 
compared with horror and distress. 
 
4.1.3 Relationship of predictor variables to intrusive memories 
 
The present study found that trait rumination was unrelated to the number of intrusive memories 
developed.  Zetsche et al. (2009) found that state rumination measured using the Perseverative 
Thinking Questionnaire-State Version (PTQ-S; Ehring et al., 2010) was positively associated 
with number of intrusive memories, although they did not look at trait rumination.  Watkins 
(2004) found an interaction between trait rumination and processing mode in the development 
of intrusions following an analogue failure experience, although this was not found in the 
present study.  It is possible that in the present study, peri-traumatic processing mode was a 
more important predictor than a trait ruminative style of thinking.  Trait dissociation, was also 
unrelated to the number of intrusive memories developed, which is inconsistent with Murray 
(1997) who found that higher trait dissociation was associated with a higher number of intrusive 
memories over the following week.  Again, the lack of relationship between trait dissociation 
and intrusive memories in this study may have been due to processing mode being a more 
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powerful predictor, although findings on the relationship of dissociation and intrusive memories 
have in general been mixed (see Laposa & Rector, 2012). 
 
As hypothesised, self-reported proneness to intrusive memories significantly predicted number 
of intrusive memories in the current study.  Participants who reported an increased tendency to 
experience intrusive memories in response to stressful or negative events in their everyday lives 
reported a higher number of intrusive memories in relation to the film clips.  This is consistent 
with Davies and Clark (1998b) who found that a higher level of self-reported proneness to 
intrusive memories predicted a higher number of intrusive memories in response to a trauma 
film.  Greater sleep difficulties in the two weeks prior to the testing session also predicted a 
higher number of intrusive memories.  This supports Mellman et al.’s (2005) findings that 
among survivors of Hurricane Andrew, pre-trauma sleep disturbance was associated with higher 
symptom levels of PTSD, although this was based on retrospective ratings.  The current study 
provides prospective evidence that pre-trauma sleep difficulties may increase vulnerability to 
developing PTSD symptoms after a trauma.   
 
4.2 Theoretical implications 
 
Findings from the present study provide support for previous literature highlighting peri-
traumatic cognitive processing as a key factor influencing distress and the development of 
intrusive memories following trauma (Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Holmes et al., 
2004, Laposa & Alden, 2006).  Current cognitive models of PTSD do not explicitly outline how 
processing mode (i.e. abstract versus concrete processing) may influence the development of 
intrusive memories.   However, Ehring et al. (2009) drew upon Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive model of PTSD in explaining how abstract processing during trauma-related 
rumination may contribute to the development of PTSD symptoms (e.g. intrusive memories).  
This model highlights two key processes that are instrumental in the development and 
maintenance of PTSD symptoms.  The first is a disturbance in the autobiographical memory of 
the event, which is disjointed and lacks contextual information such as time and sequence of 
events.  The second is negative appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae, which include 
overgeneralisations (e.g. ‘the world is a dangerous place’, ‘I attract disaster’, ‘my future is 
ruined’).  According to Ehlers and Clark (2000), these processes interact to maintain a sense of 
current threat, which motivates the use of maladaptive coping strategies, including rumination. 
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Ehring et al. (2009) suggested that an abstract style of processing when thinking about a trauma 
afterwards, such as when engaging in rumination, may contribute towards the development of 
PTSD symptoms such as intrusive memories by interfering with the elaboration and 
contextualisation of the trauma memory, which is needed for it to be integrated into 
autobiographical memory, and the modification of negative appraisals.  This would require 
processing to occur on a concrete level, which would be expected to promote the 
contextualisation of the memory and facilitate change in negative, overgeneralised appraisals.  
With regard to the present study, it is equally plausible that an abstract style of processing 
during a trauma may also prevent the formation of a coherent trauma memory that contains 
contextual details so that the individual is unable to see it as a time-limited event and may 
generate overgeneralised appraisals about the self, the world and the future. 
 
Furthermore, both Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model and Brewin et al.’s (1996) dual 
representation theory of PTSD highlight that functional processing of a trauma requires a 
balance of two peri-traumatic processing styles: a verbal or conceptual style concerned with 
meaning, organising information and placing it in context; and a data-driven or sensory style, 
which encodes sensory impressions.  Brewin et al. (1996) distinguished between higher-level 
conscious processing of a trauma via the verbally accessible memory (VAM) system and lower-
level processing via the situationally accessible memory (SAM) system.  VAM processing 
forms verbal-narrative memories which contain contextual information and allow the trauma to 
be discriminated from other experiences.  These representations prevent lower-level image-
based memories from the SAM system, which lack information such as time code, from 
intruding involuntarily into consciousness; therefore a lack of VAM processing increases the 
development of intrusions.  Similarly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) distinguished between 
conceptual and data-driven processing, the latter leading to a disjointed, disorganised memory 
which lacks time code and is easily triggered by cues.  As intrusive memories are usually linked 
to the worst moments of a trauma, for example, when the meaning changes for the worse, these 
cues tend to be sensory stimuli occurring in close temporal proximity to that moment (‘the 
warning signal hypothesis’; Ehlers et al., 2002). 
 
Studies using trauma film paradigms have provided correlational and experimental evidence for 
the role of verbal-conceptual versus sensory-perceptual processing in the development of 
intrusive memories (Halligan et al., 2002; Holmes et al., 2004).  Laposa and Alden (2008) 
found that participants who processed a traumatic film in a way that resembled conceptual 
processing led to fewer intrusive memories than controls. 
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Although the present study did not seek to manipulate verbal-conceptual versus sensory-
perceptual processing, it is possible that the concrete mode shares functional properties with a 
verbal-conceptual mode of processing.  For example, both styles of processing aim to form a 
coherent memory of the trauma which is contextualised in place and time.  Although an abstract 
mode of processing does not resemble sensory-perceptual processing, it may represent another 
type of unhelpful peri-traumatic processing leading to insufficient processing of details and 
context, a memory of the trauma that is disorganised and poorly integrated into autobiographical 
memory, as well as promoting overgeneralised representations and appraisals which maintain 
distress.  Consistent with cognitive models of PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000), this may give rise to intrusive memories that perpetuate a sense of current threat, leading 
to avoidance, hyperarousal, and maladaptive coping strategies which maintain symptoms.  Such 
strategies may include rumination or worry, characterised by an abstract mode of processing 
which are therefore likely to prevent contextualisation of the trauma memory and modification 
of appraisals.  The findings appear to also support treatment implications of these models, for 
example, using imaginal re-living and cognitive restructuring (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), which 
may help sufferers switch to a more concrete mode of processing. 
 
As well as being compatible with cognitive models of PTSD, the present findings may also be 
explained in light of transdiagnostic theoretical accounts of how processing mode affects 
outcome.  One explanation is that a concrete mode of processing is more adaptive because it 
facilitates problem solving (Stöber, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Watkins, 2008) by 
focusing on the means to an end rather than the end itself.  It is unlikely in the current study that 
the concrete mode of processing facilitated problem-solving as such, since participants were 
watching a film clip and were not trying to achieve a personal goal.  However, it is plausible 
that the concrete mode of processing reduced distress by directing attention at the immediate 
context, focusing on steps and actions as they were occurring and what steps would need to 
occur next to move the event forward, focusing attention away from the desirability of 
alternative outcomes and the general meaning of the event.  Another explanation of the 
differential effects of processing, mode is that an abstract mode of processing fosters 
generalisations across situations, time and people, thereby strengthening overgeneralised 
appraisals which are implicated in a range of emotional disorders (Beck, 1976).  Concrete 
appraisals on the other hand are thought to reduce these overgeneralisations and promote 
situation-specific, contextualised representations.  This explanation is consistent with cognitive 
models of PTSD as discussed above.  Other possible mechanisms of effect include the concrete 
mode facilitating emotional processing of the analogue trauma, consistent with Stöber’s (1998) 
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and Teasdale and Barnard’s (1999) accounts of how mode of processing has a differential effect 
on outcome. 
 
Although the current study did not support previous findings that trait rumination or dissociation 
was associated with intrusive memories, it was consistent with Davies and Clark’s (1998b) 
findings in showing that self-reported proneness to intrusive memories significantly predicted 
intrusive memories.  The current study found that it was a tendency to develop intrusive 
memories of stressful and negative events in people’s lives that predicted the development of 
intrusions in response to the films, rather than a tendency to develop intrusive memories of 
unpleasant films or of positive events.  These findings suggest that, although intrusive memories 
are common in non-clinical populations (e.g. Berntsen, 1996; Mace, 2005), some individuals 
experience them more than others and this may be a risk factor for developing PTSD symptoms 
following trauma.  Given that intrusive memories are also a feature of other disorders (e.g. 
depression), it is possible that they constitute a vulnerability factor to other disorders as well. 
 
The finding that sleep difficulties predicted intrusive memories suggests that sleep may be a 
potential vulnerability factor towards developing intrusions following trauma.  This supports 
previous literature on the relationship between sleep and PTSD suggesting that as well as being 
a consequence of PTSD, pre-existing sleep problems may be a vulnerability factor in its 
development (Mellman et al., 2005) and that early sleep difficulties following trauma have been 
found to predict later development of PTSD symptoms (Koren et al., 2002).  The relationship 
between sleep difficulties and PTSD needs further investigation (Harvey et al., 2003).  One 
possible explanation for the etiological role of sleep difficulties in PTSD is that they may 
disrupt memory consolidation, for which sleep is important (Stickgold, 2005).   
 
4.3 Occupational implications for at-risk groups 
 
Findings from the current study have implications for the potential prevention of intrusive 
memories in occupational groups who are regularly exposed to trauma, such as ambulance and 
other emergency service personnel, journalists working in conflict zones and military personnel.  
Studies investigating the prevalence of PTSD among ambulance workers have found increased 
symptom levels compared with the general population (Sterud et al., 2006).  The current 
findings regarding the effects of processing mode could inform training programmes aimed at 
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preventing intrusive memories and enhancing psychological well-being among these at-risk 
groups.   
 
Given the complexities of a real-life trauma compared with an analogue trauma, such training 
programmes would need to be carefully tailored to the target population.  This may involve 
educating workers about the potentially helpful effects of a concrete style of processing relative 
to an abstract style of processing, with relevant examples.  It should perhaps avoid using the 
terms abstract and concrete, which could be easily misunderstood.  Care should also be taken to 
ensure that individuals understand that a concrete mode of processing does not involve 
suppression of thoughts or emotions or thinking positively, which may be harmful.  Preventative 
interventions could also incorporate other factors that have been shown to reduce PTSD 
symptoms and associated distress, such as interpretations of intrusive memories (Woud et al., 
2011).  Woud et al. (2011) used an implicit computerised reappraisal training paradigm with 
healthy participants following an analogue trauma, targeting appraisals of self-efficacy and of 
responses to the trauma films including emotions and intrusions.  Participants were trained in 
either positive or negative appraisal using a series of sentences where the meaning (positive or 
negative) was only apparent by the last word.  Those who underwent positive appraisal training 
(e.g. ‘In a crisis I predict my responses will be helpful’) reported fewer film-related intrusions 
over the following week and lower scores on the IES-R, compared with those who underwent 
negative training (e.g. ‘In a crisis I predict my responses will be useless’). 
 
One potential difficulty with applying these findings to groups such as ambulance workers 
would be increasing the cognitive demand on workers who are trying to carry out a job.  For this 
reason, it would be important to investigate whether the current findings can be extended to 
manipulating processing mode when thinking about a trauma after as opposed to during the 
event, as has been shown in other studies looking at peri-traumatic processing (e.g. Holmes et 
al., 2004; Schartau et al., 2009).  Nevertheless, compared with studies showing similar 
beneficial effects of reappraisal on emotional reactivity to analogue trauma (e.g. Schartau et al., 
2009), a concrete mode of processing, which is focused on style of appraisal, may be expected 
to place fewer cognitive demands on individuals compared with other types of reappraisal 
focused on changing the content. 
 





Several limitations merit discussion when drawing conclusions from this study.  The first 
limitation is that there was no objective physiological measure of arousal to support 
participants’ subjective ratings.  It is therefore unclear whether the differences observed 
between the two groups were due to real differences in arousal or were a result of having an 
invalid measure.  As discussed previously, it seems likely that the subjective ratings of arousal 
lacked validity, given that groups were equivalent on other measures of mood and emotional 
reactivity and that many participants struggled to understand what was meant by arousal. 
 
A second limitation concerns the lack of a no training control group.  This makes it difficult to 
determine whether the differential effect of the processing mode manipulation was due to 
beneficial effects of concrete processing or to detrimental effects of abstract processing, or due 
to both effects occurring simultaneously.  However, the inclusion of a no training condition has 
its own limitations, in that the experimenter would have limited control over the way in which 
participants processed the clips due to individual differences in processing style.  Some 
individuals may naturally have processed in an abstract or concrete way.  Nevertheless, it would 
have been useful to explore this to contrast both abstract and concrete processing to a no 
training control group. 
 
A third limitation concerns the measure of personal relevance, which was included in order to 
assess to what extent the participants thought about themselves in relation to the film clips.  The 
term ‘personal relevance’, however, may have been interpreted as the extent to which the clips 
fitted with their own experience and lives, rather than the extent to which they were focused on 
themselves while watching the clips.  It may have been more accurate to use a measure of self-
focus (i.e. to what extent participants were thinking of themselves in relation to the clip and 
applying it to their own lives). 
 
A fourth limitation is that the possibility of demand effects influencing the participants’ 
emotional reactions and number of intrusive memories in response to the film clips cannot be 
ruled out.  For example, it is possible that based on the nature of the instructions given to them, 
the abstract group may have had a higher expectation of being distressed and developing 
intrusions than the concrete group, whose instructions were less emotive.  However, both 
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groups were focusing on negative content, rather than one condition generating positive 
appraisals and the other generating negative.  Also, previous trauma film studies have failed to 
find evidence of demand effects (e.g. Holmes et al., 2006; Schartau et al., 2006).  It therefore 
seems unlikely that the current findings could be accounted for solely by differences in 
expectations.  
 
Fifth, although this study provides preliminary evidence that processing mode influences the 
development of intrusive memories following an analogue trauma, it is difficult to ascertain the 
precise mechanism of effect.  For example, although the manipulation targeted mode rather than 
content of processing, this could have inadvertently led to different valence of processing where 
the concrete group’s instructions led them to have less negative appraisals.  However, if this 
occurred, it may merely be an inevitable by-product of manipulating level of construal.  Because 
abstract processing promotes generalised processing, these appraisals may be inherently more 
negative when faced with negative events.  Nevertheless, it would have been useful to have an 
objective measure of processing mode (i.e. abstract versus concrete) and valence of appraisals.  
In addition, although decrease in mood was not significantly correlated with number of intrusive 
memories or IES-R scores, it is unclear to what extent participants’ mood or emotional reactions 
to the clips mediated the development of intrusive memories.  Davies and Clark (1998b) found 
that increases in negative mood following an analogue trauma were associated with an increased 
number of intrusive memories in response to the film in the following week.   
 
A final limitation relates to the generalisability of the findings from this study, from non-clinical 
participants (predominantly students) in a laboratory setting to individuals who are exposed to 
real-life traumatic events.  It is unclear whether a concrete mode of peri-traumatic processing 
could be successfully induced during a real-life traumatic event, such as during a traumatic 
emergency service call-out for ambulance workers, and whether it would be successful in 
protecting against distressing intrusive memories under these conditions.  There is an extant 
literature outlining a host of pre-, peri- and post-traumatic vulnerability factors implicated in the 
development of PTSD (Brewin et al., 2000; Ozer et al., 2003), which are particularly difficult to 
control in a real-life setting.  As discussed in the previous section, one of the difficulties with 
generalising the current findings to real-life traumatic events is the cognitive demand that peri-
traumatic processing manipulations may impose on individuals. 
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4.5 Future research 
 
As the present study appears to be the first to show a potential causal role of processing mode in 
the development of intrusive memories, it is important that the findings are replicated before 
being piloted in a real-life setting (e.g. with ambulance workers), taking account of some of the 
limitations described above, to better establish the reliability of the experimental effect.  It 
would be useful to include a physiological index of arousal, such as skin conductance response 
or heart rate.  It would also be useful to explore potential discrepancies between these measures 
and subjective ratings of arousal. 
 
In order to better establish whether the differential effects of processing mode were due to the 
beneficial effects of concrete processing or the dysfunctional effects of abstract processing, it 
would be useful to include a no-training control group who are asked, for example, to watch the 
clips without trying to regulate or control their emotions.  This could be followed with open-
ended questions aimed to elicit what thoughts went through their mind when they were 
watching the films to ascertain if they were using any particular processing mode.   Potential 
demand effects could be investigated by asking participants to what extent they thought their 
allocated processing mode would reduce their negative emotions in response to the clip and 
compare their expectations to observed responses (e.g. Holmes et al., 2006). 
 
It would be interesting to explore between-group differences in responses to intrusive memories, 
for example, whether the abstract group ruminated more or experienced more distress linked to 
their intrusive memories, since these are factors that have been linked to the maintenance of 
PTSD symptoms.  Furthermore, given findings that women are at increased risk of developing 
PTSD than men, it would be interesting to explore potential gender differences in the effect of 
processing mode in response to analogue trauma and whether males have a greater tendency 
towards concrete processing.     
 
The present findings could be strengthened by having a more objective manipulation check, 
indicating whether participants significantly differ on an objective measure of processing mode.  
This could involve, for example, recording thought samples from participants and having these 
rated by independent raters blind to condition, using a scale such as the Stöber and Borkovec 
(2002) abstract-concrete scale used by Watkins et al. (2008).  This would give a more reliable 
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and objective manipulation check and would increase the likelihood of any differences in 
outcome being due to differences in processing mode.  It would also be useful to obtain 
objective ratings of valence in the same way to assess whether groups’ appraisals differed along 
this dimension as well. 
 
It would be useful to see whether the current findings would extend to post-event processing, 
that is, whether training people to think about an analogue traumatic event afterwards in an 
abstract or concrete way would influence the development of intrusive memories.  Ehring et al. 
(2009) failed to find a differential effect of post-event abstract or concrete processing on 
intrusive memories in response to analogue trauma.  However, in studies of depression it has 
been shown that thinking about an induced failure afterwards in an abstract way leads to more 
intrusions about the failure compared to thinking about it in a concrete way (Watkins, 2004).  
Demonstrating that post-event processing mode is causally involved in the development of 
PTSD symptoms would have further clinical implications for individuals who are regularly 
exposed to traumatic events or early interventions for those that have experienced an isolated 
traumatic event.  In addition, thinking about a traumatic event retrospectively may reduce the 
cognitive load on individuals during a trauma and constitute a more tractable skill (Schartau et 
al., 2009).  It has been suggested that such reappraisal training programmes could be 
administered as a low intensity intervention as part of a stepped care approach for those recently 
exposed to trauma and who have preliminary symptoms (Schartau et al., 2009). 
 
As well as establishing the replicability of the effect, future research should explore what factors 
mediate the effect of processing mode on intrusive memories in order to better understand the 
precise mechanism of effect.  Potential mediating factors could include, for example, change in 
mood and level of construal (i.e. abstract versus concrete).  Although mood was not 
significantly correlated with outcome, it would also be useful to explore what happens when 
affect is returned to baseline after training or when there is a longer gap between training and 
the final test clip. 
 
If the present findings were replicated in non-clinical populations, it would be useful to then 
explore how well they generalise to occupational groups by developing and piloting a training 
programme for at-risk occupational groups such as ambulance workers.   
 





This study supports the hypothesis that processing an analogue trauma in a concrete way leads 
to fewer intrusive memories than processing it in an abstract way.  It also showed that concrete 
processing training led to reduced distress and horror elicited by a subsequent analogue trauma 
compared with abstract training, although this did not extend to subjective ratings of arousal of 
negative affect.  Investigation of the relationship between predictor variables and intrusive 
memories revealed that self-reported proneness to intrusive memories in everyday life and sleep 
difficulties significantly predicted the number of intrusions developed in response to the 
traumatic films, although trait rumination and dissociation did not.   
 
Findings are explained both in light of cognitive models of PTSD and transdiagnostic theories 
of processing mode, with common mechanisms being a concrete mode of processing enhancing 
a contextualised representation of the event and an abstract mode of processing fostering 
decontextualised representations, unhelpful generalisations and increasing distress.  Consistent 
with cognitive models of PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), it is argued 
that concrete processing promotes the contextualisation of the trauma memory, facilitating the 
formation of a coherent narrative of the event.  Abstract processing on the other hand, may 
prevent contextualisation and lead to a disjointed memory of the event as well as 
overgeneralised appraisals, two key processes which are hypothesised to cause distressing 
intrusive re-experiencing. 
 
Although replication is needed, these findings have promising implications for developing 
training programmes for at-risk occupational groups aimed at reducing the development of 
PTSD symptoms following trauma.  Future studies should include exploring replicability using 
tighter controls, examining mediating factors, investigating whether the effect can be extended 
to post-event processing and exploring generalisability to real-life settings. 
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Appendix 2: General Information Questionnaire 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please give us some background information about yourself.  
The following questions ask about you and your life in general. For each question, either write 
the answer on the line or tick the box which most applies to you. Some questions may have 
more than one answer. 
 
1. Date of birth ______/_______/__________ 
2. Gender  male 
 female 
3. Ethnic background  Caucasian (White)   Black (Caribbean, African, Other)  
 Pacific Asian    Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
 Other __________ 
4. Is English your first 
language? 
  Yes 
 No. Which is your first language? _____________ 
5. What is your marital 
status? 
 single    divorced/separated 
 married    widowed 
6. Are you    employed full-time                a full-time student 
  employed part-time                a part-time student 
  self-employed    unemployed   
  a homemaker    on disability  
  on sick leave    retired   
  other: ________________________  
7. What is your job/ 
course? (If 
unemployed/ 
retired: What was 










start: __________                   finish: ___________ 
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9. Please mark any 
qualifications you 
have. 
  No exams                 Degree                       Other: 
____________                         
 
 
  GCSE/O Levels/GNVQ   Postgraduate degree: 
please circle: Masters / PhD / 
other:______________ 
 
  A Levels/NVQ    Vocational degree          




household  income.  
  Less than £5000 per year      £20,000 to £30,000 per year 
  £5000 to £10,000 per year   £30,000 to £40,000 per year 
  £10,000 to 15,000 per year   £40,000 to £50,000 per year 
  £15,000 to £20,000 per year   over £50,000 per year 
11. How often do you 
drive a car 
  Everyday 
  Once a week 
  Twice a month 
  Twice a year 
  Never 
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Appendix 3: Trauma Screener 
Many people have lived through or witnessed a very stressful and traumatic event at some point 
in their lives.  Indicate whether or not you have experienced each traumatic event listed below 
by marking Y for Yes or N for No. 
 
 
1. Serious traffic accident, (e.g., car, bike, train, 
 or boating accident) 
 
2. Serious other accident, fire, or explosion 
 (for example, accident at work, fire at home) 
 
3. Natural disaster (for example, tornado,  
 hurricane, flood, or major earthquake) 
 
4. Non-sexual assault (for example, being  
 mugged, physically attacked, shot, stabbed, 
 or held at gunpoint) 
 
5.  Seriously injuring or killing someone else 
 
6. Sexual assault (for example, rape or  
 attempted rape) 
 
7. Military combat or a war zone 
 Please indicate whether you were: 
 civilian _____     /   military personnel _____ 
 
8. Terrorist attack (e.g., bombing) 
 
9. Unwanted sexual contact when you were  
 younger than 18 with someone who was  
 5 or more years older than you (for example,  
 contact with genitals, breasts) 
 





12. Life-threatening illness 
 
13. Witnessing others die / being seriously hurt 
 
14. Sudden, traumatic death of significant other 
 
15.  Life-threatening illness of significant other 
 









If YES, did you experience distressing 
unwanted memories of the event 
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Appendix 4: Proneness to intrusions scales 
 
How often do you find that you have unwanted memories of unpleasant or stressful events popping into your mind, for example, after an 
exam, job interview or argument with somebody? 
 
     





How often do you find that after you have seen something unpleasant on the television or at the cinema, it comes back into your mind 
without you wanting it to? 
 
     





How often do you find that pleasant or happy events pop into your mind, for example, after a nice evening with friends or a film that you 
found funny? 
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Appendix 5: Emotional reactivity scales 
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Extremely 
negative 
Neutral  Extremely 
positive 





0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No 
horror 
  Extreme 
horror 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No 
arousal 
  Extreme 
arousal 
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Appendix 6: Intrusions diary 
Participant no.: ................ 
Diary of intrusive memories post-experiment 
 
Days after experiment Please record how often you have had spontaneously occurring 
memories (intrusions) of any scenes that you saw during the film clips.    
For each one, please indicate if the intrusion was an 
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Please rate along the following scale what percentage of the time you think you watched the film in a particular way according to the 
instructions given to you 






0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
0% of 
the time 
 100% of 
the time 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
0% of 
the time 
 100% of 
the time 
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Appendix 10: Recruitment email circular 
 
 
Circular email for use for recruitment of volunteers for study ref: PNM/10/11-55, approved by the 
Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Sub-Committee (PNM RESC). This project 
contributes to the College's role in conducting research, and teaching research methods. You 
are under no obligation to reply to this email, however if you choose to, participation in this 
research is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time. 
  
You are invited to take part in a research study which investigates factors linked to people’s 
responses to trauma.  It is hoped that the results of this study will eventually help us to develop 
a prevention programme for people who are regularly exposed to trauma such as emergency 
service workers and military personnel.  You will be paid £15 as compensation for your time if 
you take part.   
  
We are recruiting people over the age of 18 who are fully fluent in English, are not currently 
experiencing depression or anxiety and who do not have current symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress disorder.  Unfortunately, you will be unable to take part if you have participated in (or are 
due to participate in) studies by our colleagues Kristen Warnock, Khodayar Shahriyarmolki or 
Juliane Sachschal. 
  
Participating in this study will involve attending a session that lasts for approximately 1 hour 15 
minutes, completing a simple diary over the following week and then completing an online 
questionnaire and submitting the diary a week later.  During the session, you will be asked to fill 
in a series of questionnaires.  You will then be shown a series of short film clips that contain 
traumatic material (e.g. humans and animals in distress) and will be asked to watch them in a 
certain way according to instructions that you will be given.  You will also be asked to fill in 
some brief questionnaires in relation to the films.  Sessions will take place at the Institute of 
Psychiatry in Denmark Hill.   
  
Your participation is entirely voluntary and if you decide to take part but later wish to withdraw, 
you may do so at any time without giving a reason.  All information will be anonymised and kept 
confidential. 
  
If you are interested in taking part in this study or would like more information then please email 






Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
  
King's College London, D. Clin. Psy. 
Department of Psychology, PO 78 
Institute of Psychiatry 
Addiction Sciences Building 3rd Floor 
4 Windsor Walk 
Denmark Hill 
London SE5 8AF 
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Appendix 11: Participant information sheet 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: PNM/10/11-55 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
What influences reactions to trauma? A an experimental study 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this Doctorate in Clinical Psychology research project.  
You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any 
way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like more information. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
This study aims to investigate what factors may influence emotional responses to traumatic films to inform 
a larger research study. Understanding these factors could help to inform the development of prevention 
programmes for people who are regularly exposed to trauma such as emergency service workers and 
military personnel, and who are at risk of developing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a severe 
stress reaction that develops after traumatic events such as violence, road traffic accidents, terrorist 
bombings and natural disasters.  
 
Are you eligible? 
You will be invited to take part if you are over the age of 18 and if the first three questionnaires you 
complete suggest that you have few signs of depression, anxiety or PTSD.  You will not be able to take 
part if, on any of these three questionnaires, you score above a certain mark, which suggests that you 
may have depression, anxiety or PTSD.  If this is the case, the researcher will chat with you and give you 
suggestions about what may be helpful, which could be a visit to your GP.  These screening 
questionnaires will be destroyed after use.  
 
What will taking part involve? 
Participating in this study will involve attending a session which will last for approximately one hour, 
completing a simple diary over the following week and then submitting the diary (by post) and completing 
an online questionnaire a week later, after which you will receive a payment of £15 as compensation for 
your time.  During the first session, you will be asked to fill in a series of questionnaires.  You will then be 
asked to watch a series of film clips that contain traumatic material (e.g. road traffic accidents, humans 
and animals in distress) and will be instructed to watch them in a certain way according to instructions that 
you will be given.  You will also be asked to fill in some brief questionnaires in relation to the films. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
As this study involves watching films that contain traumatic material, there is a risk that some people may 
become distressed.  Furthermore, some of the questionnaires ask about sensitive topics, which some 
participants could find distressing.  However, studies of a similar nature have been conducted before 
without adverse consequences and any distress that you experience is likely to be short-lived.  You are 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason, and in the unlikely event that you become distressed, 
the session would be stopped immediately.  You would be given the option to talk to the researcher, who 
is a trainee clinical psychologist.  You would also be given the opportunity to talk to the researcher’s 
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supervisor, who is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist who also is available during the testing sessions if 
needed. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
If you take part you will have the option of receiving a summary of the research findings.  Taking part will 
also give you the opportunity to be involved in research which seeks to promote a greater understanding 
of responses to trauma and inform preventative interventions for people who are regularly exposed to it. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information and data collected will be anonymised and confidential in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998).  You will be randomly allocated a unique code, which will be recorded on 
questionnaires and used in data analysis so that you cannot be identified from the data.  Anything 
containing personally identifiable information, such as signed consent forms, will be kept separately from 
the data in a locked filing cabinet and only the immediate research team (which includes the researcher 
and her two supervisors) will have access to it.  Electronic data will be kept on a secure database on a 
password accessible computer and any paper forms will be kept in a locked filing cabinet.  All personally 
identifiable information will be kept confidential.  The only circumstances under which confidentiality 
cannot be maintained is if you indicated potential risk of harm to yourself or other people. 
 
So what do I do if I want to take part? 
If you would like to take part in this study or if you have a general query about it, then please contact the 
researcher, Rachel White, at the Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Addiction Sciences 
Building, 4 Windsor Walk, London, SE5 8AF, email: Rachel.White@kcl.ac.uk, tel: 0207 848 0223.   
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.  If you decide to take part you are still free 
to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  You will also be able to withdraw your data up until 
31st December 2011.  
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King's College London using the details below for 
further advice and information:  
 
Dr Jennifer Wild (Research Clinical Psychologist, Honorary Consultant Clinical Psychologist and 
Senior Lecturer) - Institute of Psychiatry, PO Box 77, De Crespigny Park, London, SE5 8AF, 
email: Jennifer.Wild@kcl.ac.uk, tel: 0207 848 5045 
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Appendix 12: Consent form 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or  
listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: ___________________________________________ 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:________________ 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research  
must explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the 
Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether 




• I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate 
in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it immediately without giving 
any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to the point of 
publication. 
 
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I  
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data  
Protection Act 1998. 
 
• I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and understand that any such 
use of identifiable data would be reviewed and approved by a research ethics committee.  (In such  
cases, as with this project, data would not be identifiable in any report). 
 
 
The information you have submitted will be published as a report and you will be sent a copy. Please note that 








agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take 
part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and 
understand what the research study involves. 
 





Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the 
proposed research to the participant. 
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The present audit sought to examine the demographic and clinical characteristics of children and 
adolescents referred to the Autism and Related Disorders (ARD) team and to investigate change 
in these factors over a three-year period.  Monitoring such characteristics is important in 
enabling the service to understand and adapt to the needs of the population it serves.  It was 
hypothesised that there would be an increase in overall clinical complexity (characterised by 
increased age, psychiatric and medical comorbidity, clinical severity, risk and service need) 
over the three-year period.  Such an increase would suggest an improvement in local services’ 
skills in diagnosing and managing less clinically complex cases, resulting in an increasing 
number of children with more complex clinical presentations who are more difficult to diagnose 
and treat being referred.  A retrospective case note review was carried out of a three-year time 
period between July 2007 and July 2010.  Results showed that most of the sample was White-
British and male, with an average age of 11.5 years.  Over three years, there was an increase in 
the frequency of older children (i.e. secondary school age) being referred.  Most were national 
referrals although the rate of local referrals increased over time.  Overall, the sample was 
clinically complex, with high levels of medical and psychiatric comorbidity, additional (e.g. 
educational and social) needs and a moderate level of clinical severity.  Clinical comorbidity 
was related to the age of the child; older children were more likely to receive comorbid 
diagnoses of depression and anxiety disorders, whereas younger children were more likely to 
receive diagnoses of hyperkinetic disorder, oppositional or conduct disorder and enuresis or 
encopresis.  Fewer children with learning disabilities were seen in the later time period, 
suggesting that an increasing number of cognitively high-functioning children were being 
referred.  No change was seen in a measure of overall clinical complexity of cases over time, 
although limitations to the operationalisation of complexity are considered.  Implications of the 
audit are discussed in relation to meeting the needs of the increasingly older children being 
referred, providing support with transition into adulthood and supporting local services in 











1.1 Autism spectrum disorder 
 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder characterised by a triad of 
impairments, including: i) qualitative impairments in communication; ii) impairments in social 
interaction; and iii) restricted and repetitive patterns of interest and behaviour.  ASD causes 
considerable distress to individuals and families and interferes with the individual’s ability to 
function effectively in society.  This can lead to social and economic exclusion and 
development of additional difficulties.  ASD poses a considerable economic burden in the UK, 
with the annual cost estimated at over £1 billion, including costs of education, health, social 
services and other agencies (Järbrink & Knapp, 2001). 
 
The term ‘early infantile autism’ was first coined by Leo Kanner in 1943 to describe children 
with severe impairments in social interaction and communication, and an intense resistance to 
change, often associated with intellectual disability.  Towards the later part of the 20th Century, 
the term autism spectrum disorder was developed (Wing & Gould, 1979).  This reflected the 
growing recognition that symptoms could manifest differently between individuals and at 
differently levels of severity, ranging from subtle features to obvious impairments.  It was also 
increasingly observed that ASD occurred in individuals of all intellectual and linguistic levels 
(Howlin, 2010; Wing & Potter, 2002).  These changes in the conceptualisation of ASD were 
reflected in the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) and DSM-IV (APA, 1994), in which subtypes of ASD are 
collectively referred to as ‘pervasive developmental disorders’ (PDD).  Types of PDD include 
childhood autism, atypical autism, Asperger’s syndrome, other pervasive developmental 
disorder, pervasive developmental disorder unspecified and childhood disintegrative disorder.   
  
1.2 Prevalence of ASD 
 
Historically, autism was considered to be a rare condition, with prevalence rates estimated at 
four to five cases per 10,000 for ‘pure’ autism and 20 per 10,000 for children showing the triad 
of impairments described by Wing and Gould (1979).  Since the 1990s however, prevalence 
estimates have increased.  Baird et al. (2006) reported a prevalence of 38.9 per 10,000 for 
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childhood autism in the South Thames region and 116.1 per 10,000 for ASD.  ASD occurs more 
commonly among males than females, with a ratio of approximately 4:1, extending to 9:1 when 
the narrower, historical definition is used (Fombonne, 2005; 2009).  Although it is possible that 
an increase in prevalence estimates reflects a true rise in cases of ASD, evidence suggests that 
the majority of the increase is due to a broadening of diagnostic criteria (encompassing 
differences in presentation and severity) as well as an increasing awareness and recognition of 




The aetiology of ASD is multifactorial, consistent with the heterogeneity of the disorder, and 
much is yet to be understood about its genetic and non-genetic causes (Rutter, 2005).  The 
strongest evidence is for genetic factors, with data from twin studies showing a heritability rate 
of 90% (Rutter, 2005).  There is also evidence that the broader phenotype of ASD (i.e. more 
subtle impairments in communication and social interaction and stereotyped behaviours) occurs 
in up to 20% of first degree relatives of children with ASD (Bolton et al., 1994).  The role of 
genetic factors is complex, with multiple susceptibility genes involved.  Non-genetic factors 
may also play a role, although as yet evidence is inconclusive about what these factors are 
(Rutter, 2005).  Possible influences include pre-natal infections and toxins (e.g. hypothyroidism, 
use of thalidomide and other drugs) and congenital rubella.  There has been no evidence 
supporting any aetiological role for immunisations such as the MMR vaccination (Rutter, 2005). 
 
1.4 Clinical complexity and comorbidity 
 
The spectrum concept was accompanied by a growing awareness that, rather than being a 
‘stand-alone’ disorder, ASD frequently co-occurs with other developmental, physical or 
psychiatric disorders.  In fact, comorbidity is now considered to be the ‘rule’ rather than the 
exception in ASD and to be expected whenever a diagnosis is made (Gillberg & Billstedt, 
2000).  Other difficulties such as sleep problems, abnormal sensory responses and difficulties 
with attention and hyperactivity, also cause difficulties for individual and families, yet are not 
part of the ASD diagnostic criteria and may not meet criteria for a separate disorder (Gillberg & 
Billstedt, 2000). 
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Medical conditions commonly associated with ASD can be divided into non-specific and 
specific conditions (Gillberg & Billstedt, 2000).  Non-specific conditions include learning 
disability (ranging from 25.8 to 71.3% children with ASD; O’Brien & Pearson, 2004), epilepsy, 
speech and language difficulties, motor problems and hearing and visual impairments.  Specific 
medical conditions (present in approximately 10-25% cases; Gillberg & Billstedt, 2000) include 
some 50 different disorders, including genetically determined disorders such as tuberous 
sclerosis and fragile X syndrome.   
 
Studies consistently show that individuals with autism are at increased risk for psychiatric 
disorders than their normally developing peers (Gillberg & Billstedt, 2000; Kim et al., 2000).  
Ghaziuddin (2002) highlighted that referrals for assessment of ASD are often prompted these 
additional difficulties, which can cause increased disruption in functioning and be of greater 
concern to families than autistic symptoms themselves (Loveland & Tunali-Kotoski, 1997). 
Ghaziuddin et al. (1998) found an overall psychiatric comorbidity rate of 65% among children 
and adolescents with Asperger’s syndrome.  In a large representative population sample of 
children with ASD using standardised interview measures based on DSM-IV criteria (Simonoff 
et al., 2008) found a psychiatric comorbidity rate of 70.8%.  Of these, 41.9% met criteria for an 
anxiety disorder, 30% for oppositional defiant or conduct disorder, 28.3% for attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; known as hyperkinetic disorder in ICD-10), 4.8% for Tourette’s 
syndrome and 9% for tic disorders.  Only 1.4% of their sample met criteria for depression, 
although higher rates have been found in other studies.  For example, Kim et al. (2000) found a 
prevalence rate of 17% among individuals with ASD and Ghaziuddin et al. (1998) found a rate 
of 37% among those with Asperger’s syndrome.  The types of difficulties associated with ASD 
may vary according to the age and developmental level of the child.  Ghaziuddin et al. (1998) 
found that ADHD presented more frequently in younger children whereas adolescents tended to 
have higher rates of depression.  Sukhodolsky et al. (2008) found that anxiety was associated 
with higher IQ and functional language use. 
 
Comorbid emotional difficulties such as anxiety and depression may be a direct consequence 
ASD, for example, as a result of underlying biological vulnerabilities (Abramson et al., 1992; 
Piven & Palmer, 1999) or impairments with cognition (particularly executive functioning) and 
self-regulation (Loveland & Tunali-Kotoski, 1997).  However, they may also be an indirect 
consequence, particularly among older and higher-functioning children, resulting from an 
increased awareness of interpersonal differences and facing an increasingly complex social 
milieu as they approach adolescence and begin secondary school (White et al., 2009). 
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1.5 Assessment of ASD 
 
Early diagnosis of ASD is important in helping families come to terms with the diagnosis and to 
ensure that, from an early age, appropriate support is given.  Failure to diagnose ASD can result 
in inappropriate educational provision, inappropriate interventions for comorbid difficulties 
(e.g. that fail to take into account cognitive and linguistic limitations) and inappropriate 
expectations of the child.  Assessment should entail a detailed developmental history, 
observation of behaviour in structured and unstructured settings, assessments of cognition and 
language, and specialist diagnostic instruments such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI; 
Lord et al., 1994), Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) or 
Diagnostic Interview for Social and Communication Disorders (DISCO; Wing et al., 2002).  
Specialist ASD questionnaires or tests may be used (e.g. Social Communication Questionnaire, 
Rutter et al. 2003; Reading Mind in the Eyes test; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Strange Stories 
test; Happé, 1994).  Assessments should be carried out by a multi-disciplinary team and take 
place over different times and settings (Chowdhury, 2009; Howlin, 2010).  These should be 
supplemented by medical investigations such as hearing and vision tests, and genetic testing 
where indicated (Chowdhury, 2009).   
 
As well as establishing whether or not the child meets criteria for ASD, assessment should 
consider other potential diagnoses that may resemble ASD such as hyperkinetic disorder 
(ADHD) or conduct disorder.  Understanding and treating additional difficulties is important, as 
delivering interventions for additional disorders without taking into account ASD and vice versa 
is likely to impede treatment progress.  Detecting or differentiating other diagnoses from ASD is 
complex however, as symptoms such as anxiety and depression may present differently in 
children who have difficulties identifying and communicating their own feelings (Loveland & 
Tunali-Kotoski, 1997).  Nevertheless, it is important that additional difficulties (e.g. aggressive 
behaviour, hyperactivity, anxiety and depression) are understood and treated, as this can 
positively impact on overall quality of life and long-term outcome (Ghaziuddin, 2002).  
 
1.6 Treatment of ASD 
 
There is no ‘cure’ for autism.  Instead, interventions focus on improving functioning by 
targeting core deficits and working with children and families to learn skills to compensate for 
Service Evaluation Project 
137 
 
these impairments.  A vast number of interventions have been developed, which can be divided 
into those that are behaviour-based, communication-based and those that focus on improving 
social and emotional competence and understanding (Howlin, 2010).  Psychological 
interventions are also needed to treat comorbid difficulties (e.g. anxiety and depression) and 
may be adapted to accommodate difficulties individuals with ASD may face in psychological 
therapy. 
 
At present, there is no evidence that one intervention for ASD is superior to others.  It is also 
evident that there are large individual differences in response to these interventions, therefore 
emphasis is gradually shifting from ‘what works best’ to finding out which interventions work 
better for which children and under which circumstances (Howlin, 2010).  As well needs 
varying between individuals, they may also vary over time and there is a need for services 
which monitor and adapt to these changing needs over the years (Howlin, 2010). 
 
1.7 Autism and transition to adulthood 
 
Autism is a lifelong condition and adulthood poses additional challenges in terms of 
employment, relationships, housing and independence.  In recent years, outcomes for adults 
with autism have improved (e.g. in employment, independent living and meaningful social 
relationships), reflecting better education and therapy provision (Howlin, 1997).  However, 
many adults with autism still rely heavily on others for support and, compared with children and 
adolescents, support for adults with ASD is lacking (Howlin et al., 2004).  This means that 
when adolescents with autism reach eighteen, they risk ‘slipping through the net’, being 
discharged from services without being picked up by an appropriate service.  
 
The Autism Act 2009 was developed with the aim of improving outcome and quality of life for 
adults with autism.  This led to the development of the Autism Strategy (Department of Health, 
2010) which outlines plans to increase understanding and awareness of the condition, improve 
recognition and diagnosis in adults and promote greater opportunities for adults with autism to 
live fulfilling and rewarding lives.  One of the objectives of the strategy is to plan for the 
provision of services to support people with ASD in the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood and support to access independent living and employment. 
 





In recent years, there has been a growing awareness of the prevalence and complexity of ASD.  
As well as an increased understanding of the wide variation in manifestation and severity of 
symptoms, there is a growing recognition of the additional difficulties faced by individuals (e.g. 
high rates of comorbid medical and psychiatric conditions and social difficulties), which 
contribute to complexity.  Early diagnosis is crucial in order to help families come to terms with 
diagnosis, for appropriate support to be put in place early on and to minimise the impact of ASD 
on the individual’s functioning.  Diagnosis is a complex process, particularly where difficulties 
are not clear cut or where comorbidities are present.  There is a corresponding need for 
specialist services with expertise in ASD and related difficulties to carry out assessment and 
treatment of more complex cases.  Services also need to recognise individual variation over 
time, and to ensure that support is continued during the potentially problematic transition from 
adolescence to adulthood.   
 
 
2. The Autism and Related Disorders team 
 
The Autism and Related Disorders (ARD) team is a National Specialist Child and Adolescent 
Service, based at the Michael Rutter Centre in South East London, part of South London and 
Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust.  The service receives referrals from across the UK 
and offers multidisciplinary assessment and management of complex cases of ASD.  This 
includes where there are complex diagnostic issues, additional medical or psychiatric difficulties 
or when a second opinion is being sought.  The team also offers consultation to other services, 
genetic counselling, treatment and support and advice to families, including parenting support. 
 
A team intake day occurs each week when a new case is seen for assessment.  Prior to 
assessment, an intake summary is compiled outlining details of the referral and information 
from self-report measures that are sent out before the assessment, including the Social 
Communication Questionnaire, Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 
1997), Developmental and Well-being Assessment (DAWBA; Goodman et al., 2000) and the 
Conners’ Rating Scales-Revised (Conners, 2004).  As well as providing further information 
about the child’s social communication difficulties, these additional measures highlight 
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potential differential diagnoses.  The Autism Diagnostic Interview is typically carried out with 
caregivers prior to the team intake day. 
 
On the intake day, the multidisciplinary team meets with the family to gather information and 
expectations from the day, after which the psychiatrist obtains a developmental history from 
caregiver(s).  A clinical psychologist meets with the child separately, usually to carry out a 
cognitive assessment, along with a psychological assessment interview and other relevant 
psychometric measures where indicated.  The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule is 
carried out in the second half of the day, which is a standardised assessment protocol for 
assessing social communication.  It involves a series of structured and semi-structured tasks 
which aim to elicit social interaction between the individual and the examiner.  The qualities of 
target behaviours are then rated by the team to form a consensus score.  At the end of the day, 
the multidisciplinary team meets to discuss formulation and diagnosis before meeting with the 
family to give feedback and recommendations, which may include further assessment or 
intervention. 
 
Further assessment may involve school or home visits, further neuropsychological assessment 
or medical investigations such as cytogenetic testing.  Interventions may include 
psychoeducation, medication, CBT, social skills training, behavioural interventions, specialist 
educational advice, parenting interventions, behavioural management advice to schools and 
families, educational advice or consultation and advice to referring agencies.  A parenting group 
is run twice a year.  Further assessment or intervention may be carried out by the ARD service 
or may be recommended for local services. 
 
2.1 Aims and hypotheses 
 
The ARD service strives to continually evolve to meet the needs of its clients in terms of 
assessment and treatment.  By understanding and monitoring the demographic, clinical and 
service characteristics, it is hoped that the service will be better equipped to adapt to meet the 
needs of this population and their families.  It also allows recommendations to be made for ways 
in which the service may be improved.  The primary aim of this audit was therefore to establish 
the demographic and clinical characteristics of children and adolescents referred to the ARD 
team over a three-year period, as well as information about service provision.   




As a national and specialist service, it is important that local services are equipped to diagnose 
and manage more straightforward cases and that the ARD team can dedicate time and resources 
to the most complex cases.  A secondary aim was therefore to explore change in these 
characteristics over a three-year period, in particular looking at clinical complexity.  An 
increased complexity of referred cases would suggest that local services were more skilled at 
diagnosing more ‘straightforward’ cases and increasingly only referring more complex cases.  It 
also may reflect an increasing unwillingness of local services to refer to costly tier four services 
due to funding restrictions, unless such cases are particularly complex. 
 
It was hypothesised that population would be clinically complex, with high rates of comorbidity 
and additional needs (e.g. social difficulties).  It was also hypothesised that complexity would 
have increased over time, suggesting an improvement in local services’ skills in diagnosing and 
treating less complex cases and/or an unwillingness to refer due to funding restrictions, and 
consequently increasingly referring more complex cases.  This may also be reflected in an 




















3.1 Data collection and participants 
 
A retrospective case note review was carried out on 110 consecutive referrals to the service over 
a three-year period between July 2007 and July 2010.  An additional 22 cases from this audit 
period were excluded due to the majority of data being missing (e.g. the family did not attend, 
the referral was a brief follow-up; N = 10) or files not being available (N = 12).  Data were 
collected from paper files and the electronic Patient Journey System (ePJS).  They were 
recorded initially by hand using a data collection pro forma (See Appendix) and subsequently 
entered into an SPSS database for analysis.  To ensure anonymity of the data, a unique, 
randomly generated identification number was allocated to each participant, which appeared on 
the data collection pro forma and database.  A separate key sheet containing corresponding 
identifying details (e.g. name, date of birth) was stored securely and only accessible by the 
researchers.  Approval to carry out the audit was granted by the South London and Maudsley 




An overview of data collected from case notes is provided in Table 1.  Referral information was 
derived from correspondence prior to assessment.  Clinical and service characteristics were 
derived from the medical assessment and ADI reports.  Family history of ASD was indexed by 
the mention of ASD diagnosis or traits in family members.  Level of risk was attained using the 
SLaM risk assessment questionnaire and operationalised as the number of areas (out of six) in 
which risk was assessed to be ‘medium’ or higher.  Clinical severity was assessed using the 
Children’s Global Assessment Scale (CGAS; Shaffer et al., 1983), a reliable and valid measure 
of overall severity of disturbance.  Scores range from 1 (most functionally impaired) to 100 
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List of variables measured 
Demographics 
• Gender 
• Age at assessment 
• Ethnicity 
• Referral pathways (who, where from, why) 
Clinical characteristics 
• Multi-axial diagnostic profile (using ICD-10 criteria) 
• Clinical severity measured by Childhood Global Assessment Scale (CGAS) 
• Age at which first concerns noted 
• Developmental milestones (presence of overall developmental delay, language 
delay or regression/loss of skills) 
• Family history of ASD 
• Involvement of Social Services and Youth Offending Team (YOT) 
• History of psychological treatment 
• Level of risk 
• Overall clinical complexity composite score 
Service related issues 
• Mean waiting time for assessment 
• Number of professionals involved in assessment 
• Assessments used 
• Treatment recommended or offered 
Table 1. Overview of data collected from case note reviews. 
 
Overall clinical complexity was operationalised by computing a complexity composite score for 
each case.  This was done by selecting 11 variables believed to be indicative of complexity (e.g. 
comorbidity or additional service involvement) and calculating how many complexity indicators 
were present for each (Table 2).  Scores were coded as 1 if the complexity indicator was present 
and 0 if absent.  Overall complexity scores were then computed by adding the total number of 
complexity indicators for each case, which ranged from 0 to 11, with higher scores indicating a 
higher level of clinical complexity. 
 
Composite measure of complexity 
Psychiatric comorbidity (more than one diagnosis on axis 1) 
Having a specific learning difficulty (axis 2) 
Having a learning disability (axis 3) 
Having a medical condition (axis 4) 
Presence of issues in the social environment (axis 5) 
Having a CGAS score below 50 (indicating higher severity) 
Scoring ‘medium’ or higher in 3 or more areas on the SLaM risk assessment 
Involvement of Social Services 
Involvement of police, YOT or forensic services 
Having a Statement of Special Educational Need 
Previous psychological treatment 
Table 2. Variables that comprised the composite measure of complexity. 





Descriptive statistics were obtained for the whole sample (N = 110), including demographic and 
referral information, complexity of clinical presentation and service-related issues.  Subgroup 
analyses were conducted to explore differences in particular variables between gender, whether 
or not the child had a PDD diagnosis and change over time.  To explore change over time, a 
‘time point’ variable was created by selecting the first and last 30 cases and coding them as 
either ‘early’ or ‘late’.  The early group represented referrals made between January 2007 and 
June 2008 and the late group were referrals made between July 2009 and May 2010.  
Descriptive data were obtained and compared between groups and statistical analyses of 
difference were performed.  For categorical data, cross-tabulations using Pearson’s chi-square 
were conducted.  Change in ordinal data over time was analysed using either t-tests or Mann-
Whitney U tests, depending on whether or not the data were parametric.  Spearman’s rho 





For each stage of this section, descriptive statistics are presented for the whole sample and then 
for subgroup analyses (time, gender, PDD versus no PDD).  Change over time was investigated 
for all variables.  To explore potential gender differences, males and females were compared on 
age, diagnostic profile, other indicators of complexity and overall complexity.  Those who 
received diagnoses of PDD were compared to those who did not on variables including 
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Of the whole sample (N = 110) The majority of children and adolescents were male (86/100; 
78%), with a male to female ratio of approximately 4:1.  No change in the ratio of males to 




The majority of the sample was White-British (76%), with 24% belonging to other ethnic 
groups.  It is noted that a higher proportion of non-White-British children were referred in the 
later time period (Figures 1 and 2), although this increase was not statistically significant, χ2(1) 
= 1.27, p = .218. 
 
 
Figure 1. Ethnicities of children and adolescents referred during the early time period (Jan ’07-
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Figure 2.  Ethnicities of children and adolescents referred during the later time period (July ’09-
May ’10; N = 30). 
 
4.1.3 Age at assessment  
 
The mean age at assessment was 11.5 years (SD = 3.63), with no difference between males and 
females, t(101) = .054, p = .957.  Participants were significantly older in the later time period, 
with the mean age increasing from 10.9 (SD = 3.7) to 12.8 years (SD = 3.6), t(58) = -2.07, p = 
.043.  A chi-squared analysis also showed that there was a higher number of secondary school 
age children (>10 years) in the late group than in the early group and a smaller number of 
primary school age children (≤10 years), χ2(1) = 4.8, p = .028, which is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of children under and over ten years old referred to the service over two 
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Table 3 presents an overview of referral pathways to the clinic, including reason for referral, 
source of referral and referral region.  Referrals were most frequently made by a child and 
adolescent psychiatrist (48.1%) for an assessment of possible ASD (76.6%).  The majority of 
referrals were national referrals (62.9%), predominantly coming from other parts of London and 
the South East.   
 




Referral source  



















Referral region  
• Local (SLaM) 
• National (non-SLaM) 
o London  
o South East 
o Other national 


















Reason for referral  
• ASD assessment 
• Treatment/advice 
• Review 












Table 3. Referral pathways to the clinic for whole sample and comparison of early and late time 
periods. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 compare referral regions across time, and illustrate a significant increase in local 
(from SLaM) compared with national (non-SLaM) referrals across the three-year period.  There 
were significantly more local referrals in later period and fewer national referrals, χ2(1) = 10.34, 
p = .001. 
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Figure 4. Referral regions for the early time period (Jan ’07-June ’08; N = 30). 
 
Figure 5. Referral regions for the late time period (July ’09-Apr ’10; N = 30). 
 
4.1.5 Summary of demographic and referral information 
 
The majority of children and adolescents referred to the clinic were White-British males.  The 
mean was age eleven and a half, although children tended to be older in the later time period.  






Time period: Early 
SLaM 











Service Evaluation Project 
148 
 
4.2 Clinical Characteristics 
 
4.2.1 Diagnostic profiles and comorbidity: whole sample 
 
Table 4 provides an overview of the multi-axial diagnostic profile of children and adolescents.  
It shows a high level of comorbidity, with 67.3% of the sample having more than one axis one 
diagnosis and the mean number of axis one diagnoses being 2.14 (SD = 1.23).  Nearly three 
quarters (72.9%) of the sample met criteria for a pervasive developmental disorder.  Of the 
whole sample, 37.1% had a specific disorder of psychological development (e.g. specific 
language or motor disorder) and 18.1% had a learning disability.  There was a high rate of 
medical comorbidity (with a range of disorders such as epilepsy, tuberous sclerosis, 
macrocephaly, hearing impairment, Down’s syndrome, diabetes), and a very high proportion 
(86.7%) of children had issues present in their social environment (e.g. anomalous parenting, 
intrafamilial discord, family mental health or developmental problems, bullying).  The mean 
CGAS score was 47.6 (SD = 9.7), which falls under ‘moderate degree of interference in 
functioning in most social areas or severe impairment in functioning in one area’ (Shaffer et al., 
1983). 
 
Multi-axial diagnostic profile Whole sample (N = 107) 
Axis 1  
• Mean number of diagnoses 
• Met criteria for PDD 
• Percentage with comorbidity 
Axis 2 (Specific disorder of psychological 
development) 
Axis 3 (Learning disability) 
Axis 4 (Medical condition 
Axis 5 (Issues in social environment) 
Mean CGAS score 
 








47.6 (SD = 9.7; N = 86) 
Table 4. Multi-axial diagnostic profile for whole sample. 
 
Figure 6 shows the breakdown of PDD diagnoses for the whole sample.    The most frequently 
made PDD diagnosis was ‘other pervasive developmental disorder’ (38%), followed by 
childhood autism (21%), Asperger’s syndrome (18%), pervasive developmental disorder 
unspecified (13%), atypical autism (9%) and childhood disintegrative disorder (1%).   
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Figure 6. Distribution of PDD diagnoses for whole sample (N = 78). 
 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of axis one diagnoses for the whole sample.  The most common 
diagnoses aside from PDD were hyperkinetic disorder (35.9%) and conduct disorder (25.5%).  
These were followed by obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; 16.3%), depression (12.6%), tic 
disorders (13.6%), other anxiety disorders (e.g. separation anxiety and generalised anxiety 
disorder; 11.7%), social phobia (7.8%), enuresis or encopresis (7.8%), elective mutism (2.9%) 
and ‘other’ (e.g. psychosis, bipolar affective disorder, childhood emotional disorder; 4.6%). 
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4.2.2 Multi-axial diagnostic profile and comorbidity: change over time 
 
Table 5 compares data on multi-axial diagnostic profile and comorbidity between the early and 
late time periods.  Overall, there was little change in diagnostic profile over time.  There were 
comparable rates of axis one comorbidity, diagnoses of PDD, medical comorbidity, presence of 
issues in social environment and overall clinical severity.  However, fewer young people 
presented with a learning disability in the late than in the early time period (0% versus 20.7% 
respectively), χ2(1) = 6.91, p = .012.  This suggests that a greater number of cognitively higher-
functioning children are being seen in the later time period. 
 
 Early (N = 30) Late (N = 30) 
Axis 1  
 Met criteria for PDD 
 Mean number of diagnoses  
 Percentage with comorbidity 
(more than 1 axis 1 disorder)  
Axis 2 (Specific disorder of 
psychological development  
Axis 3 (Learning disability) 
Axis 4 (Medical condition) 
Axis 5 (Issues in social 
environment) 
Mean CGAS score 
 
23/30 (79.3%)  
2.36 (SD = 1.45; N = 28) 
 







47.63 (SD = 9.14; N = 19) 
 
21/30 (72.4%)  
2.24 (SD = 1.09; N = 29) 
 







46.85 (SD = 7.35; N = 28) 
Table 5. Comparison of multi-axial diagnostic profiles over the two time periods. 
 
Figure 8 shows distribution of axis diagnoses over time.  Significantly fewer tic disorders were 
seen in the later time period, χ2(1) = 5.22, p = .026, although there was no significant change 
over time for other diagnoses. 
 




Figure 8. Distribution of axis 1 diagnoses over the early (N = 29) and late (N = 29) time periods. 
 
4.2.3 Multi-axial diagnostic profile and comorbidity: comparison by gender 
 
Table 6 compares the multi-axial diagnostic profile between males and females.  Males had a 
significantly higher rate of comorbidity, χ2(1) = 4.84, p = .031, and a higher mean number of 
diagnoses, U = 580.500, z = -3.364, p = .001.  However, there was no difference in the rate of 
PDD diagnoses, the rate of diagnoses on axes 2-5, or overall clinical severity.  There were no 
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Multi-axial profile Male (N = 83) Female (N = 23) 








• Childhood autism 




• Asperger’s syndrome 
• PDD other 
• PDD unspecified 
• Risk 
















3.06 (SD=1.47; N=52) 
















2 (SD=1.08; N=13) 
Table 6. Comparison of multi-axial diagnostic profiles between males and females. 
 
Figure 9 compares the distribution of axis one diagnoses by sex.  Males had a significantly 
higher rate of tic disorder, χ2(1) = 3.904, p = .038, hyperkinetic disorder, χ2(1) = 10.31, p = .001, 
and conduct disorder, χ2(1) = 5.775, p = .011.  Females had a higher rate of social phobia, χ2(1) 
= 5.185, p = 0.04.   
 
 
























Axis 1 diagnosis 
Male 
Female 
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4.2.4 Multi-axial diagnostic profile by PDD diagnosis 
 
Table 7 compares the multi-axial diagnostic profiles between children who received a diagnosis 
of PDD and those that did not.  Children who received a diagnosis of PDD had significantly 
higher rate of comorbidity than those who did not, χ2(1) = 6.183, p = 0.14.  They also had a 
significantly higher level of overall clinical severity score on the CGAS, U = 491.500, z = -
2.276, p = .023.  There were no significant differences between the two groups in rates of 
diagnoses on axes 2-5. 
 
 No PDD diagnosis (N = 29) PDD diagnosis (N = 76) 
Mean no. of diagnoses 
%Comorbidity 
• Axis 2 
• Axis 3 
• Axis 4 
• Axis 5 
• Mean CGAS 
1.39 (SD = 1.13; N = 28) 





51.52 (SD = 11.93; N = 23) 






46.14 (SD = 8.48; N = 63) 
Table 7. Comparison of multi-axial diagnostic profiles between those who received a diagnosis 
of PDD and those who did not. 
 
Figure 10 compares the distribution of axis 1 diagnoses between those who received a diagnosis 
of PDD and those who did not.  Those without a PDD diagnosis had a significantly higher rates 
of enuresis or encopresis, χ2(1) = 5.905, p = .028.  No significant differences were found for 
other diagnoses.  
 




Figure 10. Comparison of percentages of axis 1 diagnosis distribution between those who 
received a diagnosis of PDD (N = 77) and those who did not (N = 27). 
 
4.2.5 Age and psychiatric comorbidity 
 
A Spearman’s rho correlation was performed to explore whether certain conditions were 
associated with the child’s age group.  Older children (over 10 years old) were more likely to 
receive diagnoses of depression (r = .257, p = .005), OCD (r = .203, p = .022), social phobia (r 
= .178, p = .039) and ‘other’ anxiety disorders (r = .275, p = .003).  Younger children (10 years 
or younger) were more likely to have hyperkinetic disorder (r = -.318, p = .001), oppositional or 
conduct disorder (r = -.218, p = .015) and enuresis or encopresis (r = -.196, p = .026). 
 
4.2.6 Other indicators of complexity of clinical presentation  
 
This section examines other variables thought to contribute towards complexity of clinical 
presentation.  Table 8 shows the proportion of children with developmental delay for the whole 
sample and for the early and late time points.  Overall, 62.6% of the sample had delayed 
milestones and 46.9% had delayed language development.  Regression or loss in skills were 
reported in 20% of the sample.  For most children, concerns were first noted when the child was 
approximately 1-2 years old.  A significantly higher rate of developmental delay was found in 





















Axis 1 disorder 
PDD yes 
PDD no 
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 Whole sample  
(N = 109) 
Early (Jan ’07-
June’08; N = 26) 
Late (Jul ’09 – May 
’10; N = 29) 
Developmental delay  
Delayed language  
Regression or loss of 
skills  






13-24 months  
(N = 97) 
20/26 (76.9%) 
15/26 (57.7%)  
 
7/23 (30.4%) 
12 months  
(N = 24) 
14/29 (48.3%)  
11/28 (39.3%)  
 
4/28 (14.3%)  
0-12 & 13-24 
months* (N = 28) 
Table 8. Developmental profile for whole sample and comparisons between early and late time 
periods.  *Multiple modes exist therefore both are shown. 
 
Table 9 shows other complexity indicators for the whole sample in terms of additional support 
from other services (Social Services and police/YOT), previous psychological treatment and 
level of risk assessed. 
 
 Whole sample Early Late 
Social services 
involvement 
YOT Involvement  
Statement of 
Educational Needs  
Previous treatment 
SLaM risk  
assessment  
 
31/105 (29.5%)  
11/105 (10.5%)  
 
55/103 (53.4%)  
35/90 (38.9%) 
2.85 (SD = 1.46; N = 
65) 
 












14/30 (46.7%)  
3.14 (SD = 1.49; N = 
21) 
Table 9. Other complexity indicators for whole sample and across the two time points. 
 
Children in the early time period had significantly more social services involvement than the 
later time period, χ2(1) = 6.356, p = 0.12, and were more likely to have a Statement of Special 
Educational Need, χ2(1) = 12.98, p = .000.  Children in both groups were comparable in terms of 
police or YOT involvement, prior psychological therapy and risk. 
 
No differences were found when comparing males and females on Social Services, Police or 
YOT involvement, previous psychological treatment or having a Statement of Special 
Educational Need.  However, males had a higher overall level of risk than females (3.06 versus 
2.00 respectively), t(24.53) = 2.92, p = .007.        
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4.2.7 Family history of ASD 
 
Table 10 presents data on the family history of ASD for the whole sample (indexed by having 
relatives with an ASD diagnosis or showing ASD traits).  Approximately one third of the 
sample had a family history of ASD. 
 
Whole sample Number (percentage) 
Family history of ASD 32/103 (33.3%) 
Sibling(s) with ASD 15/103 (14.6%) 
Parent(s) with ASD 12/102 (11.8%) 
Other relative with ASD 16/103 (15.5%) 
Table 10. Family history of ASD for whole sample. 
  
Of those who received a diagnosis of PDD, rates of family history of ASD were comparable 
with the whole sample (Table 11).   
 
PDD diagnosis Number (percentage) 
Family history 23/74 (33.8%) 
Sibling(s) with ASD 10/74 (13.5%) 
Parent(s) with ASD 9/73 (12.3%) 
Other relative with ASD 12/74 (16.2%) 
Table 11. Family history for those who received a diagnosis of PDD. 
 
4.2.8 Overall clinical complexity 
 
A complexity composite score was computed for the whole sample and compared across the 
two time points.  This comprised the total number of complexity indicators present for each 
child including: having more than one axis 1 disorder; disorder(s) on axes 2-5; a CGAS score of 
less than 50; previous psychological treatment; social services, police or YOT involvement; 
‘medium’ or higher scores in three or more areas on a measure of risk; and having a Statement 
of Educational Need.  Overall the mean complexity score was 4.86 (SD = 1.95, range = 0-10) 
and there was no significant change in complexity over time, U = 349, z = -1.523, p = .128.  
There was no difference in overall complexity between those who received a diagnosis of PDD 
and those who did not, U = 1031, z = -.711, p = .477.  However males had a significantly higher 
complexity score than females, U = 720.5, z = -2.284, p = .022. 
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4.86 (SD = 1.95; N = 110) 
Early 5.2 (SD=1.83; N=30) 
Males 5.08 (SD=1.96, N=86) 
Yes 5.08 (SD=1.69; N=78) 
 
Late 4.73 (SD=1.68; N=30) 
Females 4.08 (SD=1.72; N=24) 
4.69 (SD=1.91; N=29) 
Table 12. Complexity composite scores for the whole sample and then broken down by time 




The sample was characterised by a clinically complex presentation in terms of high psychiatric 
and medical comorbidity, social difficulties and a moderate degree of interference in 
functioning.  Overall clinical complexity remained stable over time although changes were seen 
in individual clinical characteristics (e.g. lower rates of learning disability, fewer tic disorders, 
lower rates of developmental delay and additional service need).  A relatively high proportion 
(one third) of cases had a family history of ASD diagnosis or traits.  Subgroup analyses revealed 
differences in clinical presentation between males and females and those with and without a 
PDD diagnosis.   
 
4.3 Service-related characteristics 
 
Table 13 summarises service-related characteristics for the whole sample.  The mean waiting 
time for assessment was 111 days and mean waiting time for reports was 94 days.  On average, 
five professionals tended to be involved in assessments, which typically included a consultant 
child and adolescent psychiatrist, specialist trainee registrar (STR), senior house officer (SHO), 
clinical psychologist and trainee clinical psychologist.  The mean number of psychometric tests 
was 2, which tended to be tests of intellectual ability and educational attainment.  Very few 
ASD specific tests were used (e.g. Reading the Mind in the Eyes, Strange Stories).  A full risk 
assessment was completed in 67.4% cases.  Intervention was recommended in almost 9 out of 
10 cases, which was predominantly psychological intervention (e.g. CBT, behavioural 
management advice), followed by educational interventions (e.g. advice), medical interventions 
(e.g. medication for hyperkinetic disorder) and ‘Other’ (e.g. social skills training, family 
therapy).  In approximately one quarter of cases it was explicitly stated that the ARD team 
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would implement the intervention.  Further assessment was recommended in two thirds of cases 
(e.g. medical investigations, neuropsychological assessment, home or school visits). 
 
 Whole sample (N = 105) 
Waiting time for assessment (days) 
Waiting time for report (days) 
Number of professionals involved 
No. of assessments used 
ASD specific measures 







ARD to offer (but not clear) 
Recommendations for further 
assessment 
111 (SD = 60; N = 88) 
94 (SD = 55.60; N = 82) 
4.58 (SD = .979; N = 102) 
2.23 (SD = 1.958; N = 105) 











Table 13. Service provision characteristics for whole sample. 
 
Table 14 compares service-related characteristics over time.  The mean waiting time for both 
assessments and reports decreased although this was not statistically significant, U = 268.5, z = -
1.83, p = .067 and U = 201, z = -1.161, p = .246 respectively.  The number of professionals 
involved in assessments remained the same.  However, the number of psychometric tests 
administered increased, U = 81.5, z = -5.602, p = .000, as well as the use of ASD specific tests, 
U = 251.5, z = -3.514, p = .000.  It appears that risk assessments were being completed more 
frequently in the later time period, although this increase was not significant, χ2(1) = .355, p = 
.383.   
 
In terms of plans and recommendations, no significant differences were found over time.  
However, it appears that further assessments are being recommended less frequently and 
interventions are being recommended more frequently.  Furthermore, it seems that medical 
interventions (e.g. medication) are being recommended less frequently, and educational 
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 Early (N = 30) Late (N = 30) 
Waiting time for assessment 
(days) 
Waiting time for report (days) 
Number of professionals 
involved in assessment 
No. of assessments used 
ASD specific assessments 






ARD to offer (but not clear) 
Rec. for further assessment 
132.69 (SD = 65.29; N = 26) 
 
105.62 (SD = 60.65; N = 21) 
 
4.78 (SD = 1.25;  N = 27) 
1.14 (SD = 0.79; N = 29) 









100.79 (SD = 31.95; N = 29) 
 
79.92 (SD = 43.94; N = 24) 
 
4.7 (SD = 0.70; N = 30) 
3.9 (SD = 2.47; N = 30) 









Table 14. Service provision characteristics across two time points. 
 
4.3.1 Summary of service-related findings 
 
Service characteristics largely remained stable over time although there was a significant 
increase in the number of neuropsychological assessments administered.  Most children were 
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5. Discussion and clinical implications 
 
The present audit aimed to obtain an overview of the demographic, clinical and service 
characteristics of children and adolescents referred to the ARD Team and to explore change in 
these variables over time.  Understanding and monitoring these characteristics helps services 
adapt to meet the needs of the population it serves.  In this section, key findings will be 
discussed along with limitations and research and clinical implications from the audit. 
 
5.1 Demographics and referrals 
 
The majority of children and adolescents referred to the clinic were White-British and male.  
The male to female ratio of 4:1 reflects that of ASD in the general population (Fombonne, 2005; 
2009).  The service tends to see older children, with the mean age being eleven and a half, the 
age at which most children begin secondary school.  Older children may represent more 
complex or difficult to diagnose cases as ASD difficulties may have been particularly subtle, 
atypical in presentation or, in the earlier years, masked by other difficulties (e.g. hyperkinetic or 
conduct disorder).  This pattern could suggest that referrals are prompted when children enter 
the transitional stage of adolescence and face an increasing number of social and academic 
demands.  The number of secondary school age children increased over time.  This suggests that 
local services may be better at diagnosing younger children and therefore a higher number of 
older children are being referred. 
 
Most referrals were national, originating mainly from other parts of London and the South East, 
and were made most frequently by consultant child and adolescent psychiatrists.  Unexpectedly, 
the number of national referrals decreased over time whereas the number of local referrals 
increased.  This increase may have been due in part to an agreement made with a local service 
in Croydon from which a series of referrals were received from in 2010, coinciding with the 
later time period.  However, given findings of the increasing number of older children and those 
with potentially more subtle impairments being referred, it may also reflect local services 
referring such cases at a greater rate. 
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5.2 Clinical characteristics 
 
Nearly three quarters of the children assessed in clinic met criteria for a pervasive 
developmental disorder, the most common of which was ‘other pervasive developmental 
disorder’.  As expected, there was a high rate of comorbidity with other axis one disorders, 
particularly hyperkinetic disorder, anxiety disorders and oppositional or conduct disorders.  The 
overall psychiatric comorbidity rate of 67.3% is similar to that found by Ghaziuddin et al. 
(1998) of 65% and Simonoff et al. (2008) of 70.8%.  The rate of hyperkinetic disorder (35.9%) 
was higher than that of 28.3% found by Simonoff et al. (2008) although similar to Ghaziuddin 
et al.’s (1998) finding of 37% among children with Asperger’s syndrome.  There was a high 
rate of anxiety disorders (28.6%) which is lower than the estimated rate of 41.9% in Simonoff et 
al.’s (2008) study although substantially higher than among children and adolescents in the 
general population of 5% (King & Ollendick, 1997), and the rate of OCD was double that of 
Simonoff’s study.  The proportion of children with oppositional defiant or conduct disorder was 
also high (25.5%) although lower than the estimated rate of 30% found in Simonoff et al.’s 
(2008) study.  The rate of depression in the present audit of 12.6% was higher than Simonoff et 
al.’s (2008) study (1.4%) although is lower than the rate of 17% found by Kim et al. (2000) and 
37% found among children with Asperger’s syndrome (Ghaziuddin et al. 1998). 
 
The sample was also complex in terms of presence of diagnoses on other axes.  Specific 
disorders of psychological development were common and one fifth had a learning disability, 
which is lower than population prevalence which is estimated to range from 25.8 to 71.3% 
(O’Brien & Pearson, 2004).  Nearly two thirds had a comorbid medical condition and a high 
number of children had issues present in their social environment; such as anomalous parenting 
and familial discord, parental mental health difficulties and bullying.   With regard to overall 
clinical severity, the mean CGAS score corresponded to a ‘moderate degree of interference in 
functioning in most social areas or severe impairment in functioning in one area’ (Shaffer et al., 
1983).   
 
Over time, there was little change in the clinical characteristics of children and adolescents.  A 
lower rate of tic disorders was found in the late time period although there was no significant 
change over time in other diagnoses.  However, exploratory analyses revealed that hyperkinetic 
disorder was more common in younger children whereas depression and anxiety disorders were 
more prevalent among older children.  This is consistent with existing literature suggesting that 
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the types of diagnoses presenting alongside ASD vary according to the child’s age and 
developmental stage (Ghaziuddin et al., 1998; Sukhodolsky et al., 2008).  There was a decrease 
over time in the number of children with learning disabilities, indicating an increase over time 
in the number of children who were cognitively high-functioning.  Males had a higher rate of 
psychiatric comorbidity than females and were more likely to have diagnoses of tic disorders, 
hyperkinetic disorder and conduct disorder.  Females were more likely to have social phobia.  
Those who received a diagnosis of PDD also had a higher rate of comorbidity and a higher level 
of clinical severity on the CGAS than those who did not.   
 
Over time, there was a decrease in the rate of developmental delay, a key diagnostic criterion for 
ASD.  A lower rate of developmental delay suggests subtler yet impairing difficulties that are 
more difficult for local services to diagnose.  Children in the early time period also had a higher 
rate of social services involvement and were more likely to have a Statement of Educational 
Need.  This could reflect a social worker having left the team during the sampling period and 
therefore standard questions to assess level of risk not being asked.  Approximately one third of 
the sample had a family history of ASD diagnoses or traits.  Males and females were 
comparable on these characteristics although males had a higher level of risk.   
 
Contrary to expectations, there was no change in the composite measure of clinical complexity 
over time.  It is possible that this represents consistently high levels of complexity which may 
be expected for a National and Specialist service.  However, on reflection it may have also 
reflected an inadequate operationalisation of complexity, which was therefore insensitive to 
change.  Clinical complexity was defined in terms of additional needs and difficulties and a 
higher level of clinical severity.  However, complexity in ASD may potentially be better 
conceptualised as difficulty in receiving an accurate diagnosis due to have more atypical or 
subtle manifestations that have gone undetected or been masked by other difficulties.  Males 
had a higher complexity score than females.   
 
Although there was no change in the overall complexity score, some of the variables which 
changed over time may be indicators of complexity in ASD.  For example, that children tended 
to be older over time implies that an increasing number of children are being seen whose 
symptoms had gone undetected for longer and therefore were perhaps harder to detect by local 
services earlier on.  Symptoms may become more apparent as children face the difficult 
transitional stage of adolescence and secondary school and when other difficulties (e.g. anxiety 
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and depression) emerge.  Moreover, an increase in cognitively high-functioning children 
suggests a more complex presentation as greater cognitive and linguistic abilities may conceal 
underlying developmental difficulties.  These demographic and clinical changes may reflect a 
different conceptualisation of complexity in children and adolescents with ASD.  
 
5.3 Service-related characteristics 
 
There was little change over time in service characteristics, with the only significant differences 
being an increase in the number of psychometric assessments carried out.  On inspection of 
descriptive data across the time points it can be seen that waiting times for assessments and for 
reports were lower in the later time period and that the number of risk assessments completed 
was higher.  Although change in these variables was not statistically significant, it is promising 
for future service provision if waiting times continue to decrease and the number of risk 




Aside from the operationalisation of complexity, additional limitations need to be considered 
when drawing conclusions and implications from this audit.  First, 22 cases were excluded, 
which may decrease the representativeness of the findings. Second, particular variables were 
difficult to assess due to information being missing from files or unclear reporting of 
information (e.g. dates of reports, details of diagnoses and treatment recommendations).  Third, 





Three main implications arise from the present audit in terms of the future of the ARD team 
service provision.  First, given that an increasing number of older children are being seen in the 
clinic, it is important that the team has the skills and expertise in working with older children.  
This may include providing support around making transitions into adolescence, coping with 
secondary school and interventions for difficulties associated with increased age such as 
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depression and anxiety.  Second, it is important that support is provided for the transition into 
young adulthood and that young people are linked in with appropriate services when they reach 
eighteen.  Findings highlight the relevance of proposals set out in the recent Autism Act 2009, 
emphasising the need for transition services.  It may be useful for the team to promote 
awareness of these issues to other agencies and provide consultancy in managing them.   
 
Third, although in the present audit some characteristics indicative of clinical complexity 
increased (e.g. age, cognitive ability), it remains important for the ARD team to work with local 
services in developing skills in assessment of less complex cases so that the ARD service can 
dedicate its resources to diagnosing and managing the most complex cases.  Given that the 
number of national referrals has decreased and the number of local referrals increased, the team 
should work to support local services in developing skills in recognising and diagnosing ASD 
among those with subtler presentations (including older children with less obvious impairments) 
It should also aim to promote awareness of the service among national (non-SLaM) services to 
increase national referrals.   
 
It is recommended that in order for the service to develop and to adapt to changes in the needs 
of children and adolescents referred, future audits are conducted assessing further change in 
demographic, clinical and service characteristics.  Improving the recording of variables listed 
above should be considered to make it easier to monitor these characteristics (e.g. diagnoses, 
report dates, treatment provision).  Future research could also investigate more thoroughly what 
constitutes complexity among individuals with ASD and therefore how it can best be 
operationalised.  For example, by investigating factors that complicate diagnosis or treatment 
and using factor analytic methodologies.  It could also look more closely at variables such as 




In conclusion, this audit enables the ARD service to better understand the demographic, clinical, 
characteristics and associated needs of children and adolescents referred, and has highlighted 
areas of potential growth and development.  The young people referred to the service have a 
complex clinical presentation, which is consistent with its purpose.  The service needs to ensure 
it is equipped to recognise and manage issues associated with an increasing number of older 
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children being referred, as well as continuing to meet the needs of younger children.  Results 
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Date of Birth  
Twin? Yes/ No 
Ethnicity and code  





Date of referral  
Reason for referral ASD assessment / TS / Treatment / Other 
Referring source CCAP / Psychology / Paeds/ Other 
County/PCT  
Date of assessment  ADI: 
ADOS: 
Psychometry:  





Background:                                                            
 
First concerns noted Age (months): 
Delayed milestones? Yes/ No / NS 
1) Language delay Yes/ No / NS 
 




2) Motor skills delay Yes/ No / NS 
3) Bladder/ Bowel 
control delay 
Yes/ No / NS 
Regression / Loss of 
skills? 
Yes/ No / NS 
 
 
Current/previous psychological treatment: 
 
Yes / No / NS Circle those that apply: Behavioural therapy/ Cognitive behavioural therapy/ Counselling 















Code ‘D’ if actually diagnosis given; Code ‘T’ if subjective trait given 
 Sibling Mother Father Distant 
ASD     
Developmental Disorders     
Social phobia     
Obsessive compulsive 
Disorder 
    
Other anxiety disorder     
Depression     
Schizophrenia     
BPD     
Anorexia Nervosa     




    
 




Number of services currently or previously involved 
 
CAMHS Yes/ No 
Paeds Yes/ No 
Psychology Yes/ No 
SALT Yes/ No 
OT Yes/ No 
Safeguarding/ LAC/ social care Yes/ No 
Forensic / Police / YOS / YISP Yes/ No 
Other Yes/ No (specify): 
Number (and type) of professionals 
involved in ARD assessment: 
Number: 
Type (please circle): CCAP/ Psychologists / Mental Health 
Worker / Social Worker / SALT / SPR / SHO / TCP / Other: 
 
Educational needs 
           
Does the child attend a mainstream or special 
needs school? 
Mainstream / Special 
 
Does the child have a Special Educational Needs 
statement? 
Yes / No 
 
If not, does the child receive support in school? 
(e.g. School Action and School Action plus, 
LSA/classroom support) 
 






















Mental and behavioural 
disorders due to 




and delusional disorders 
 
F30-F39 
Mood [affective] disorders 
 
F40-F48 







and physical factors 
 
F60-F69 
Disorders of adult 











Behavioural and emotional 
disorders with onset usually 




Unspecified mental disorder 
 
 





















Axis VI psychosocial 

























How many psychometric assessments 
used? 
 
Of these - how many were ASD specific?  
 
IQ test: Yes / No 
 





    
 
Developmental assessment (e.g. Mullen, Bayley, Vineland):  Yes / No 
 








Adaptive behaviour scale:  Yes / No 
 





   
 
Attainment Test: Yes / No 
 
Attainment test and 
subtest used 























Language tests: Yes / No 
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Other neuropsychological test: Yes / No 
 
Neuropsychologi
cal test and 
subtest used 
Date Standard Score Percentile Age equivalent if 

















Additional psychometric tests administered?: Yes / No 
 
Additional Psychometric 




SCQ completed: Yes / No 
SCQ Parent Score:  
 





Positive Impression : probably valid / possibly invalid / probably invalid (circle) 




















Positive Impression : probably valid / possibly invalid / probably invalid (circle) 














     
 
Self Report Connors 
 
Positive Impression : probably valid / possibly invalid / probably invalid (circle) 
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SDQ completed: Yes / No 
     (Score with initials i.e. VH = Very high / VL = Very Low) 
 
SDQ Parent Teacher Self Report 
Overall stress    
Emotional distress    
Behavioural difficulties    
Hyperactivity and attention deficits    
Difficulties getting along with 
others 
   
Kind and helpful behaviour    
Impact of difficulties on young 
person’s life 
   
 
             (Score with initials i.e. Very high etc) 
Diagnostic predictions 
 
Any diagnosis  
Emotional disorder (anxiety/depression etc.)  
Behavioural disorder  
Hyperactivity or concentration disorder  
 
 
DAWBA completed: Yes / No 
 
Who by? Parent / Teacher / YP 
 
Diagnostic Predictions ICD-10 
Autism Spectrum  
Separation Anxiety  
Specific Phobia  





Generalised Anxiety  
Depression  
Deliberate self Harm  




Anorexia / Bulimia  
Tics  
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ADI completed: Yes / No 
 
ADI Algorithm scores  Algorithm 
scores 
A1  B1  
A2  B4  
A3  B2 (v)  
A4  B3 (v)  
Total A cutoff = 10  Verbal Total B cutoff = 8  
  B1  
  B4  
  Non-verbal Total B cutoff = 7  
C1    
C2    
C3    
C4    
Total C cutoff = 3    
Total D cutoff =1     
 
If ADI not fully completed, please give reason: 
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ADOS – Module 1 2 3 4      (circle as appropriate) 
 
ADOS algorithm scores (NB not all will apply to all modules) Module algorithm 
 A1   
 A2   
 A3   
 A4   
 A5   
 A6   
 A7   
 A8   
 A9   
 A10   
 A. Communication Total: 
 B1   
 B2   
 B3   
 B4   
 B5   
 B6   
 B7   
 B8   
 B9   
 B10   
 B11   
 B12   
 B. Social Interaction Total: 
 A+B. Communication + 
Social Interaction Total: 
 C1   
 C2   
 C. Imagination/ Creativity 
Total: 
 D1   
 D2   
 D3   
 D4   
 D5   
 D. SB and RI Total: 
 E1   
 E2   
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Level of risk: 
 




Yes / No 
 
Child protection register (CPR)? (please state 
details) 
Yes / No 
 
Risk in family? E.g. sibling CPR, parental mental 
health or substance misuse 
Yes / No 
 
Number of areas (out of 6) containing scores at or 
above medium risk level: 
 
Further action needed based on risk (e.g. 
assessment/management plan, referral to SS) 

















Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 




Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
Medical treatment (e.g. 
medication) 
 




Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
Other (please specify): 
 
Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
 
Recommendations for further assessment: Yes / No 
 




Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
Cytogenetic testing Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
Other medical (please 
specify): 
Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
Home assessment Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
School assessment Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
Further ASD assessment? Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
Other (specify): Yes / No ARD Team / local service / other team / not specified 
 
 
 
 
